

JAPAN  
AND WORLD PEACE  
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














## **JAPAN AND WORLD PEACE**

**BOOKS BY KAWAKAMI**

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# JAPAN AND WORLD PEACE

BY

K. K. KAWAKAMI

AUTHOR OF "JAPAN IN WORLD POLITICS"

New York

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TO THE MEMORY  
OF  
OUR BELOVED NEPHEW  
SERGEANT ALFRED KRISTOFERSON  
WHO DIED A HEROIC DEATH  
IN THE BATTLE OF THE ARGONNE FOREST  
OCTOBER FIFTEENTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTEEN



"I beg to add another voice to echo the congratulatory speeches that have been made on the presentation of a document which is, perhaps, the most important document that has been compiled by man. The great leaders, with staunch purpose, have personified this great movement, a movement involving intricate problems of divers nations, and they deserve the gratitude of their fellow men for successfully piloting to this advanced stage a most effective instrument for the maintenance of the peace of the world. Their names will be written indelibly on the pages of history, and that will be the grateful acknowledgment of humanity for their labor."

—VISCOUNT NOBUAKI MAKINO  
On the League of Nations





## PREFACE

This little volume is an attempt to describe Japan's place in the League of Nations. I have tried to explain the aspirations and hopes, fears and misgivings, which Japan will entertain under the new world regime, as under the old.

The foremost problem of Japan to-day is the population problem. An intelligent understanding of that question is essential to the appreciation of Japan's policies and activities.

Intertwined with the population question is the matter of Japan's iron and coal supply. With her increasing population sealed up in a small archipelago, Japan sees the only means of solving the problem of overpopulation in the promotion of her industry and the expansion of her foreign trade. In a word, Japan's foremost desire to-day is to become a great industrial and trading nation. But in order to realize this desire Japan must have coal and iron, two essentials of modern industry. Unfortunately, Japan's small territory has little of either in store. She is compelled to seek them in territories not too far from her home land.

Here, in a nutshell, is the condition which furnishes the underlying motives as well as the impelling power to Japan's policies, internal and foreign.

I have devoted a considerable space to Japan's relations with China, because those relations are most vital to the existence of the island nation. In speaking of the prevailing conditions in China, I have, in the past, endeavored to express myself with reserve. But I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the time has come when the world should be informed of the true situation. There is no use in evading the fact that China is utterly incapable of managing her own affairs, and that the civilized nations of the world must come to an agreement with a view to establishing an international guardianship for China.

In concluding this preface, it is my duty as well as my great pleasure to acknowledge my deep obligation to Mr. D. S. Richardson, of Berkeley, California, who has read the manuscript with sympathetic interest.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

### JAPAN'S PART IN THE WAR

PAGE

Why Japan entered the war—The alliance with England—The German menace in the Far East—Bismarck's policy in Asia—The Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril—General von Bernhardt on Japan and China—German intrigue against Japan at the end of the Chino-Japanese war—Germany responsible for the Russo-Japanese war—The Japanese campaign against Kiau-chow—Its far-reaching significance—Military operations against Kiau-chow—How Germany treated the Japanese—How Japan treated the Germans— <i>Bushido</i> the real cause of Japan's kindness to the enemy—Japan's naval operations against Germany—Japanese submarine destroyers in the Pacific—Japan's assistance to Russia—Japanese merchant vessels used by allies—Japan's financial contributions.....	1
---	---

## CHAPTER II

### DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN

The effect of German defeat upon Japanese politics—The new cabinet of Japan—Premier Hara, the "Commoner" of Japan—President Wilson on autocracy—Mr. Root on Japan—The diplomacy of autocracy—Dawn of modernism in Japan—The Oath of Five Articles—Advent of radical doctrines—Prince Ito and the Japanese constitution—The Mikado not an autocrat but a ceremonial head—The Mikado and the Cabinet—The Mikado reigns but does not govern—The extension of suffrage the first requisite of democratising Japan—Labor unions in Japan—Freedom of speech—Socialism in Japan—Japanese socialists against the Russian war—Japan's ability to ad-

	PAGE
just herself to new conditions—Democracy retarded by Japan's constant struggle with aggressive Powers—The apprehension of Japanese advocates of liberalism.....	18

## CHAPTER III

## THE RACE PROBLEM AND THE WORLD LEAGUE

Baron Makino on the League of Nations—Japanese statesmen not in favor of raising the race issue—The race issue forced upon the envoys by popular clamor—Why the Japanese misunderstood Western sentiment—Mr. Wilson inspires the masses of Japan—Japan's population question—Japan's desire for expansion totally different from Germany's—Japan's real objective not free emigration—Japan not spokesman for all Asia—Why the Japanese are skeptical of the world league idea—Japan's disappointment at the Hague Court of Arbitration—The West maintains double standards of justice.....	45
---	----

## CHAPTER IV

## JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Why the masses of Japan clamor for the Pacific islands—Japan's overpopulation the real cause for that clamor—Japanese emigration—Japan has no real colony—Resources of the South Pacific islands—Potash deposits valuable to rice culture in Japan—The Marshall Islands—The Caroline Islands—The islands under the League of Nations.....	63
---	----

## CHAPTER V

## JAPAN AND SIBERIA

Foreign Minister Viscount Motono on Siberia—Japan confers with France and England on the chaos in Siberia—France suggests intervention—Russian views in favor of allied intervention—Bolshevik-German intrigue in Siberia—The Japanese press and the elder statesmen objected to Siberian interven-	
---	--

	PAGE
tion—Ambassador Uchida on Bolshevism—American opposition to intervention—Appearance of Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia—President Wilson changes his attitude—His statement of August 3, 1918—Japan concurs with America—The Japanese statement—The failure of the Wilson policy—Unnecessary sacrifices due to Mr. Wilson's delay—Japanese conduct in Siberia—Foreign Minister Uchida's declaration on Russia—Japan withdraws her troops from Siberia—The disputed question of the Siberian railway—The American agreement with the Kerensky administration—An international control of the Siberian railway—The Monroe Doctrine, American and Japanese.....	72

## CHAPTER VI

### JAPAN AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The American proposal to annex Lower California—The American agitation against Japanese enterprises in Mexico—How Japan faces it—A reflection upon American morals—The duty of the State Department to investigate the Mexican land project—Definition of the Monroe Doctrine—Governor Estaban on the annexation propaganda—General Aguirre on the foreign ownership of Mexican land—The Magdalene Bay Canard—How it was started—Senator Lodge's resolution—The Japanese in Mexico—The German propaganda in Mexico—Japan respects American policy in Mexico.....	93
--	----

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CHAOS IN CHINA

Danger to foreigners in China—The North China Daily News on the Chinese situation—A British view of China's internal warfare—The First and Second Revolutions—The Third Revolution—The Fourth Revolution—Dr. Sun Yatsen and General Li Yung-ting—The situation in Yun-nan—President Wilson's letter to China's new President—Military despotism of the	
--	--

	PAGE
worst type—Military governors worse than feudal chiefs— Arbitrary seizure of railways by generals—Instances of political blackmail—Japan's move to end internal warfare in China....	109

## CHAPTER VIII

### HOW CHINA ENTERED THE WAR

An interview with the leader of Southern Republicans—His views as to why China should not have helped the Entente Powers— A misrepresentation by a Chinese peace envoy—Yuan Shi- kai's imperial designs and his war policy—Japan checks Yuan's ambition—Japan and America advise China to declare war— Why China delayed the declaration of war—Factions fight over the war question—Southern republicans oppose the Cabinet's war policy—The war question plunges China into a civil war—General Chang restores the Manchu dynasty— The fall of General Chang—Southern Republicans still oppose the war policy of the Cabinet—The Cabinet declares war upon Germany—Liang Chi-chao's exposition of China's internal politics—China's motives in entering the war.....	125
--	-----

## CHAPTER IX

### CHINA'S CONTROVERSY WITH JAPAN

The attitude of the new Japanese cabinet towards China—Actions of the Chinese peace delegation—No secret treaties between Japan and China—Kirin forest and mine loan agreement—Pre- mier Tuan's explanation of the same agreement—Manchurian railway agreement—The Japanese Government's statement on the same—Shan-tung railway agreement—The Chino-Japanese military agreement—The Chinese Government's statement on the same—These agreements not proper subjects of discussion at the Peace Congress—China's extraordinary performances at the Peace Congress—The Japanese Premier explains Japan's attitude towards China—Japan has no objection to publishing agreements with China—Why not also discuss at the Peace
--

Congress China's agreements with other nations?—China's real motives in opposing Japan—Discreditable tactics of the Chinese peace envoys.....	143
---	-----

## CHAPTER X

## THE JAPANESE ADVANCE IN CHINA

The Ishii-Lansing understanding—Self-preservation underlying motive of Japanese policy in China—Japan anxious to get iron and coal from China—Japan's precarious industrial structure—Japan's interest in the Han Yeh Ping Company—To solve her population problem Japan must become an industrial nation—The blunder of the "twenty-one demands"—The "group five" of those demands—The supply of arms to China—Foreign advisers to China—The Chino-Japanese treaties of May, 1915—Transformation of Manchuria under Japanese management—Dr. Martin on extritorial rights in China—The fall of the Okuma Cabinet due to its failures in China—The Terauchi Cabinet and China—The Hara Cabinet's policy in China.....	160
--	-----

## CHAPTER XI

## JAPAN AND THE FINANCES OF CHINA

China's singular proposals at the Peace Congress—Her admission of liabilities—China's annual deficit—Financial difficulty main reason for her entrance into the war—Official corruption worse under the new regime—Examples of corruption—China's foreign indebtedness—Japan's share in the same—Japan's economic loans to China—Japan compelled by China to make financial advances—Japan's present financial policy in China defined by the Foreign Office—Wanted: An international supervision of China's finances—President Wilson advises American bankers to withdraw from China—Mr. Wilson reverses that advice—America's new financial policy in China.....	180
---	-----





# JAPAN AND WORLD PEACE

## CHAPTER I

### JAPAN'S PART IN THE WAR

Why Japan entered the war—The alliance with England—The German menace in the Far East—Bismarck's policy in Asia—The Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril—General von Bernhardt on Japan and China—German intrigue against Japan at the end of the Chino-Japanese war—Germany responsible for the Russo-Japanese war—The Japanese campaign against Kiau-chow—Its far-reaching significance—Military operations against Kiau-chow—How Germany treated the Japanese—How Japan treated the Germans—*Bushido* the real cause of Japan's kindness to the enemy—Japan's naval operations against Germany—Japanese submarine destroyers in the Pacific—Japan's assistance to Russia—Japanese merchant vessels used by allies—Japan's financial contributions.

Japan made a modest contribution towards the winning of the war, and asks little or nothing at the Peace Congress.

True, Japan proposed that the covenant of the League of Nations should contain a provision forestalling racial discrimination in future international dealings. But this proposal was made for the sake of principle rather than for Japan's own sake. For she believed it to be in perfect accord with the humanitarian ideals to which allied statesmen had pledged themselves during the war.

True also it is that Japan at first desired to retain the Marshall and Caroline Islands in her possession, provided, of course, other Powers were to hold the German colonies they had seized. But as soon as the mandatory system was suggested by President Wilson, Japan cheerfully consented to place them under the control of the League of Nations.

As for Kiau-chow, the former German territory in China, Japan, as early as May, 1915, irrevocably pledged herself to restore it to China.

Before entering into the discussion of what Japan expected from the Peace Congress and what her position under the new world regime will be, let us see what Japan did for the war.

The reason for Japan's entrance into the war is two-fold. First, she was bound by her alliance with England to declare war upon Germany. And, secondly, she had long regarded Germany as a dangerous factor in the Far East, and had looked upon the German possessions in China as a perpetual menace to the peace of the Orient and to her own safety.

Upon the details of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance we need not enter. We will only say that it was obviously England's right to call upon Japan for aid, while it was Japan's duty to respond to England's call. Read the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance carefully, and you will notice that wherever either high contracting party is attacked by a third Power the other high contracting party is required to come

to its assistance *in the regions of the Far East*. The treaty does not say "aggressive action in the Far East," but "aggressive action wherever arising." The state of affairs described in the treaty had certainly come into existence by the time England asked for Japan's aid, and Japan could not shirk the responsibilities put upon her shoulders by the treaty.

On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war, Sir Conyngham Greene, the British Ambassador to Japan, hurried back to Tokyo from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his Government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities. Baron Kato answered that the question before him was so serious that he could not answer it on his own account.

On the evening of the same day, Count Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of this meeting, Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not evade the responsibilities which she had assumed in entering into alliance with England.

At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to declare war at once. But on August 7 the British Ambassador asked for an interview with

Baron Kato and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed in such a manner as would oblige Japan's immediate entrance upon the war. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the "elder statesmen" and his colleagues to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until 2 o'clock the next morning. Before it adjourned Japan's policy had been definitely formulated.

Even without the obligations of an alliance with England, Japan would have welcomed an opportunity to oust Germany from the Far East. To appreciate the intense feeling entertained by the Japanese against Germany, one must know something of German policy in the Orient during the two decades before the war.

The fundamental principle of German policy in the Orient was voiced by Prince Bismarck when he told Prince von Bulow: "In Russia there is a serious amount of unrest and agitation for territorial expansion which may easily result in an explosion. It would be best for the peace of the world if the explosion took place in Asia, and not in Europe. We must be careful not to stand in the way, otherwise we may have to bear the brunt of it."

In these few words the Iron Chancellor set forth Germany's fundamental policy in the Far East. The conversation took place towards the end of the "eighties" and in the "nineties" this policy began to show itself in German activities in Eastern Asia.

There is not the shadow of a doubt that the prin-

ciple laid down by Bismarck has been closely followed by his successors and the Kaiser. It explains the *raison d'être* of that historic picture of the "Yellow Peril" painted by the versatile German Emperor. It furnishes a key to the general attitude of Germany towards Japan. It shows why Germany seemed always anxious to divert Russia's attention towards the Far East. Even in the anti-Japanese propaganda in America the Kaiser's hand was clearly seen. On the authority of Dr. A. N. Davis, for years physician to the Kaiser, we now know that the malicious rumor that the Japanese are so dishonest as to necessitate the employment of Chinese cashiers by Japanese banks, was also started by the Kaiser or his intriguing *entourages*.

It would be scandalous to presume that the Kaiser was foolish enough to believe that the Japanese, rallying under their sun flag all the fighting forces of Asia, would march across the continent and trample under foot any territory of Europe. Only a perverted mind could conceive such a case. In no other light than that of the fundamental principle upon which Germany's Far Eastern policy is established can we account for the Kaiser's picture of the Yellow Peril.

While, on the one hand, conspiring to divert Russian ambition to the far East, German diplomacy was at work to prevent the establishment of harmonious relations between China and Japan. Says General Friedrich von Bernhardi: "The polit-

ical rivalry between the two nations of the yellow race must be kept alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia." This frank utterance, coupled with the confession of Prince von Bulow, leaves no room to doubt that Germany's Far Eastern policy was based upon the theory that Asia must remain the "happy hunting ground" of European nations.

It was at the end of the Chino-Japanese war that the Kaiser's mailed fist was for the first time lifted against the Japanese. In the middle of April, 1895, Japan, after brilliant victories, concluded a peace treaty with China. On the day the treaty was signed at Shimonoseki between Prince Ito and Li-Hung-Chang, all Japan was celebrating the glorious termination of the war.

Suddenly out of the blue came the report that Germany had approached Russia and France with a view to force the retrocession of the Liao-tung peninsula which China had just ceded to Japan. The report was soon confirmed, and the whole country was stricken with grief and aflame with wrath. Never was Japan's honor so ruthlessly outraged.

On the morning of April 23rd the German, French, and Russian ministers at Tokyo deigned to present themselves, one after the other, at the Foreign Department, each bringing with him a note admonishing Japan for affronting the Powers by taking the

Liao-tung peninsula. The German "advice" was of the most peremptory nature, and the masterful, overbearing manner in which it was handed to the Foreign Department by the Kaiser's envoy is still a topic of occasional conversation among the Japanese. The German Minister brought two copies of the advice, one in German, the other in the Japanese language transcribed in Roman letters.

The note was very brief and bluntly stated that the Japanese occupation of the Liao-tung peninsula was a menace to the Chinese capital and would jeopardize the peace of the Far East. "Therefore," it concluded, "the German Government advises the Japanese Government to abandon the idea of occupying the territory."

The original note even contained such a threatening phrase as this—"Japan is weak, Germany is strong; the outcome of an armed conflict between the two countries is obvious."

Japan was, forsooth, too weak not to heed the "advice." She gave up the Liao-tung peninsula with what grace and dignity she could. And behold! only a few years later, Russia, encouraged and instigated by Germany, appropriated the whole territory of Manchuria, while Germany herself seized the territory of Kiau-chow. With Manchuria and Korea dominated by the Czar, Japan had no alternative to preparing to fight Russia. Japan's titanic struggle with Russia in 1904-5 was the inevitable aftermath of the German intrigue in and after 1895. Japan

holds the Kaiser as much responsible as the Czar for the Manchurian war in which she sacrificed unnumbered lives and untold treasure.

With this historical background before us, we can fully understand why Japan welcomed an opportunity to drive Germany from the Far East.

The campaign against the German territory of Kiau-chow, extremely small in scale as it was, was no easy task for Japan. The impecunious nation was still suffering from the financial burden caused by the Russian war. The Okuma Cabinet had come to power upon the promise to reduce taxation which had been increased in consequence of that war. It had also declared its intention of curbing the influence of the military clique and of retrenching the expenditures of the army. All these promises had to be cast to the winds because of Japan's entrance into the war. The appropriation for the Kiau-chow expedition alone amounted to \$30,000,000, not to speak of the cost of the extensive naval operations required of Japan.

The far-reaching significance of the Kiau-chow campaign will be the more clearly understood if we picture in our minds what would have happened, had Japan decided to sit on the fence. Had she declined to declare war upon Germany, Russia would have had to keep large forces in Siberia; France would have been compelled to garrison Indo-China with several army corps, while Great Britain would have been forced to maintain in the Indian and Pacific



Oceans, for the protection of India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, a fleet equal to that of Japan. Had German cruisers and gunboats, with the splendid harbor of Kiau-chow as their base of operations, marauded in the Pacific and Indian oceans, the transportation of Australian and Indian forces to the scenes of war would have been well-nigh impossible, while British trade in those waters would have been completely paralyzed. With Japan's attitude uncertain, even the United States might not have felt safe in casting her lot with France and England. Under such circumstances, the situation in Europe would have become extremely difficult for the entente Powers.

There is another important aspect of the Kiau-chow campaign which has escaped the serious consideration it deserves. Had Japan delayed her action against Kiau-chow, it was more than probable that the Germans would have raised a large army of Chinese in Shantung, captured the arsenal at Techow on the Tientsin-Nanking line, virtually seized the whole of that province, and thus compelled the Government at Peking to declare war upon the Entente Powers. In the state of disorganization in which China found herself at that time, it was obvious that such a German plan would have easily been put into practice. China would have had to accept the German yoke and been compelled to drive all British and French interests from the country. Only by Japan's prompt declaration of war upon Germany was such an eventuality prevented.

When Japan declared war upon Germany, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, the commander of Kiau-chow, had at his disposal a force of some 13,000 men, of whom 3,000 were German trained. The fortification was reputed to be one of the most formidable in the Orient. Within the harbor was a fleet of German and Austrian gunboats, though the cruisers had already left the port on a marauding cruise.

Against this stronghold Japan sent 30,000 men under the command of Lieutenant-General Kamio. This force was joined by 1,200 British, 800 Wales Borderers, and 800 Indian troops, under the command of General Bannardiston.

On August 25 the first division of the Japanese forces landed at Kiau-chow, and by September 18 the last contingent set foot on Chinese soil.

On August 25 the Japanese fleet, assisted by British warships, effected the blockade of the Bay of Kiau-chow. As the blockading fleet took position off Tsingtau, a typhoon swept the coast, and it was followed by a second and fiercer typhoon that scattered the ships.

On land the Japanese advance was made extremely difficult by rain and flood. During that summer that section of China was flooded as it had not been flooded in sixty years previously. Rivers rose until whole valleys were inundated, while villages of mud houses melted into these lakes. All Shantung was a mud slough after the waters fell, retarding the landing and progress of the Japanese and British forces.

Through sloughs of mud the Japanese reached the shores of Kiau-chow Bay, and farther inland seized a station of the German railway line leading up three hundred miles to the provincial capital of Tsinan-fu. This railway was seized for all its length, because the German garrison had been using it in receiving war materials, food supplies, reservists from all parts of China, and the returning crew of the Austrian cruiser which had been disarmed in early August.

The general attack on the fortification began on October 22, and on November 7 the garrison surrendered to the beseiging forces.

Throughout this campaign the barbarous German treatment of the Japanese in Germany presented a marked contrast to the civilized manner in which the Japanese treated Germans.

Upon the arrival of the Japanese ultimatum in Berlin every Japanese in Germany was clapped into prison. The Japanese Embassy at Berlin was not allowed to communicate with them, nor could they get the list of their names. Some of these Japanese were even robbed of their bank deposits by the Kaiser's Government. Of course, Japanese Government money, amounting to some \$1,250,000, deposited in the Deutsche Bank was immediately confiscated.

Meanwhile, how did the "heathen" Japanese treat the "Christian" Germans? Says the charming American authoress, Miss Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore:

"Simultaneously with the declaration of war the Minister of Home Affairs, alarmed by the savage

ways of war in Christian Europe, issued instructions concerning the protection of German subjects in Japan, securing the same protection of person, property, and honor as before, if they conducted themselves without prejudice to the interests of Japan and her allies. The Minister of Education warned teachers not to make impudent remarks that might arouse the animosity of young students, and urged them to show every kindness and facility to German teachers and students who might be called to the colors. The Chief of Police in Tokyo reminded people that, although the two Governments 'had entered into hostilities for good reasons,' the people of the two countries as individuals should not act against each other in any way, and that the citizens of Tokyo should be more magnanimous than ever to those Germans who chose to remain; that they should not hold public meetings to inspire animosity, but always to be worthy of a civilized country. . . .

"German Government money deposited in Japan was not touched, and the Deutsche Bank in Yokohama continues unhindered in its management. No German property was injured, no German molested. No one's German governess, valet, or employee of any kind was interfered with or imprisoned. Germans naïvely wrote their names in the lists for tennis tournaments, unconscious of the fact that not a British woman or child would tread the same court with them."

This generous conduct of the Japanese towards

the Germans may be somewhat puzzling to Westerners. The superficial even brand it as "pro-German," forgetting that the Japanese were just as generous towards the Russians during the Manchurian war. The Japanese explanation is totally different. From time immemorial *Bushido*, the canon of knightly conduct, taught the Japanese to be kind to his enemy. If you have an opponent, says *Bushido*, beat him, use every effort to that end and spare yourself nothing, but once you have beaten him, then see to it that you make him your friend. Japan has beaten Germany in the Far East. Kiau-chow is in her hands, to be eventually turned over to China. Germany, as far as Japan is concerned, is now completely innocuous; therefore, the Japanese turns to the German and says in effect: "Sir, I admire your courage. I for one have no further use for enmity, let us be friends." Of this national precept the Mikado's exhortation to soldiers and sailors is a fine example. He says:

"The soldier and the sailor should esteem valor. Ever since the ancient times valor has in our country been held in high esteem, and without it Our subjects would be unworthy of their name. How then may the soldiers and the sailors, whose profession is to confront the enemy in battle, forget even for one instant to be valiant? But there is true valor and false. To be incited by mere impetuosity to violent action cannot be called true valor. The soldier and the sailor should have sound discrimination of right

and wrong, cultivate self-possession, and form their plans with deliberation. Never to despise an inferior enemy or fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor—this is true valor. Those who thus appreciate true valor should, in their daily intercourse, set gentleness first and aim to win the love and esteem of others. If you affect valor and act with violence, the world will in the end detest you and look upon you as wild beasts. Of this you should take heed."

To return to Japan's part in the war. Her greater, though more quiet, participation than her land operations against Kiau-chow was on sea. In the first year of the war, the Japanese navy took charge of the Eastern seas as well as the Pacific and Indian oceans. In this task Japan used a naval strength twice as large as the British Eastern and Australian Fleets prior to the war. When German cruisers were at large in the Pacific, Japanese men-of-war protected the coasts of Australia, New Zealand, and British Columbia, and kept safe the lanes of transportation from Hong-Kong to Vancouver, from Sydney and Singapore to Suez and Zanzibar. The great fleets of transports, which bore Australian and New Zealand troops to the various fronts of war, were usually convoyed by Japanese warships. It may also be safely said that without the co-operation of the Japanese fleet the hunting down of the *Emden* and the destruction of von Spee's ships off the Falkland Island at the hands of the British and Australian fleets would have been infinitely more difficult. As

early as December, 1915, Admiral Yashiro, the Japanese Minister of the Navy, declared in the House of Representatives that after the fall of Kiau-chow the Japanese squadrons, which were constantly employed in co-operating with the British fleet, totaled 225,000 tons.

As soon as the Pacific and Indian oceans were cleared of German ships, Japan sent to the Mediterranean Sea a cruiser and three flotillas of submarine destroyers. While the British, French, and Italian squadrons were engaged in blockading the Adriatic Sea and the Dardanelles, these Japanese destroyers kept the routes of communication open from Gibraltar to Suez, from Marseilles to Alexandria. This was by far the most difficult and hazardous task imposed upon the Japanese navy during the war, and the spirit in which Japan undertook it was admirable, for the task was entirely outside the obligations of the alliance with England.

Not the least important contribution which Japan made towards the successful execution of the war was the assistance she extended to Russia. In March, 1916, Japan turned over to the Russian Navy two battleships, *Sagami* and *Tango*, and an armored cruiser, *Soya*. In the early stage of the war Japanese ships transported a contingent of Russian soldiers from the Manchurian port of Darien to the Western front. But it was with munitions that Japan helped Russia most. As early as November, 1915, two Japanese arsenals were incessantly at work producing

immense quantities of munitions exclusively for Russia. Of the millions of men Russia had mobilized at that time, only one-third was armed, and she had asked Japan to arm the rest. In response to the Russian appeal, Japan invoked all her industrial resources, employing every available mill and factory throughout the country. In meeting the Russian demand Japan had to turn away orders from China, her chief and permanent market.

In the single year of 1915 Japan supplied Russia with munitions to the value of \$100,000,000. Of rifles alone Japan shipped no less than 750,000, a number sufficient to arm fifty-two divisions. Upon the fall of Warsaw in August of that year, Japan redoubled her energies in producing arms and munitions for Russia. Without this prodigious effort on the part of Japan, Alexieff could not have conceived or Brusiloff carried out the superb offensive which began on June 4, 1916.

Nor was it the Russians alone whom Japan supplied with arms. Even Kitchener's armies received rifles from her. The British navy, too, secured guns from Japanese arsenals.

When Russia completely collapsed with the advent of Bolshevism, Japan, in co-operation with the United States, dispatched a contingent of forces into Siberia where released German prisoners, hand-in-glove with the Bolsheviki, were creating general disorder. This particular aspect we shall discuss at length in another chapter.



In addition to naval assistance to her allies, Japan placed at their disposal a large fleet of merchant vessels. In April, 1918, she agreed to turn over to the United States sixty-six ships aggregating 514,000 tons. Of that number twenty-four ships, with a total tonnage of 150,000, were immediately chartered by the American Shipping Board. In this transaction the Japanese Government had to pay Japanese ship owners \$9,000,000, representing the difference between the inter-allied charter rates and the rates paid by the Shipping Board. Even before this agreement was made no less than fifty Japanese steamers had been chartered by various foreign governments and individuals.

Japan's financial contribution to the winning of the war must perforce be small, for she is a poor nation. Yet her loans to England amount to \$265,000,000. To France she advanced \$77,500,000 and to Russia \$127,000,000. To this should be added \$110,000,000, representing Japanese foreign loan bonds and company debentures redeemed in foreign markets.

I have described Japan's part in the great war not in a spirit of boastfulness, for her rôle was certainly a modest one. My only intention is to put on record what contributions Japan was privileged to make within her limited means, hoping that the unbiased historian of the war will not be reluctant to take cognizance of such contributions.

## CHAPTER II

### DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN

The effect of German defeat upon Japanese politics—The new cabinet of Japan—Premier Hara, the “Commoner” of Japan—President Wilson on autocracy—Mr. Root on Japan—The diplomacy of autocracy—Dawn of modernism in Japan—The Oath of Five Articles—Advent of radical doctrines—Prince Ito and the Japanese constitution—The Mikado not an autocrat but a ceremonial head—The Mikado and the Cabinet—The Mikado reigns but does not govern—The extension of suffrage the first requisite of democratising Japan—Labor unions in Japan—Freedom of speech—Socialism in Japan—Japanese socialists against the Russian war—Japan’s ability to adjust herself to new conditions—Democracy retarded by Japan’s constant struggle with aggressive Powers—The apprehension of Japanese advocates of liberalism.

The defeat of autocratic Germany at the hands of democratic allies has had a salutary influence upon the political tendency of the Mikado’s empire. It has dealt a severe blow to the worshippers of “Kultur” and the admirers of German efficiency. With the disillusionment of the Germanophile came the universal revival of faith in the ideals and traditions of democratic nations.

Had German arms emerged victorious from the Herculean combat, its effect upon Japan’s political ideals would have been unfortunate. It would have strengthened the belief of the militarists that the ideals of disarmament and of universal peace were

nothing but a golden dream impossible of realization. It would have accentuated the skeptical attitude of the reactionaries towards democracy, and retarded the progress of liberalism in Japan for at least a decade or two.

It seems not a mere coincidence that the inauguration of a liberal cabinet at Tokyo came simultaneously with the decline of Germany's military prowess. When the Terauchi Cabinet, generally accredited with conservatism, was ready to resign in September, 1918, Marquis Okuma, for many years identified with the liberal movement in Japan, informed the Emperor that war had brought a great change in the sentiments of the people, as it had widened the gulf between the wealthy classes and the masses. This, he said, created a dangerous tendency which if ignored might undermine the social foundations of the empire. Thus Marquis Okuma urged the inauguration of a liberal cabinet capable of appreciating the desires and aspirations of the lower classes. In asking Takashi Hara, the "commoner of Japan," to organize a new ministry, the Emperor was undoubtedly influenced by the wise counsel offered by the "Grand Old Man," as Marquis Okuma is familiarly called.

The Hara Cabinet came into power on September 29, 1918. It is avowedly a party cabinet, as eight of its ten members are closely identified with the Seiyu-Kai, the liberal party. As soon as it was organized, the new Cabinet made it plain that it intended

to abolish anachronistic practices of the bureaucracy. Under bureaucratic cabinets the offices of ministers and vice-ministers, as well as those of other high officials, were like sanctums, inaccessible to common people. The Hara Cabinet has abolished this usage, and opened the doors of those sanctums to all persons who may have plausible reason to interview cabinet members. It has also dispensed with the personal guards who used to be attached to every minister under the previous cabinets. The custom of guarding cabinet members with officers in plain clothes originated in those turbulent days of the early period of the new regime, when high officials were subject to frequent attacks at the hands of assassins. There is no reason why this custom should be continued indefinitely. In abolishing it the Hara Cabinet responds to the popular tendency of the present age. The new cabinet also announces its intention to deviate from the policy of reticence which has characterized its bureaucratic predecessors. In short, the "open door" is the avowed policy of Premier Hara in the administrative practices of his cabinet.

These changes may appear to be of small consequence. But as an indication of the spirit of the times they are of great importance. If the new liberal cabinet lives up to its professed principles, and carries out its promise to extend the scope of franchise, guarantee the freedom of speech, and remove the restriction hitherto put upon the activities of or-

ganized labor, it will have proved itself worthy of the first liberal government of Japan.

A study of this liberal tendency in Japan, as well as the fundamental principles of her government, is doubly interesting in view of President Wilson's repeated assertions in defense of democratic ideals.

In his historic "war message" of April 2, 1918, the President declared that the "world must be made safe for democracy," that "a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations," and that "no autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with it or observe its covenants."

As far as Japan's willingness to observe foreign treaties is concerned, there can be no two opinions. She has never entered into any agreement, to which she did not, with all sincerity, intend to adhere. No one, familiar with Japan's relations with foreign governments, can impeach her with lack of sincerity. On this particular point I quote an American authority who is much better qualified to speak than I am. Says Mr. Honorable Elihu Root, in one of his recent public addresses:—

"For many years I was very familiar with our own department of foreign affairs, and for some years I was especially concerned in its operations. During that time there were many difficult, perplexing and doubtful questions to be discussed and settled between the United States and Japan. . . . During all that period there never was a moment when the

government of Japan was not frank, sincere, friendly, and most solicitous not to enlarge but to minimize and do away with all causes of controversy. . . . And there never was a more consistent and noble advocacy of peace, of international friendship and of real, good understanding in the diplomacy of this world than was exhibited by the representatives of Japan—both here and in Japan— during all those years in their relations to the United States. I wish for no better, no more frank and friendly intercourse between my country and any other country, than the intercourse by which Japan, in those years, illustrated the best qualities of the new diplomacy between nations as distinguished from the old diplomacy as between rulers.”

One of the peculiarities of an autocratic country is found in the inclination of its sovereign to indulge in diplomatic intrigue. An autocratic ruler, be he a Kaiser or a Czar, an Emperor or a King, exchanges with other autocratic rulers personal emissaries and letters, interfering with the international affairs of his country which should be conducted through duly instituted diplomatic channels. It is indeed the “personal” diplomacy of the autocratic monarchs of Europe which complicated the international situation not only in Europe but also in the Far East. Of such reprehensible practices of autocracies, the personal message exchanged between the Kaiser Wilhelm and the Czar Nicholas afford a most conspicuous example. The Mikado of Japan has never

so much as attempted to meddle with the diplomatic affairs of the empire. He has never exchanged with any foreign sovereign any note or mission bearing upon the international relations of his country. The diplomacy of Japan is always conducted by her Foreign Minister who is in the cabinet organized with due respect for public sentiment.

So much for Japan's willingness to keep faith with foreign Governments. Now we come to the more essential part of our discussion—namely, the principles of the Japanese Government as they affect Japan's internal condition.

It is plain that neither Mr. Wilson nor the American people are concerned with the external forms of foreign governments. In form England and Italy are monarchical as much as Germany and Austria. Yet no one hesitates to accept England and Italy as America's partners in war and in peace. What is important is not the form of a government, but the principles by which that Government is guided in the administration of the affairs of the state. That Japan is ruled by an emperor is, in itself, of small consequence to us. What concerns us is not the *name* but the *reality* of the power that governs the people of Japan.

Among the Japanese themselves opinion is sharply divided as to the fundamental principles of their government. The conservative elements advance the theory that the Mikado enjoys absolute authority—a theory dangerously approaching the sinister

doctrine of the divine origin of the ruler. As opposed to this principle the liberals try to interpret the constitution much as Englishmen would interpret their constitution. Wide as the difference between the two schools is, they agree on one point—that the foundation of Japan's constitutional principles is the "Oath of Five Articles" proclaimed by the Mikado in 1868.

But before describing this Oath of Five Articles, I must dwell upon the historical antecedents leading up to the proclamation of that Oath.

Soon after the Western nations began to knock at Japan's doors, the farsighted men of the country became fully conscious of the need of co-operation between the government and the people. In 1866 Shonan Yokai, a scholar with unusual vision, suggested to the Shogun a radical change of government. "At a time of extraordinary transformation such as to-day," he said, "I believe it most opportune to institute a deliberative assembly, the upper house of which shall be composed of civil and military nobles, while the lower house shall consist of able men selected from among the people."

At that moment the Shogun, the military magistrate, was still in power. With the Mikado holding nominal sovereignty, Japan had a dual government. The abolition of this anomalous system was of the greatest importance, if Japan was to attain the much desired end of national unity. Yodo Yamanouchi, one of the most powerful feudal lords of the time, in



advising the Shogun to surrender his powers to the Mikado, urged the establishment of the imperial regime upon a new basis. "I beseech you," he said, "to follow the just and rational course, and by the co-operation of all the people, to bring about a change in the form of national government."

When Yoshinobu Tokugawa, the last of the Shoguns, inspired by patriotic motives, voluntarily decided to resign his office, he addressed to the Mikado a remarkable memorial in which he said:

"It is earnestly believed by your servant that the interests of the country may be best advanced and its position best maintained among the nations of the world, by the awakening of public opinion and by the patriotic and unanimous co-operation of all."

In accepting the Shogun's resignation and assuming himself the reins of government, the Mikado proclaimed to his subjects that it was his "will to establish the new government on the basis of the first emperor Jimmu, and to share his fortune with all the people by having each contribute towards the fair and proper discussion of public affairs without any distinction of civil or military profession."

These antecedents were soon followed by the Oath of Five Articles which definitely committed the country to the adoption of a constitutional government.

This historic "Oath" was sworn by the late Emperor Mutsuhiro before the solemn and great assemblage of all the Court nobles and feudal chiefs in 1868, when the country had just awakened from the

lethargy of seclusion. The five articles of the Oath read as follows:

"1. Public councils shall be organized, and all governmental affairs shall be decided by public opinion.

"2. All classes shall with one heart devote themselves to the advancement of national interests.

"3. All civil and military officials, as well as common people, shall be allowed to realize their aspirations.

"4. All absurd customs of former times shall be abolished, and justice and equity, as they are universally recognized, shall be followed as a basis of action.

"5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, and thus place the empire upon more solid foundations."

The direct occasion for this remarkable proclamation was the advent of the Black Ships, those monstrous leviathans from the West threatening the coasts of Japan. Confronted by the danger of foreign domination, the far-seeing leaders, who had been assisting the Mikado considered it imperative to abolish the caste system, raze the political barriers which had separated the various classes from one another, and thus mold the country into one harmonious whole. They believed this reform to be the first requisite of national efficiency, for no nation could become efficient unless its individual members were assured preferment commensurate to their respective abilities and aspirations. They saw that,

unless the people were allowed a voice in the management of public affairs, their true patriotism could not be awakened. Thus they recognized, though in a vague, unconscious, undefinable way, the necessity of a representative government as the base for national solidarity. There is no doubt that the men who were responsible for the Oath were absolutely sincere in their belief in popular representation in the government, because they were men who had sprung from the lowest rank of the samurai, the intellectual middle class which was instrumental in effecting the transformation of modern Japan.

In the wake of the new era radical doctrines of all schools of Europe and America made their appearance in Japan. Montesquieu and Rousseau, Bentham and Mill, and even Robespierre and Mirabeau became popular figures among the political students of Japan. The theory of "social contract," and even the doctrine that the government was a "necessary evil" found responsive readers. The country witnessed a plethora of literature in the form of translations of books written by well-known exponents of radicalism in England and France. The Declaration of Independence was hailed with enthusiasm by the young liberals of Nippon. The names of Washington and Lincoln were on the lips of every student. It seemed as though the country was plunging headlong into the yet unexplored field of democracy. Lured by the charms of political theories which had so suddenly dawned upon them, the young radicals

seemed determined to emulate the hazardous yet brilliant careers of the men who had played leading parts in the revolutions in France and England.

Alarmed by this radical tendency, those occupying responsible positions in the government saw the wisdom of a conservative policy, and tried to slacken the pace of political reform. Even those who drafted the imperial Oath of Five Articles reacted against this unforeseen turn which the course of events began to take. As the authorities became more conservative the ardor of the agitators for reform seemed to become more intense. A collision between the two was the inevitable outcome. Soon there were riots and uprisings and bloodshed in different parts of the empire. It was significant that some of the men who took part in the movement for parliamentary government were not irresponsible young agitators, but publicists who had occupied various governmental positions.

By 1881 the popular demand for constitutional government had become so irresistible that the Government was compelled to issue an imperial edict promising to grant the wish of the people in nine years. In the intervening period the Government was to investigate the constitutions of Western countries, and draft an instrument best suited to the conditions of Japan. Unfortunately, the late Prince Ito, who in 1882 was sent abroad to study foreign political systems, was influenced by the German idea of government, and in drafting a constitution for his coun-

try, preferred to follow the German pattern rather than the Anglo-Saxon conception of democracy.

Thus the Constitution promulgated in 1889 contains the article that "the emperor is sacred and inviolable." If this provision were nothing more than a historical fiction or tradition reduced to writing, no harm would follow. As a matter of fact that is what it amounts to. It is one of those fictions to which no one pays much attention. No Japanese, in spite of all the revolutionary agitations of the earlier period of the New Japan, really desires to abolish the imperial dynasty. On the contrary, the people are appreciative of the magnanimity which has characterized the deeds of successive emperors, and entertain love and respect for the imperial house.

The late Prince Ito, in his "Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan," tells us:

"The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; he is preëminent above all His subjects. He must be revered and is inviolable. He has indeed to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold him accountable to it."

To the western critic such utterances must be incomprehensible. Even to the Japanese they are not comprehensible. Most Japanese do not care to scrutinize such dogmas concerning the Imperial House, because they know that they can afford to let them alone as long as nobody attempts to put them into practice. The Emperor of Japan, though absolute in theory, is, in practice, anything but an

autocrat. From an early stage of our history it was the custom of the emperor to entrust wise men with the affairs of the state. As early as the beginning of the seventh century the Constitution of Prince Shotoku contained the following provision:

“The duty of men in the government must be assigned according to their capacity. When intelligent men serve the state, the people are happy; but when the unintelligent are in office, calamities ensue. If wise officers are chosen, public affairs are well managed, the community is free from anxiety, and prosperity prevails.”

This provision appears in the Japanese constitution issued by Prince Shotoku in the year 604 of the Christian Era. From that time the spirit of that constitution was observed by successive emperors. In the course of time the administrative power of the state passed almost entirely into the hands of the ministers. Thus the Mikado of Japan, like the constitutional King of England, became the mere ceremonial head of the state, preserving for himself only the mystic sublimity of the sovereign. This peculiar position occupied by the Emperor is well described by a Japanese scholar, Dr. Y. Uyehara, in these words:

“The removal of the emperor from the active sphere of government placed him beyond popular censure and criticism. Whatever errors and blunders the Government committed, the ministers of state alone were blamed; and it was tacitly admitted that

'the emperor can do no wrong to his subjects.' Thus he was sanctified, his dignity enhanced, and the reverence and affection for him increased, so that in the minds of the Japanese masses he appears as a 'Mystical Sacred Being.'"

When, therefore, Prince Ito told us that the Emperor was "heaven-descended and sacred," he simply harped upon the traditional conception of the Mikado prevailing among the masses of Japan from time immemorial. Certainly he did not expect the Japanese of these modern times to accept, at its face value, the obsolete doctrine of the divine origin of the Mikado. Perhaps Prince Ito would have appealed to the loyalty of the people more effectively, had he been more sensible and told the people that the Emperor, farsighted and magnanimous, had willingly accepted the will of the people and granted them the constitution, voluntarily binding himself to observe its provisions as well as all laws that might be enacted in accordance with it. As a matter of fact the intellectuals of Japan never paid serious attention to Prince Ito's dogmatic assertions concerning the Mikado, because they were absolutely confident that those assertions were set at naught by the practical working of the constitution. In other words, they were permitted to pass, because they were harmless.

It is clear that the presence of the Mikado in the body politic of Japan is no impediment to the progress of democracy in that country. It has al-

ready been shown that the position of the Mikado in the Japanese political system is similar to that of the King in the political world of England rather than to that of the Kaiser in the German or Prussian political system. This leads us to an inquiry into the relationship between the Mikado and the Cabinet, and that between the Cabinet and the people.

Whatever be the interpretation of the Japanese constitution on the part of the conservative school, the Cabinet, acting as the representative of the Emperor, is, as a matter of fact, responsible to the people. No cabinet, which is not approved by the people represented by the Parliament can remain in power. If such a Cabinet clings to power on the plea that it enjoys the confidence of the Mikado, it will soon find itself in difficult straits, because the people are quick to see an effective weapon for attack in the Cabinet's impudence in "dragging his Majesty into politics." Consequently, it has already become customary among statesmen and politicians in Japan not to invoke the aid of the Emperor in a political crisis, because such a step is bound to endanger the safety of the Imperial Household.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution, the Mikado, like the King of England, "reigns but does not govern." It is the Cabinet which rules in lieu of the Emperor, and which assumes all responsibilities for the administration of the affairs of the state. The Cabinet is, so to speak, the safety valve



between the Emperor and the people. Unless that safety valve works to attain the purpose for which it is provided, the permanent security of the Imperial Household cannot be guaranteed. Constitutional theorists of Prince Ito's school may assert that the Cabinet is responsible to the Emperor, and not to the people, but this is a legal quibble which cannot be sustained in the light of the practical working of our Constitution. The Constitution itself owes its inception to the will of the people, though its promulgation took the form of an imperial gift. Had not the people of Japan awakened to the need of a representative government and agitated for the adoption of such a government, the constitution would not have been promulgated, at least as soon as it was issued. In other words, the Japanese constitution, like those of other countries, was wrested by the liberty-loving people from an unwilling government.

It is highly fortunate that, since the establishment of her constitutional government, Japan has had emperors who have never attempted to force their ideas upon the Cabinet or the Diet. They have had the wisdom to see that it is safest to keep aloof from politics. To be sure, the Emperor exercises potent influence upon the affairs of the state, but whatever he does is done with subtlety and moderation, avoiding discord and creating harmony. If his advisers and ministers do not misunderstand or misinterpret the true desire of their imperial master, and refrain

from doing, in his name, what he himself never thinks of doing, the imperial regime will prove no obstacle to the wholesome development of democracy in Japan.

From what I have said it may be inferred that Japan is on a fair road to democracy. Whatever may be said by reactionaries, this is an incontrovertible fact. Even Prince Ito, if he were to rise from his grave today, would admit it. The simple fact that she has a constitution is, in itself, a refutation of the fictitious theory of the divine right of the sovereign, because a constitution is the tacit, if not explicit, recognition of the rights of the people. Japan could not, even if she would, adopt Western instruments of democracy, such as modern industrial system, high-power machinery, compulsory education, free press, local assemblies, and a parliament, and, at the same time, reject the political theories of democracy. The task is impossible. The time will come when her statesmen will have to look the question squarely in the face, and make sincere efforts to inaugurate an age of enlightened liberalism, if they are to forestall the dangerous outbursts of unwholesome radicalism which must inevitably proceed from minds cramped by repressive measures.

In order to democratize Japan the first task which should be undertaken by her is the extension of suffrage among the populace. At present the suffrage is confined to male citizens above twenty-five years of age who pay a direct national tax of not less than

ten *yen*, or five dollars.\* The property qualification, low as it is, denies franchise to a large portion of the population. The present percentage of franchise-holders is a little over 28 for each 1,000 of its population. In the past such restriction of suffrage may have been justified upon the ground that the masses had not been sufficiently educated to employ the political privilege to the advantage of the country. Now that Japan has had thirty years of training in representative government, and that the people are, in increasing numbers, enjoying the benefits of modern education, the removal of property qualifications will entail no pernicious effect upon politics.

Political democracy must precede economic democracy. By economic democracy I mean a state of society in which the right of workingmen to organize unions is recognized,—in which the welfare of the so-called lower classes is protected and promoted by the laws enacted by the representatives of the people. Unless the masses are permitted to express their will through legislative channels, measures for social reform cannot be inaugurated.

Once universal suffrage is adopted the proletariats of Japan will have an effective organ through which they will be enabled to express their desires and aspirations. Not until then will the labor organization in Japan be founded upon secure base. True

\*Since this chapter was written, the Hara Cabinet has revised the election law, lowering the tax to be paid by franchise-holder to three *yen*. This will make the percentage of franchise-holders about 60 for each 1,000 of the population.

it is that even at present the organization of trade unions is permitted by law in Japan—at least we have no law which prevents workingmen from forming unions. As a matter of fact, Japan has seen, in the past score of years, the inauguration of many labor organizations. The trouble lies in the fact that the authorities are inclined to employ their power in such a manner as would render the activities of trade unions extremely difficult. This is especially true, when organized labor resorts to strike in its effort to enforce its demands.

The extension of suffrage among the masses is likewise essential to the freedom of speech. Not until the populace are allowed a voice in the enactment of laws, will the freedom of speech be securely established. Under the present election system in Japan, restricting the franchise to certain property holders, it is small wonder that laws cannot be adopted guaranteeing absolute liberty with regard to public expression of views. That the Japanese and the Japanese press enjoy the liberty to discuss current political or social problems is not enough. They must enjoy freedom to discuss, even advocate, any doctrine, however radical it may be. To throttle, for instance, the advocacy of socialism is ridiculous. The authorities seem to fear that socialism will undermine the security of the Imperial Household. They close their eyes to the obvious fact that among the monarchs of Europe the King of England enjoys, perhaps, the greatest security, in spite of rapid

growth of socialism in his country. Given fair education, accompanied by a sense of responsibility among the populace, unfettered freedom of discussion is the safest course to adopt on the part of any government.

To some Japanese statesmen Socialism is a nightmare. To the officers of law in particular Socialism is synonymous with "dangerous thought." Indeed "dangerous thought" is the official term for Socialism.

In 1901 Japan, for the first time, saw the advent of a Social Democratic Party. The main features of the platform of that pioneer party were these:

1. The realization of the ideal of universal brotherhood.
2. Universal disarmament.
3. The abolition of class distinctions.
4. Public ownership of land and capital.
5. Public ownership of the means of transportation and communication.
6. Equal distribution of wealth.
7. Equal distribution of political rights.

Scarcely had the first Social Democratic Party in Japan seen the light of day when the Government ordered its immediate suppression. Yet the light that was once kindled could not be extinguished in such an arbitrary manner. It was evident that Socialism had come to Japan to stay. Whether or not that doctrine was permitted to express itself through party platform, the people of Japan began

to take keen interest in it. The very suppressive measures directed against the Social Democratic Party seemed to awaken and provoke public interest in the ideals of Socialism.

When the Russo-Japanese war became imminent in 1903, the Socialists of Japan, though not organized in a political party, lifted their voice against the war. They held anti-war meetings. They gave public lectures in denunciation of the war. Their weekly organ "The Proletariat" published vehement articles, asserting that the war would infinitely increase the suffering of the poor and the working class, no matter which side might win. Even when the Japanese army was locked in deadly combat with the Russian soldiers, the Socialist organ continued its fight against the war. We cannot but admire the courage with which the Japanese Socialists defended the principles to which they had consecrated their lives. And yet, when we look at the situation through the perspective of the years that have gone by, we cannot help wondering whether the valiant stand they had taken against the Russian war was not a serious blow to the wholesome development of Socialism in Japan. During the critical years from 1903 to 1905 the whole population of Japan, with the solitary exception of a handful of Socialists, were imbued with the fear of Russian autocracy, stretching its grasping hands across the Asian continent, and towards Korea and the Japan Sea. The masses were at one with the diplomats and statesmen in urging

war against Russia as the only means of avoiding a great national disaster which, they believed, would surely befall Japan in the event of Russian occupation of Korea and Manchuria. To cry peace and to oppose the war in the face of such strong determination as was shown by the Japanese in those critical years preceding the Russian war, was as futile as an attempt to break the wall of adamant with a fist. The suppression of the socialist organ was the inevitable outcome. How often has war furnished Governments with plausible reason for adopting measures which they would hesitate to adopt in times of peace!

In the Russo-Japanese war, then, the Socialist propaganda in Japan received a severe shock, from which it has never recovered. But the real influence of Socialism in Japan should not be judged from the number of its professed advocates, or from their obvious activities. Professor Isowo Abe, the greatest authority on Social problems in Japan, entertains the same view when he says in one of his recent essays:

“Socialistic ideas have been widely diffused throughout the empire in the past few years, and scholars and statesmen are, in increasing numbers, devoting themselves to its study, while a great many students take interest in the subject. It would be a great mistake to judge the influence of socialism from the yet small number of professed socialists only. The socialistic spirit is afloat everywhere.

To what, then, is the fact attributable that the political movement of socialists is yet very insignificant in influence? Certainly to the narrow limitation of the suffrage, by virtue of which the large number of socialists have no qualification to participate in the parliamentary elections. But once the scope of suffrage is enlarged, their activities will be brilliant. It is for this reason that socialists are crying for the adoption of universal suffrage."

After all has been said about the unsatisfactory political condition in Japan, it is fair to admit that democracy does not grow overnight like Topsy. We, who know how long it took England to reach her present stage of political freedom, must not be impatient with the apparently slow progress of democratic ideas in Japan. Considering the short period in which Japan has transformed her political system, we cannot but admire the courage and the singleness of purpose with which her leaders have devoted their energies to the difficult task of rehabilitation. What has already been done is remarkable, and promises greater achievements for the days to come.

Few nations have turned to outside influences so sensitive a front as have the Japanese. The efforts they made, upon the opening of their country, to adapt themselves to the ideas and customs of the advanced peoples of the West, were almost pathetic in the steadfastness of their purpose. The supreme end to which those prodigious efforts were bent, was, of course, the elevation of their country to the plane



of the Western nations which assumed an air of superiority in dealing with them. The laws were codified in accordance with the modern principles of jurisprudence; their time-honored social usages and customs were modified so as to bring them more or less into harmony with Western ideas; foreign dress became the official dress, both for men and women, in the imperial court and in the various departments of government; the use of English was encouraged throughout the country; even Christianity, which had long been under the ban of the government, began to receive official recognition, if not encouragement. All this was not without its comical aspects, but no one will deny to the Japanese well-deserved credit for their determination to attain equality with the civilized nations of the West. Through all its apparent flippancy the outstanding quality of the Japanese reveals itself, and that is their extreme sensitiveness to external forces and their ability to adjust themselves to new conditions of life which they deem beneficial or inevitable. If this quality is turned to good use, as it has been in the past, Japan's political ideals and her governmental system will, in due season, witness salutary evolution.

Japan's continuous struggle for existence against formidable pressure from her powerful neighbors has been an important factor in retarding the progress of democracy in that country. When she opened her doors to foreigners, she was at once confronted by aggressive powers threatening her integrity and

independence. Naturally the first task she was compelled to undertake was the organization of a strong centralized government, which seemed, under the circumstances, best suited to ensure national security. The war with China of 1895 was, from the Japanese point of view, entirely a war of self-preservation. China, then regarded as a sleeping giant, infinitely more powerful than Japan, had been determined to annex Korea, whose independence was deemed essential to the existence of Japan. The war ended in Japan's victory, and China accepted Japanese demands which were by no means exorbitant. Then, Germany, France and Russia combined their influence to deprive the Japanese of the fruits of their victory. This again impelled them to fortify their position in a military sense to cope with the powers which had no scruple in trespassing upon the rights of Japan. Japan's fear of the West became even more intense when, only three years after the Chinese war, those very powers, which had compelled her to surrender what she had rightfully secured from China, began to slice for themselves large sections of China. Russia, in particular, proved so audacious as to appropriate for herself the very territory that she had, in the name of the peace of the Far East, advised Japan to surrender. Not satisfied with the actual absorption of Manchuria, Russia cast covetous eyes towards the peninsula of Korea. Had Korea been annexed by such an aggressive military power as Russia, the fate of Japan

would have been sealed. In combatting Russia in the arena of Manchuria, Japan was inspired by no other motives than those of self-preservation.

Confronted by formidable hostile nations one after another, Japan's energies were devoted to the sole purpose of preserving her integrity. After the Russian war the Japanese had a period of respite, in which they were permitted to take a pause and look around to see where they were. Soon came the great war in Europe, and Japan was once again called upon to employ her military and naval forces.

Few nations have had such a strenuous existence as Japan has had in the past half century. She has been pulled by external forces to a height for which she was not internally prepared. What wonder that she has been going forward with makeshifts improvised as necessity dictates? Such circumstances are not conducive to the growth of democracy.

To the liberals of Japan, these critical times are a period of suspense, of doubt, of apprehension. They entertain sincere doubt as to the nature of the new age which is to dawn upon the ruins of the war. How will the tremendous armament which the war called into existence be retrenched? How will the powers dispose of the gigantic fleets of warships which they have built and are building? Will they agree to put their dreadnaughts and their guns upon the scrap heap? And, again, what will become of the magnificent fleets of merchant vessels which the nations have built for the transportation of troops and war

supplies? Will they become a formidable factor in the international rivalry for commercial supremacy—a rivalry which, no one can be sure, will not develop into an armed conflict, as has too often happened in the past? These are the questions which the Japanese advocates of liberalism are constantly asking. What they are particularly concerned with at present is the possible attitude of the Powers towards China after the conclusion of peace.

In such a mental state of doubt and apprehension prevailing among the Japanese, the imperialists of Japan will undoubtedly find a receptive soil to sow seeds of militarism. Whether the cause of democracy in Japan will be promoted after the war, therefore, must, to no small extent, depend upon the attitude of the Powers towards the Orient. If, after the war, the Western Powers will continue to deal with the Orient as she has been accustomed to deal, the cry of "preparedness" will continue to be the dominant note in the opinion of the leading men of Japan. Not long ago, an Occidental writer declared that the "only Chinese question that exists is, what the Powers of *Europe* will decide to do with China." If such continues to be the attitude of the Powers its effect upon Japan's internal politics cannot but be unfortunate. For it will furnish the military faction a convenient pretext not only to keep up a large army and a powerful navy, but to foster imperialistic ideas as against the progress of liberalism and democracy.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RACE PROBLEM AND THE WORLD LEAGUE

Baron Makino on the League of Nations—Japanese statesmen not in favor of raising the race issue—The race issue forced upon the envoys by popular clamor—Why the Japanese misunderstood Western sentiment—Mr. Wilson inspires the masses of Japan—Japan's population question—Japan's desire for expansion totally different from Germany's—Japan's real objective not free emigration—Japan not spokesman for all Asia—Why the Japanese are skeptical of the world league idea—Japan's disappointment at the Hague Court of Arbitration—The West maintains double standards of justice.

When on February 15 the first draft of the covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the Peace Congress, Baron Nobuaki Makino, senior member of the Japanese delegation, delivered a congratulatory speech in the course of which he said:

"I beg to add another voice to echo the congratulatory speeches that have been made on the presentation of a document which is, perhaps, the most important document that has been compiled by man. The great leaders, with staunch purposes, have personified this great movement, a movement involving intricate problems of divers nations, and they deserve the gratitude of their fellow men for successfully piloting to this advanced stage a most

effective instrument for the maintenance of the peace of the world. Their names will be written indelibly on the pages of history, and that will be the grateful acknowledgment of humanity for their labor."

At the same time, the Baron expressed a desire to reserve the "privilege of addressing, at a later stage of the discussion of this project, certain propositions which I hope will receive earnest and favorable consideration." If one remembers what the Japanese peace envoys had proposed two days before the adoption of the draft of the constitution of the League, one can surmise what Baron Makino had in mind in making this significant reservation.

It will be recalled that on February 13 the Japanese envoys proposed that the covenant of the League of Nations should include an article abolishing racial discrimination in future international dealings. The Peace Conference, without giving Japan even a semblance of a hearing, rejected the proposal.

Of all rebuffs Japan has met at the peace table, that was the most discouraging. By Japan I do not mean the Japanese Government, much less the Japanese peace envoys. By Japan I mean the Japanese people, for this proposal to eliminate racial discrimination was primarily the proposal of sixty million souls of the Mikado's Empire. One might almost say that it was forced upon the Japanese peace envoys by the masses of Japan. Not that the Japanese statesmen were not in sympathy with this

popular demand, nor that they failed to recognize the logic and reason of the proposition. Convinced as they were of the justice of the argument advanced for the removal of racial barriers, the Japanese statesmen at the helm could not, nevertheless, see their way to put the proposition through the peace conference. However cogent and convincing the reasons might be in favor of the proposal, the Japanese leaders could not but recognize that the peoples of those great western countries, who had long discriminated against the Asiatic races, had not undergone a change of heart. To the contrary, they saw that even the baptism of blood and fire, from which the world had just emerged, failed to consecrate mankind to the ideals of humanity and universal brotherhood. What, then, would be the use of presenting to the Peace Congress such a pretentious proposal as the abolition of racial discrimination? The illustrious statesmen of the Occident—Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd-George, and their enlightened associates—might be broad enough to appreciate the reasonableness of such a proposition, but they, too, were naught but representatives of the multitudes of their respective countries, just as the Japanese envoys represented sixty millions of Nippon. And the multitudes whom those statesmen represented have, to no appreciable extent, altered their attitude towards the Asiatic peoples.

The question of racial discrimination resolves itself, on the last analysis, to the hackneyed expres-

sion, "You cannot change human nature." And indeed the war has wrought little change upon human nature. Why, then, has the Japanese public been led to believe that the great statesmen at the Peace Congress may lend ear to a proposition to remove race discrimination? The explanation is simple.

For this miscalculation on the part of the Japanese the naïvete of the Japanese mind is partly responsible. But a greater responsibility rests with the foremost statesmen, publicists and thinkers of Europe and America who seemed, during the period of the war, to vie with one another in expressing themselves in favor of justice and equity as the basic principles of international relations. In no previous war in the history of mankind has the world resounded with such humanitarian proclamations. To the Japanese, there was no doubt that the great war stirred the conscience of mankind and of nations, and created among them a sincere desire to readjust the future relationship among the civilized peoples of the world in accordance with the principles of humanity.

In the movement to awaken this world aspiration for establishing a lasting peace upon justice and humanity, America and President Wilson have figured most prominently. Mr. Wilson's public addresses and his numerous messages to Congress since the beginning of the war contain many passages replete with lofty ideals and noble sentiments. All such addresses and messages have been translated and



published in the Japanese press. Every utterance that fell from Mr. Wilson's lips, every sentence proceeding from his pen on the question of the war have been read and studied by millions of Japanese people. Of Mr. Wilson's many noble utterances, one which went most forcibly home to the Japanese mind, is contained in the following passage of his historic war message of April 2, 1917:

"Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance. The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there, of course, cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power."

From such humanitarian proclamations it seems

but natural that the majority of the Japanese, unfamiliar with the complex currents of thought and sentiment in Europe and America, should be encouraged to conclude that, whatever be the attitude of the European statesmen, the illustrious American president, at least, would not turn a deaf ear to their appeals, the cardinal point of which is, in the president's own language, nothing more than an "equality of rights," and a "freedom of life." Would that the Japanese might know that President Wilson, sagacious and sympathetic as he is, could not assume responsibility for all the ills of mankind. His shoulders, already bent under the weight of the white man's problems, could not carry the added burden of the yellow man's problems.

If one realizes the unfeigned trust reposed in President Wilson by the Japanese, one can also appreciate the keen disappointment which was felt by them when Mr. Wilson uttered no encouraging word for the proposal against racial discrimination, which they had caused their envoys to lay before the Peace Congress.

Ever since Japan opened her doors to foreign intercourse, the Japanese have observed that the Occidental nations had two standards of morals or justice,—one for themselves, and one for Asiatic peoples. If ever there was an opportunity for the abolition of this anomalous state of relations between the East and the West, the Japanese thought that the present Peace Congress offered such an oppor-

tunity. They are wondering whether the feint of hearing, which their proposal received at the peace table, is an indication that the great Powers of the West mean to adhere to the double standards of justice which they have long maintained.

To understand the intense feeling with which the Japanese desired to write into the covenant of the League of Nations an article providing for the removal of racial discrimination, one must know something of the population problem which has been harassing the Japanese.

During the past half century Japan's population has been increasing at an average rate of 400,000 per year. In recent years the rate of increase, instead of diminishing, has shown a tendency to become greater. The year 1917 witnessed a record-breaking increase, totaling 800,000 in round numbers. Fifty years ago Japan's population numbered some 33,000,000; today it has increased to 57,998,000. As the total area of Japan proper measures only 148,756 square miles, the density of population is about 389. While her population has been growing so rapidly she has in the past fifty years sent only 2,690,000 emigrants to various countries, including Hokkaido (North Island of Japan), Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, Hawaii and North America.

All European countries, at certain stages of their internal development, have alleviated the pressure of population at home by encouraging emigration. Moreover, most European countries have acquired

vast overseas territories which have proved profitable to the mother countries either as colonies or as sources of supply of raw materials. These two factors—emigration and the acquisition of overseas territories have, to no small extent, been responsible for the increase of wages and the promotion of general welfare among the working classes in Occidental countries. Contrary to this advantage enjoyed by the European nations, Japan, one of the most congested countries in the world, has, by agreement among the Occidental Powers, been compelled to grapple with the difficult task of disposing of "surplus population" without seeking colonial territories, and without sending her sons to any of the countries which seem to offer the greatest opportunities to emigrants with modest means. Today food materials produced from Japan's own soil are not enough to feed her own population. With the standards of living growing higher the shortage of food supply becomes more serious.

Germany has always tried to justify her aggressive policy by referring to the necessity of finding a "place in the sun." Yet Germany has always been free to send emigrants wherever she pleased. Her subjects, whether entrepreneurs or laborers, merchants or tillers of the soil, have always been at liberty to settle and engage themselves in various enterprises in all parts of the world. In a sense, therefore, Germany has always had her place in the sun. Were Japan allowed the same freedom and privilege as

have been enjoyed by Germany, she would perhaps have little of which to complain. In Japan we see a nation whose need of a place in the sun is not imaginary, as in Germany's case, but decidedly real. What Japan would see the Western Powers grant her is nothing more than what President Wilson calls "an equality of rights." With Mr. Wilson, she recognizes the impossibility of establishing "equality of territory or of resources" among the various nations. Japan asks for no other kind of equality than that which can be gained "in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves."

In spite of the serious pressure of population at home, Japan cheerfully entered into agreement with the United States, Canada, and Australia, restricting the emigration of her people to those countries. These agreements have been observed by Japan in good faith and with the greatest strictness. And yet the governments of those Western countries have not desisted from enacting measures curbing the rights and privileges of those Japanese who have been admitted into those countries in accordance with the provisions of the same agreements. Indeed, this last named discrimination has proved even more galling to the Japanese than the prohibition of emigration that has been imposed upon them. There is reason to believe that the Japanese complaint would be quieted, if the great Powers were to agree upon a principle of non-discrimination to be

applied to the treatment of Orientals lawfully admitted into their domains, if not to the larger question of Oriental emigration. As an indication of this conciliatory attitude on the part of the Japanese, I quote the following passages from a recent editorial in the *Tokyo Asahi*, admittedly one of the most influential organs of public opinion in Japan:

"We do not propose to send our emigrants of the laboring class even where they are not welcome. But we do demand that our countrymen, who have gone abroad in compliance with the provisions of our treaties and are engaged in legitimate business and enterprises in foreign countries, should be accorded the same protection and the same privileges as are enjoyed by other nationals who are settled in those countries. We also demand that our merchants and travellers—people who do not belong to the laboring class—should not be made to suffer in foreign countries such inconveniences and restrictions as have never been imposed upon the "white" persons of a corresponding class. These are the essential points which we hope will be seriously considered by those statesmen of the West who are championing the cause of humanity.

"This, of course, does not mean that we recognize the justice of the exclusion policy assumed by certain western countries against our emigrants. To the contrary, we believe that such sparsely populated countries as Australia, most sections of which have only one inhabitant to the square mile, should re-

ceive our emigrants. At the same time, we realize that our insistence upon this point will disturb our amicable relationship with foreign nations. Wisdom dictates that we should not insist upon an absolute freedom of emigration for our people of the working class.

"But there is no reason why the exclusive or restrictive measures directed against our working men should also be applied to our merchants and travelers, who, small in number, seek to enter countries controlled by Western nations. For this class of our countrymen, we can reasonably demand an absolute freedom of travel and residence. We must also see to it that those of our countrymen who have been lawfully admitted into such countries are not made objects of discrimination and persecution, and subjected to inequitable laws, often depriving them of the means of livelihood as well as the security of property."

I feel justified in saying that, even if the proposal for the abolition of racial discrimination were adopted, Japan would not insist upon the complete and immediate removal of the barriers which have been erected against Japanese immigration in various Western countries. What Japan will insist upon is nothing more than a fair and just treatment for the Japanese who are entitled to travel or reside in those countries. Nor does she urge that all Asiatic peoples be put upon an equal footing, if the Western Governments find it more practicable to deal with the

Japanese independently of other Asiatic races. For Japan certainly has no ambition to be the champion and mouthpiece for her numerous and ponderous neighbors on the continent. At the same time, Japan feels that no nation should be made an object of discrimination at the hand of any Power with which it is on a plane of equality. This is an international usage, unwritten but nevertheless in force. A nation, admitted by universal consent into the comity of the world's foremost Powers, must be accorded the respect and consideration due such a Power. Fortunately or unfortunately, Japan is the only nation in the Orient which has attained such a position. She would fain leave it for the Western statesmen to decide whether she should be put in a class separate from other Asiatic peoples.

The rejection by the Peace Congress of the Japanese contention on the race issue must inevitably accentuate the skeptical views prevailing among the Japanese concerning the league of nations. In principle, the Japanese are, of course, ready to welcome any proposal for the creation of a world court and international commissions to which all international difficulties may be submitted for readjustment. As a practical question, however, they are still at a loss to decide whether such courts and commissions which will inevitably be dominated by the representatives of the Western nations will be capable of doing justice to the claims of Asiatic nations, insignificant both in number and in influence. From



the Japanese point of view, Japan's past experiences in dealing with the great powers of Europe and America have been far from reassuring.

To illustrate the skeptical views prevailing among certain classes of Japanese on such questions as a court of arbitration and a league of nations, we may refer to the decision rendered by the Hague Court of Arbitration, in 1905, on the matter of taxation upon the property of foreigners in Japan.

When Japan opened her doors to international intercourse half a century ago, she agreed to set apart certain sections in the open ports for the residential and business purposes of foreigners. In these "settlements" foreigners secured from the Japanese government perpetual leases of lands. Not only were rents on such lands nominal, but they were exempt from all taxation. With the abrogation of the old treaties in 1898 these foreign settlements were also abolished, but even then Japan had to acquiesce in the insistence of foreign governments that the perpetual leases must remain valid.

When the Japanese authorities contracted the treaties exempting the leased lands from taxation, they had no intention of extending this prerogative to the buildings which the foreigners would erect thereon. Since the establishment of the leases the foreigners have set up buildings amounting in value to many millions of dollars. Consequently the Japanese government asked them to pay taxes on these buildings, asserting that the immunity from

taxation stipulated in the treaties was meant to apply only to the lands and not to the buildings. This contention seemed the more reasonable because rents on lands were but nominal. But the British, French, and German governments took a firm stand against this Japanese interpretation of the treaties. So the dispute was submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in 1904. The tribunal which considered this case consisted of two arbitrators and an umpire. The arbitrators were M. Louis Renault, professor of law in the University of Paris, representing the three European governments concerned, and Mr. Ichiro Motono, the Japanese Minister at Paris, representing the government at Tokyo. The umpire was Mr. Gregers Gram, formerly Norwegian Minister of State. The decision rendered under date of May 22, 1905, sustains the contention of the European Powers that the treaties exempt not only the land but "buildings of every description constructed or which may hereafter be constructed on such land, from all imposts, taxes, charges, contributions or conditions whatsoever." The Japanese representative had, of course, to abide by the decision, but in putting his signature to the document he recorded his "entire disagreement with the majority of the Tribunal both as regards the argument and the conclusion."

The significance of this decision lies not so much in its material effects as in the moral influence which it has produced upon the Japanese mind. From a

material point of view, payment or non-payment of taxes upon a few million dollars worth of property is comparatively a small matter. The important point in issue is the principle involved. The Japanese are still firmly convinced of the justice and fairness of their contention on the question above described, and are grieved that their first experience in an international court, to which they had looked up with profound respect, proved disappointing. They are indeed impelled to wonder whether an equitable judgment can ever be meted out to an Asiatic nation by a tribunal in which the majority of judges are men identified with Occidental governments. This apprehension must inevitably be intensified by the denial of the Peace Congress to recognize that racial difference should not be permitted to interfere with international intercourse.

It cannot be denied that in the past the nations of the West have applied to Asiatic peoples standards of justice and equity quite different from those applied to themselves. Even those Westerners and those Western organizations professing to advocate internationalism have been incapable of redeeming themselves from this traditional attitude. This is best illustrated by the attitude of Socialists and labor unionists in Europe and America. The Allied Labor Conference held at Leeds in July, 1916, adopted a programme guaranteeing to the working people of all countries "freedom to work in any country where employment is available under equal

conditions with its citizens." To the International Labor Conference now being held in Paris, American labor has submitted a platform containing the provision that "no political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and to cripple or embarrass others" shall be adopted by any country. Did the labor leaders of Europe and America, in adopting such provisions, have in mind the working classes in the Orient, as well as their fellows in the Occident? If they did, their acts certainly have not conformed with their principles. When Socialists in Europe and America pledge themselves to internationalism they are thinking only of Europe and America, forgetting that across the oceans teeming millions are crying for larger fields of activity. When the trade unionists of Europe and America speak of the brotherhood of workers, they are thinking only of their own race. They complain that Japanese working men work for low wages, ignoring that, if the teeming masses of England or America were bottled up in a small archipelago as are the Japanese, their wage scale would not have risen as rapidly as it has. When the pacifists of Europe and America advocate world peace, they seem to mean maintenance of peace by sustaining the *status quo* of the relations of the East and West—by permitting the West not only to continue its occupation, in all parts of the world, of more territory than it is justly entitled to possess, but also to exclude from such territories all dark-skinned races whose overcrowded

home lands afford not only scant opportunity to their natives, but are themselves often subject to ruthless exploitation at the hands of the West. A Western nation may declare a Monroe Doctrine, but is reluctant to accord an Asiatic nation a similar privilege. The West expects the East to open its doors to the enterprises and even exploitation of the white race, but reserves the right to slam its own doors in the face of the East.

It is highly doubtful that this anomalous relationship between the Orient and Occident will be appreciably altered by the organization of the League of Nations which refuses to accept the obviously just principle that no race in the league shall be discriminated against in any of the countries bound by its covenant. As far as Asia is concerned, the League is not likely to be a harbinger of glad tidings. Even the former German colonies will, under the euphonious title of mandatory, be controlled by a Western nation or nations, which will exclude therefrom all Orientals as they have excluded them from other territories in their possession. The Far Eastern peoples, then, must not, under the new world regime, expect much brighter days, but must be prepared to trudge along the same thorny path as heretofore, making the best use of their own resources, and endeavoring not to trespass upon the domain monopolized by the great Powers of the West, even if they have to trample upon one another within their own sphere in the sheer struggle for existence.

Since this chapter was written Japan has revised her proposition, making it clear that she does not seek free immigration and that her sole object is to safeguard the rights and privileges of her nationals who are already in or may hereafter be admitted into, foreign countries in conformity with treaties (such as the "gentlemen's agreement") which she has entered or may enter into with other nations. This is the principle which Japan proposes to apply equally to all nations which are members of the League.

As the manuscript goes to press (April 30) the fate of this proposal is still uncertain.

## CHAPTER IV

### JAPAN AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

Why the masses of Japan clamor for the Pacific islands—Japan's over-population the real cause for that clamor—Japanese emigration—Japan has no real colony—Resources of the South Pacific islands—Potash deposits valuable to rice culture in Japan—The Marshall Islands—The Caroline Islands—The islands under the League of Nations.

In a statement issued on the question of mandatory for the Marshall and Caroline islands, a member of the Japanese peace delegation said:

“The Japanese have a great pride in their achievements in the Pacific, and feel that they should be permitted to extend their culture and civilization to the two groups of islands which are inhabited by undeveloped peoples.”

This is an official view diplomatically expressed. It may be sincere, but does not echo the popular sentiment.

The masses of Japan do not base their clamor for the South Pacific islands upon such pretentious abstract arguments. Their claim is more spontaneous, more direct, more straight from the shoulder. They do not “beat around the bush,” like diplomats, but plainly assert that they want to keep those islands because they need them more badly than any other nation.

To be explicit, the popular clamor for the South Pacific islands proceeds from the instinctive fear of the Japanese that they will be eventually smothered to death if they are permanently bottled up in their own small archipelago. It is like a drowning man frantically clinging to anything that may come within his reach. He does not stop to think whether the thing he is going to catch will keep him afloat. You may tell the Japanese that those islands in the South Pacific are of no value as a colonial territory. But the populace would not listen to such expostulations. To them the Marshalls and the Carolines were German *colonies*, and that is enough. If the Germans, they ask, made colonies of them, why can they not be utilized by the Japanese as colonies?

We may liken the Japanese clamor for the South Pacific islands to the popular support of the League of Nations in Europe and America. There are many enlightened critics who detect flaws in the covenant of the League, and point out difficulties which are, to them, certain to arise once it is put into execution. To the war-weary masses such fine arguments do not appeal. To them it is enough that the League is meant to abolish war. On the question of the Pacific islands, we also notice the vague, instinctive feeling of the masses of Japan asserting itself in much the same way against the fine reasoning of enlightened critics like Professor Yoshino, of the Imperial University, pointing out the uselessness of those islands for colonial purposes.



In discussing the race problem in connection with the League of Nations in Chapter III, I called attention to the land-shortage and overpopulation from which Japan is suffering. That aspect of Japan's national existence must be kept in mind, if we are to understand the universal desire of the Japanese people to develop the South Pacific islands now in their hands.

During the past half century the population of Japan proper has been increasing at the rate of 400,000 per year. In other words, where there were 33,000,000 Japanese fifty years ago, there are to-day about 53,000,000.

As the total area of Japan proper measures about 148,756 square miles, the density of population is about 356 per square mile.

If we leave out of consideration Hokkaido, the northern island, the density increases to 451 per square mile. In other words, 110,212 square miles of three of the four islands constituting Japan proper represent the area demanding relief from congestion.

The first available territory for the solution of the question is the island of Hokkaido just mentioned. Hokkaido is, of course, very small, measuring only 30,275 square miles. Moreover, it is traversed by mountain ranges, while its winters are severe and protracted.

The second territory available for colonization is Korea. This newly annexed territory has an area of 86,000 square miles, with a population of 14,566,73.

X This gives a density of 169 per square mile. The country, therefore, offers no great room for Japanese settlers.

X The third country to which Japan looks for relief is South Manchuria. This territory, though containing 91,000 square miles, is almost as thickly populated as Korea. Moreover, with the exception of the leased territory of the Kwantung peninsula (1,290 square miles) and a very narrow strip of land along the South Manchuria railway, the country is not under Japanese control. By the Chino-Japanese agreement of 1915, the Japanese secured the privilege of engaging in agricultural pursuits in this region, and it is hoped that it will hereafter afford more room and opportunity to Japanese settlers.

X I have shown that during the past five decades Japan's population has increased by 20,000,000. As against this increase Japan has sent but 2,690,000 emigrants to various countries as follows: Hokkaido (Northern island of Japan), 2,000,000; Formosa (Southern island of Japan), 100,000; Korea, 300,000; Manchuria, 100,000; Hawaii, 80,000; Continental United States, 70,000; China, South America and others combined, 40,000.

England, when the rate of increase in her population was highest, sent her sons and daughters abroad by the hundreds of thousands every year. So did Germany. To the United States alone the German Empire has sent many millions of emigrants. From 1881 to 1899, when the tide of German emigration

was highest, Germans came to this country at the average of 124,200 per annum. In South America Brazil alone has received more than a million Germans. It may be safely stated that all European countries have alleviated the pressure of population at home by encouraging emigration. The most conspicuous example at present is Italy. X X

Now Japan, one of the most congested countries in the world, is compelled to solve the same question without sending emigrants to those countries which offer the greatest opportunities. With her population increasing at the rate of 400,000 every year, this is no easy task. Yet Japan, docile and courteous, is mindful of the admonition of the "big brothers" of the West, and is willing to undertake this Herculean task. In refraining from sending her emigrants to British colonies, and in accepting the "gentlemen's agreement" with the United States, Japan has signified her intention to dispose of the serious question of surplus population without embarrassing the Western nations. V

It is true that Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain are more densely populated than Japan. Belgium with its 659 inhabitants to the square mile, is the most thickly populated country. Holland with 474 population per square mile, and England with 370, come next, followed by Japan's 356, Italy's 316, Germany's 310, and France's 193. China, including her outlying territories, has only 70 people to the square mile. X X

X Although some European countries are more densely populated than Japan, those countries have each acquired extensive colonies, which either afford room for a large population to alleviate congestion at home, or store abundant natural resources to be utilized for the benefit of the home population.

Thus England, whose home territory supports 370 people per square mile, possesses vast colonies totaling 12,624,435 square miles, from which all Asiatics are most strictly excluded, though their population number but 31 to the square mile.

Again Belgium, though most densely populated at home, has colonies totaling 900,000 square miles, harboring only 16 inhabitants to the square mile. Holland, the second most crowded country in the world, has greater colonies than Belgium.

On the other hand, Japan, whose home land shelters 356 people per square mile, has just recently acquired 95,700 square miles of colonial territories. But these territories are already thickly populated—having 187 inhabitants per square mile.

Germany has been clamoring for a “place in the sun,” yet she had before the present war already brought under her flag more than a million square miles of colonial lands, averaging only 13 people to the square mile.

Russia, whose home land measures as much as 1,862,000 square miles, supporting only 122,550,000 people, or 65 to the square mile, has already won 6,785,000 square miles of thinly populated territories,

and was, under the old regime, eager to expand at the expense of China and Japan. Was not Mongolia (1,368,000 square miles), Chinese Turkestan (550,000 square miles), and three-fourths of Manchuria (273,000 square miles) virtually added to the map of Russia?

In the peculiar condition of Japan which we have above noted lies the real reason for the Japanese demand to retain the Pacific islands and to develop what resources they may have in store. The islands are, of course, too small for settlement purposes, but they have certain raw materials which can be used to the great advantage of Japan.

Chief among such materials are potash deposits found in large quantities in the Marshall islands. As Japan's soil is not naturally rich, but is made productive only by artificial means and by the most painstaking cultivation, these potash deposits will be of great value in the agricultural development of the country. Potash is especially valuable in the culture of rice, the staple food of the Japanese. As the Japanese have raised rice on the same land for many centuries, the yield must inevitably diminish, unless fertilizer is liberally applied. With the rapid growth of her population, Japan's crop of rice is hardly enough to meet demand. This was indeed one of the causes of the rice riot in the summer of 1918, resulting in many deaths and the destruction of valuable property. If the Japanese are forbidden to leave their country and immigrate into territories

offering greater opportunities, they must find some means to increase the productivity of their soil.

Before the war Japan was dependent upon the German Potash Trust for the supply of the fertilizer essential to rice culture. The German trust, with the aid of the Strassfurt and Alsatian potash deposits, has practically controlled the output of this commodity. If Japan has at her command the potash deposits of the Marshall islands, her suffering from land-shortage and overpopulation will be alleviated to a degree.

Moreover, the Pacific islands are rich with copra and other tropical products. The Japanese, having never had free access to tropical lands, are naturally anxious to possess those islands, even though they are but dots of land.

The Marshall group consists of two chains or rows of lagoon islands, some of which are uninhabited. One of these two chains is called Ratack, consisting of thirteen islets, and the other Ralick, comprising eleven islets. These islands have belonged to Germany since 1885. At the beginning of the war the Europeans on the islands numbered 179, of whom 91 were Germans. The native population is estimated at 15,000. Jaluit is the largest island in the group and has been the seat of the German administration.

The Caroline group consists of some five hundred coral islets. Chief among them are Ponape, with 2,000 inhabitants, Yap, 7,155, and Kusai, 400. The group, together with the Pelew and Marianne groups,

was, in 1899, ceded to Germany by Spain for the payment of \$4,200,000. Ponape islands, perhaps the largest in the Caroline group, has an area of some 130 square miles. The phosphate deposits on the island are the most valuable asset. All larger islands in the Caroline and Marshall groups produce potatoes, white yams, cocoanuts, breadfruit, and other tropical fruits. There is no doubt that the islands, in the hands of the Japanese, will prove economically useful.

Japan has agreed to place the islands under the League of Nations, but she will undoubtedly be appointed the mandatory for them. Under the Japanese mandate, not only will the resources of the islands be fully developed, but the native population will receive the benefit of an efficient administration.

## CHAPTER V

### JAPAN AND SIBERIA

Foreign Minister Viscount Motono on Siberia—Japan confers with France and England on the chaos in Siberia—France suggests intervention—Russian views in favor of allied intervention—Bolshevik-German intrigue in Siberia—The Japanese press and the elder statesmen objected to Siberian intervention—Ambassador Uchida on Bolshevism—American opposition to intervention—Appearance of Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia—President Wilson changes his attitude—His statement of August 3, 1918—Japan concurs with America—The Japanese statement—The failure of the Wilson policy—Unnecessary sacrifices due to Mr. Wilson's delay—Japanese conduct in Siberia—Foreign Minister Uchida's declaration on Russia—Japan withdraws her troops from Siberia—The disputed question of the Siberian railway—The American agreement with the Kerensky administration—An international control of the Siberian railway—The Monroe Doctrine, American and Japanese.

In early February, 1918, the press of the world, including that of Japan, began publishing news to the effect that Japan had proposed armed intervention in Siberia. In view of the great ado created by this news at that time, the following definite statement made by Viscount Ichiro Motono, then Foreign Minister of Japan, in the House of Representatives on March 27, 1918, is as surprising as it is significant:—

“The Japanese Government has neither suggested nor proposed to any country whatever the idea of military action in Siberia. None the less they see,



with the greatest concern, the actual state of affairs in Siberia, particularly the danger involved in the eastward movement of German influence.

"The Japanese Government has received no *joint* proposal from the Allies on the subject. Should Japan be approached, however, in the future by the Allied Governments, she would give the matter the most careful consideration. She will on no account slacken the effort, which she has been and is making wholeheartedly for the common cause of the Allies.

"Should the situation in Siberia become such as to threaten the security of this Empire or endanger its vital interests, the Government is determined to take prompt and adequate measures of self-defense.

"Even in the event of this country being compelled by force of circumstances to send troops to Siberia, the Imperial Government has no intention whatever of treating Russia as an enemy. We will never adopt an aggressive policy such as Germany is pursuing in European Russia. Indeed, I do not hesitate to declare unreservedly and most sincerely that the deep and warm sympathy of this nation is wholly with the Russian people, with whom we are most anxious to continue and to promote cordial friendship. And I believe that this view is held in common by all the Allies."

Even the Japanese press was puzzled by this sweeping denial. It is unthinkable that Viscount Motono had taken no steps concerning the Siberian situation. Where there is no fire, there can be no smoke.

What did Japan really do? As far as we are able to ascertain, the real situation was this.

When Russia was about to sign a separate treaty of peace at Brest-Litovsk, Viscount Motono instructed the Japanese ambassadors at London and Paris to ask Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, in an informal manner, what measures they thought Japan should take in the Russian Far East, now that the Bolsheviki had all but violated Russia's agreement with her allies in regard to the conduct of the war. The Japanese Foreign Minister submitted no formal or definite proposal either to England or France, and, of course, said nothing about the intervention in Siberia.

France, or some of her responsible statesmen, when thus approached by the Japanese ambassador, urged immediate dispatch of Japanese troops to Siberia. In their judgment this was not only Japan's right but her duty. England, though at first undecided, was understood eventually to have joined France in suggesting Siberian intervention.

Having received such suggestions, the Japanese Cabinet took up the matter for consideration. It is reported that Foreign Minister Motono was favorably inclined to the idea of intervention. In taking this attitude Viscount Motono was undoubtedly influenced by the appeals of the Russians themselves, for the Russians, opposed to the Bolsheviki, entertained the opinion that military intervention was the only way to save Russia. Prince Lvoff, who headed

the first provisional government after the overthrow of the Romanoff dynasty, was one of the leading Russians who had been urging allied intervention in Siberia. Alexander Kerensky, the premier of the second provisional government, which succeeded the Lvoff administration, frankly admitted that allied military assistance must precede economic aid. In the opinion of Mr. Eugene de Schelking, formerly First Secretary of the Russian Embassy at Berlin, allied intervention in Siberia, to be worth while, must be backed by a force of at least 80,000 soldiers of whom 50,000 might be Japanese. Mr. Konovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry under three provisional governments, declared that military intervention was the only means that could save Russia from the state of chaos into which it had been thrown. The Russian citizens in Harbin and Vladivostok also passed resolutions appealing for military aid from the entente allies.

While anti-Bolshevik Russians were appealing to Japan for military intervention, the Bolsheviks had entered into an agreement with the German General Staff, promising to send Russian agitators and agents of destruction out of Vladivostok to the ports of the United States, Japan, and the British colonies. They had also agreed to ship across Siberia three submarines in parts, to be put together at Vladivostok and used in the Pacific to the detriment of allied shipping. The evidence of these intrigues was made public by the American Committee

on Public Information on September 14, 1918, but in the inner circles of the Japanese and American Governments it had been known as early as the beginning of that year.

All these circumstances had conspired to induce Foreign Minister Motono to believe that an armed intervention was inevitable. And yet his idea was far from receiving united endorsement from his colleagues. Public opinion, as expressed in the newspapers, was also adverse to Viscount Motono. When the Brest-Litovsk treaty was about to be signed, the Japanese press were naturally greatly excited and thought that Germany, riding upon the crest of the Russian debacle, would immediately stretch her hands across Siberia, and become a serious menace to the Far East. As time passed, however, they learned to view the situation a little more calmly, and came to the conclusion that Japan could wait until the German menace in Eastern Siberia assumed a more definite aspect.

Even stronger was the objection raised by the "elder statesmen" to the idea of sending an armed expedition to Siberia. Prince Yamagata, dean of the elder statesmen, was of the opinion that Japan must establish better relations with China before she was in a position to undertake anything in Siberia.

Then came surprising statements of Viscount Uchida, the Japanese ambassador to Russia, opposing the suggestion of Siberian intervention for much the same reasons for which President Wilson has

withheld his endorsement of that suggestion. The ambassador had, from the beginning, counselled his colleagues at home not to take rash action with regard to the Russian situation. Upon his return to Tokyo on March 22, he gave out statements which were astonishing to the press and the public. He said that the Bolsheviki were not such rascals as many Japanese would make them; that Bolshevism was in Russia to stay; that many of the German prisoners in Russia had become so enamored with Bolshevism that the Kaiser was afraid to have them come home; that the German menace in Siberia had not yet become so serious as to require immediate mobilization of the Japanese army. Viscount Uchida counselled the press of Japan to judge the Bolsheviki, not from their methods, but from the principles they were trying to realize. Of course his views on Bolshevism are open to criticism, and indeed he was severely taken to task by the public for his extraordinary attitude. But his counsel undoubtedly threw a new light upon the Russian question. Whether influenced by it or not, the Cabinet decided against Foreign Minister Motono's opinion which favored intervention.

In addition to these circumstances, militating against the idea of Siberian intervention, President Wilson could not see his way to endorse any plan which would assume the appearance of an interference with Russia's domestic affairs. Japan, of course, had no desire to create discord among the

entente allies on the Siberian question. As long as the German penetration of the Russian Far East did not spell danger to her security, Japan was willing enough to let Siberia alone. President Wilson's counsel, opposing an armed intervention across the Japan Sea, was welcomed in the Mikado's Empire.

And thus the matter was entirely dropped for the time being in responsible circles in Japan. Yet conditions in Siberia were going from bad to worse. The Bolsheviki were everywhere fraternizing with German and Austrian prisoners of war whom they had released. East of Lake Baikal they were fighting against General Semenoff, the leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Eastern Siberia. The number of liberated war prisoners in that region was estimated variously between 30,000 to 60,000.

At that critical period a new and important factor was injected into the Siberian situation in the advent of a large number of Czecho-Slovaks who came into collision with the Bolsheviki and their German allies. These Czecho-Slovaks were originally part of the Austrian army. They had, fifty thousand strong, deserted Austria and joined the Russian army at the eastern front, intending to help defeat the central Powers with the hope of securing the independence of their native land. When Russia collapsed under the Bolshevik regime, the Czecho-Slovaks took possession of Siberian trains and moved eastward with the intention of going to the western front by way of America. By the summer of 1918 many of

these Czecho-Slovaks reached eastern Siberia, and there engaged the Bolsheviki and Germans in fighting.

In the advent of these soldiers, alien to Russian soil, President Wilson saw a gleam of hope for restoring order in Siberia. In June, 1918, Mr. Wilson began to negotiate with Japan with a view to sending a Japanese-American force to Siberia for the aid of the Czecho-Slovaks. On August 3 the two Governments, having arrived at an agreement, simultaneously issued statements defining their attitude towards Siberia. The American statement, evidently prepared by Mr. Wilson himself, contained this declaration:

“As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, military action is admissible in Russia now only to render such protection and help as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. . . .

“In taking this action, the Government of the United States wishes to announce to the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that it contemplates no interference with the political sovereignty of Russia, no intervention in her internal affairs—not even in the local affairs of the limited areas which her military force may be obliged to occupy—and no impairment of her territorial integrity, either now or hereafter, but that what we are

about to do has as its single and only object the rendering of such aid as shall be acceptable to the Russian people themselves in their endeavors to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny."

Echoing the sentiment expressed in the American statement, the Japanese statement declared:

"The Japanese Government, actuated by sentiments of sincere friendship toward the Russian people, have always entertained most sanguine hopes of the speedy re-establishment of order in Russia and of the healthy, untrammelled development of her national life.

"Abundant proof, however, is now afforded that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of the defenseless and chaotic condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country and are steadily extending their activities to Russia's eastern possessions. They have persistently interfered with the passage of Czecho-Slovak troops through Siberia. In the forces now opposing these valiant troops German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners are freely enlisted, and they practically assume a position of command.

"The Czecho-Slovak troops, aspiring to secure a free and independent existence for their race and loyally espousing the common cause of the Allies, justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern.



“In the presence of the danger to which the Czecho-Slovak troops actually are exposed in Siberia at the hands of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, the Allies have naturally felt themselves unable to view with indifference the untoward course of events, and a certain number of their troops already have been ordered to proceed to Vladivostok.

“The Government of the United States, equally sensible of the gravity of the situation, recently approached the Japanese Government with proposals for the early dispatch of troops to relieve the pressure weighing upon the Czecho-Slovak forces. The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission, and a certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok.

“In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.”

Looking at the Siberian situation in the light of

what has developed since the advent of the American-Japanese forces, one is inclined to think that the policy initiated by the President was not a success. However painstaking we may be in explaining our true intention, the Bolsheviki have no ear to listen to such explanations, but have set their minds irrevocably against any form of foreign interference. The President said many words stating that the move he had taken was not an intervention. But the Bolsheviki looked at it in no other light than that of intervention, pure and simple. If we were afraid of the opposition of the Bolsheviki—if we were anxious not to incur their ill-will, the only rational course we should follow would be to stay away from Siberia.

At the same time, those Russians, who are opposed to Bolshevism, have always been favorably disposed towards allied armed assistance, call it an intervention or any other name. From the beginning there was no hope of reconciliation between these moderate Russians and the extreme Bolsheviki. For us it was no use trying to carry water on both shoulders. The choice should have been made in the early spring of 1918, when moderate Russians appealed to the entente Powers, and especially to Japan, for armed assistance. In Siberia Bolshevism has not found so receptive a soil as in European Russia. The Siberian Russians would have, at any time, welcomed allied intervention whose purpose was to establish order against the destructive activities of the Bolsheviki. If these sane-minded, plain people of Siberia must be helped

at all, America and Japan should have agreed upon a policy of co-operation in the spring of 1918, when Viscount Motono, then Foreign Minister of Japan, consulted Washington with that end in view. Had the two countries arrived at an agreement at that time for immediate action in Siberia, peace and order would have been established before the winter at least east of Lake Baikal. The Bolsheviki and the Germans would have opposed such an action, as they always would, but the overwhelming majority of Siberian Russians would have heartily welcomed it. Had this been done the Czecho-Slovaks, who had been proceeding eastward from European Russia, would have been greeted by the allied forces before the coming of winter in the neighborhood of Irkutsk on Lake Baikal. But President Wilson, with all his good intentions, delayed that action until the late summer. It was about August 10 when the first contingent of allied forces landed at Vladivostok and was received with great enthusiasm by the natives. The same enthusiasm would have been displayed had the allies entered Siberia half a year sooner. We must remember that the rigorous winter of Siberia sets in about the middle of October. During the long winter months effective military operations are well-nigh impossible. The allied forces, arriving in Vladivostok in the late summer, had only two months in which to "clean" Siberia, before the coming of winter. With the Fahrenheit thermometer often registering sixty to seventy degrees below zero, it is small

wonder that the allied forces suffered terribly, when fighting, through snow and blizzard, against the Bolsheviks who are inured to the rigors of northern winter. All such sufferings would have been avoided had the allies taken action in the spring of 1918.

The wisdom of pinning the hopes of Siberia to the appearance of the Czecho-Slovaks is also open to question. The Czecho-Slovaks were merely "birds of passage," passing through Siberia only for the purpose of going home or to the western front. Their encounters with the Bolsheviks were but incidental. They never took genuine interest in the establishment of order in Siberia. Nor did the Siberian Russians take great interest in them, for the Russians knew that the Czecho-Slovaks were strangers passing through Russian territories on their homeward journey. To hold up such alien elements as a nucleus of peace and order in Eastern Russia was, to say the least, too far-fetched.

The allied forces, having entered Siberia too late, could not pacify even the territory east of Lake Baikal before the winter. And when winter came their operations against the Bolsheviks and Germans came virtually to a stop. The result is that Amur and Trans-Baikal Provinces are still infested with disorderly elements, carrying on desultory warfare against the allied forces. The annihilation of a Japanese force of 250 men in early March is an indication of the unnecessary suffering which the allied expedition is enduring through the winter.

From the beginning of their advent in Siberia, the Japanese strictly adhered to the spirit of the declaration issued on August 3 by the Japanese Government, disclaiming any desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia. As if emphasizing that spirit, Viscount Uchida, formerly Ambassador to Russia, now Foreign Minister, made in the House of Representatives on January 19, the following declaration:

“Our hearts go out in full sympathy to the Russians in their present plight, and we entertain a sanguine hope that the efforts now being made by patriotic elements in various parts of Russia for the establishment of a unified and orderly government may be crowned with success. We confidently look forward to the rehabilitation of Russia as one of the great powers to contribute to the progress and civilization of the world and we are quite ready to offer her all due assistance for this purpose.

“We have no intention whatever to interfere in the internal politics of Russia, still less would our policy be influenced by any tendency of taking advantage of domestic troubles in Russia to promote any selfish aims of territorial or economic aggression.”

That the Japanese forces in Siberia have been true to Japan's avowed policy as expressed in the above official declaration there is no room to doubt. An American business man, George A. Dyer by name, who was in the city of Nikolaevsk when the Japanese entered there, bears witness to the above statement in recounting his personal observations. He says:

“Nikolaevsk is a port on the Amur River about 30 miles from the Okhotsk Sea. I was in the city on September 9 when it was taken over by Japanese marines. A few days before, 200 of the Germans and Magyars had left the town, taking with them about 700,000 yen of gold from the Government laboratories and several million rubles in bank notes from the Government bank. About fifty of the least important German-Magyars were left in the city, and these were jailed by the Japanese. After holding the town for two days, the Japanese turned it over to the Russians, and said they did not want to interfere in the government in any way. The Japanese explained that it was their duty simply to keep out the German Magyars and Bolsheviki, and to guard the city on behalf of the Russians. Fifteen hundred Japanese then returned to their gunboats in the harbor and about twenty marines were stationed in different parts of the city to help prevent disorders.”

Japan's announcement, in early January, that 24,000 of her forces in Siberia would soon be withdrawn is another evidence of her faithfulness to the avowed purpose of the allied expedition. If the purpose of that expedition be, as President Wilson says it is, to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks, the *raison d'être* of the presence of allied forces in Siberia has ceased to exist, now that the Czecho-Slovaks are no longer in danger. But the rescue of the Czecho-Slovaks should never have been the chief reason for the

allied aid to Siberia. The chief, even sole, reason should have been the restoration of order and the redeeming of Siberia from the Bolshevik-German menace. This is obvious from the protest of the Siberian Russians against the Japanese announcement to withdraw 24,000 of her troops from Siberia.

One of the mooted questions arising out of allied intervention in Siberia was the control of the Siberian railway. Certain American interests have had an eye upon that railway ever since the late Mr. Harri-  
man proposed, in 1905, to purchase the Manchurian railways. Mr. Knox's proposal to "internationalize" the railways in Manchuria was understood to be another effort in the same direction. When Mr. Elihu Root, heading the American mission to Russia, went to Petrograd in June, 1917, he was reported to have come to a certain understanding with the Kerensky Government with regard to the control of the Siberian railway as a war measure. Perhaps, in pursuance of that understanding, Colonel John F. Stevens, with some three hundred American railway engineers, arrived in the Far East in the fall of 1917. But the fall of the Kerensky administration in November, to be succeeded by the Bolshevik reign of terror, made it impossible for the American railway engineers to proceed with the task they had come to undertake.

With the appearance of allied forces in Vladivostok in August, 1918, the opportunity for the American engineers to carry out their original plans apparently

arrived. At that stage, however, the question was no longer so simple as in 1917. The intervention was undertaken by all the entente Powers, Japan furnishing the largest number of soldiers. As a war measure, therefore, the control and improvement of the Siberian lines could no longer be undertaken by the United States alone. The Japanese seemed especially sensitive to any plan which would give the Americans a preponderating influence in that section of the Far East where they would, if they could, establish an Asiatic counterpart of President Monroe's famous doctrine. Of course they had no objection to Americans gaining control of that section of the Siberian railway which lies west of Manchuria, but the prospects of foreign control of the Russian railways in Manchuria and Amour and Maritime provinces were far from pleasing to them. The Japanese had long observed how jealous America had been, as she still is, in excluding all Japanese enterprises from Mexico. They knew that their Government, lest it might incur the displeasure of the Americans, dared not permit any firm to sell arms or advance loans to the Mexican Government, however anxious the latter might be to secure such assistance from the Japanese. The Government at Tokyo has even desisted from issuing passports to Japanese subjects interested in Mexican land enterprises or mining projects. At this writing a certain senator and representative at Washington are urging Congress to adopt a resolution to authorize the Amer-



ican Government to purchase Lower California. One of the reasons they advanced for this resolution is the prevention of Japanese enterprises in that section of Mexico. If America is so anxious to extend the application of the Monroe Doctrine so as to exclude all Japanese enterprises in Mexico, no matter how innocent they may be, is it any wonder that the Japanese should attempt to apply a similar doctrine to those sections of the Far East close to their islands?

It is, however, highly gratifying that a satisfactory agreement has been reached between Japan and America on the control of the Siberian railway. On January 14, 1919, the State Department at Washington was enabled to issue the following statement:

"The State Department has been advised that an understanding has been reached in Tokyo regarding the proposed restoration of the efficiency of the Trans-Siberian Railway, including the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that the proposed plan will be submitted to this government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

"In brief, the proposal is that there shall be an interallied committee, under the presidency of a Russian, this committee to consist of one representative of each of the following nationalities: Russia, China, Japan, United States, Great Britain, France and Italy.

"Under this committee there will be established two boards—First, a technical board on which John F. Stevens will serve, and second, a military board."

It is reported from Paris that if the United States insists upon the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine under the League of Nations, Japan will ask the privilege of declaring a similar doctrine for the Far East. To be frank, the Monroe Doctrine is an antiquated idea of a bygone age. It is incompatible with such advanced ideas as those embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations. It is almost pathetic to see Mr. Wilson and other supporters of the League striving to explain that the principles of that new world organization do not conflict with the Monroe Doctrine. Of course, the President "knows better." But he also knows that he must trim his sails in order to conform to the traditional belief of the American people with regard to President Monroe's historic doctrine.

If Japan is to be honest with herself—if she is to be consistent in accepting the principles of the League of Nations, she should not propose to espouse any such antiquated provincial doctrine as the Monroe Doctrine of today, but should propose to abolish all such doctrines. But Japan knows the futility of such a move. She knows that America will stand as a wall of adamant against any proposal to weaken, not to say abolish, the Monroe Doctrine. The only alternative for her is to recognize the American principle, requesting at the same time that she be allowed to adopt a similar principle in the Far East.

How far Japan will go in the application of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine must needs depend upon

how far America will go in applying her doctrine. When President Monroe declared that doctrine he had in mind only the prevention of the establishment of foreign political influence in Central and South America. In these latter days, however, the advocates of that doctrine seem to invest it with new meanings, permitting its application to be extended almost indefinitely. This is especially the case when the American publicists want to apply the doctrine to Japanese enterprises. It seems as though there is absolutely nothing that Japanese can do in Mexico, for instance, without treading upon the sensitive toes of the advocates of the Monroe Doctrine. If a Japanese secures a fishing privilege along the Mexican Coast, he is held to be encroaching upon that doctrine. If a Japanese gets a mining concession there, the same doctrine stands ready to expel him. If a handful of Japanese farmers or laborers manage to get into Sonora or Lower California, down comes the Monroe Doctrine to denounce them. If a Japanese business firm sells arms to the Mexican Government, that is regarded as a violation of the doctrine. What, indeed, would the Monroe Doctrine say if a Japanese concern, even unassisted by the Japanese Government, were to propose building a railway in Mexico? In short the Monroe Doctrine of today, as applied to the Japanese, is not a political doctrine as it was meant to be by President Monroe; it is an economic dogma conceived to bar out all Japanese enterprises, which are in nature purely economic, and which are

the result of the natural growth of the ordinary pursuit of individuals, unattended by governmental influence.

And yet, on the other hand, America has more than once proposed to build railways and work mines in Manchuria. She has no hesitation in recognizing the right of her financial interest to advance funds to the Chinese government, or build railways, or exploit mineral resources in China or Eastern Siberia. Japan, of course, has no desire to pick quarrels with America on such matters, but she may at least be permitted to point out the peculiarities of the Monroe Doctrine as applied to her citizens in the Western hemisphere.

## CHAPTER VI

### JAPAN AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The American proposal to annex Lower California—The American agitation against Japanese enterprises in Mexico—How Japan faces it—A reflection upon American morals—The duty of the State Department to investigate the Mexican land project—Definition of the Monroe Doctrine—Governor Estaban on the annexation propaganda—General Aguirre on the foreign ownership of Mexican land—The Magdalena Bay Canard—How it was started—Senator Lodge's resolution—The Japanese in Mexico—The German propaganda in Mexico—Japan respects American policy in Mexico.

At the Peace Congress the Monroe Doctrine has been a topic of serious discussion. Objection to the League of Nations on the part of many American publicists hinged upon the absence, in the draft of the Constitution of the League, of any clause clearly recognizing the right of the United States to perpetuate the Monroe Doctrine under the new world regime.

Meanwhile, certain senators and a section of the American press are engaged in a violent agitation whose double purpose is to expel all Japanese enterprises from Mexico, and to frighten the American public into taking a step toward the annexation of those parts of Mexico contiguous to America.

In the past session of Congress at Washington an identical resolution was introduced both in the

Senate and in the House, urging the American Government to purchase Lower California and the northern part of Sonora. Whether by coincidence or by prearrangement, a similar resolution was presented to the legislature of California. The proponents of these resolutions made it plain that one of the objects in view was to frustrate Japanese designs upon that section of Mexico.

As if to support and add strength to these resolutions, certain American newspapers and publicists have started a vigorous propaganda, exaggerating and misrepresenting the innocent enterprises of a few Japanese individuals in Mexico, insignificant both as to number and as to financial capacity. The amazing contention of these newspapers and publicists is that a Japanese interest has purchased, or is about to purchase, 800,000 acres of land across the Mexican border. Of course they know that this story is absolutely baseless, but they want to conjure up a Japanese bogie to scare the people into believing that the annexation of northern Mexico is the best course America should take.

This agitation, apparently anti-Japanese but really designed to further the annexation movement, has created in Japan a great deal of amusement. The Japanese press in particular has found in it a live topic to awaken interest and curiosity in the minds of jaded readers.

Time was when Japan vigorously protested against the way American publicists in and out of Congress

dragged her name into the discussion of Mexican questions. She felt that she had been made a scapegoat in an unholy political game whose object was to advance American interests in Mexico. An innocent bystander, Japan could not understand why her "big brother" across the ocean should sling mud at her, accusing her of schemes of which she had no knowledge.

When, in 1912, Senator Lodge declared that Japan had been scheming to establish a naval base in Magdalena Bay, the Japanese met the undeserved accusation with unfeigned resentment. It set the whole nation aflame with wrath, for the Japanese were convinced that America was using them as a cloak to cover her own selfish designs to acquire new interests in Mexico.

As the charge in one form or another was repeated year after year, the Japanese ceased to take it so seriously. They have begun to see the humorous aspect of the game and deal with it in a sporting spirit. They see how the Monroe Doctrine becomes a handy tool in the hands of American politicians, and they make humorous comment upon it. They make piquant and flippant remarks about the peculiar psychology of American publicists who fail to see their inconsistency in trying, on the one hand, to exclude all Japanese enterprises from Mexico, while, on the other, they have no scruple in urging the extension of American interests in China and Siberia. Isn't it odd, the Japanese would ask in perfectly good

humor, that those apostles of the Monroe Doctrine across the water could blandly and with no feeling of embarrassment advise their government to finance the Chinese Government, build railroads in China, purchase Manchurian railways, control the Philippines, procure ship yards on the Chinese coast, and even assume control of the Siberian railroads? It is indeed a very ingenious invention, this Monroe Doctrine of America, they say.

To the Americans, this is a matter which cannot be treated so lightly, for it is a reflection upon their moral sensibility. The Japanese are firmly convinced that American interests, when scheming to push their influence in Mexico, have no scruple in using Japan as a tool. Take, for instance, the above-mentioned story of the Japanese purchase of 800,000 acres of Mexican land. In 1917 an American interest called the Mexican Land Company, which controlled a vast area of land across the border, tried to interest a few Japanese in the agricultural development of that land. The American interest proposed to lease 50,000 acres to the Japanese, who were to secure labor from Japan to develop the land. The project was, from the beginning, destined to fail, for the Japanese Government, fearful of the susceptibilities of the American government and people, would never issue passports to Japanese laborers intending to come to Mexico. Of course, *bona fide* farming by Japanese individuals in any part of Mexico is no encroachment upon the Monroe Doctrine, but in



these days no one knows what the Monroe Doctrine may be utilized to accomplish when the Americans are determined to expel Japanese enterprises from Mexico. With the Japanese Government refusing to issue passports to Mexico, the project of the Mexican Land Company came to naught. But now come American newspapers and publicists exploiting the dead project for the selfish purpose of pushing the annexation movement.

In view of this spurious propaganda, it seems to me proper that the State Department at Washington should investigate the matter and issue a clear statement dispelling all doubt as to Japan's part in the Mexican land project. There is nothing of which Japan is afraid of investigation and disclosure. It is indeed the duty of the State Department to take steps to exonerate a friendly, innocent nation from all charges that have been brought against it by designing interests.

It is also to be hoped that the world will be given a clear definition of the Monroe Doctrine of to-day, because it is obvious that this doctrine, as it is applied to Japanese enterprises in Mexico, is something totally different from what President Monroe meant it to be. When, in 1823, Mr. Monroe, in his message to Congress, enunciated the famous doctrine, he had in view the prevention of foreign political influence establishing itself in the infant republics to the southward. At its inception the doctrine was especially directed against Spain, which had been courting the assist-

ance of the reactionary Powers of Europe in her efforts to win the revolted colonies of South America back to her own crown. Consequently, President Monroe told the Congress and the world what attitude he meant to take towards any attempt on the part of the European Powers "to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere." He should deem such an act, he declared, dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power," he said, "we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."

These words of President Monroe permit of no misconstruction. It is plain that the President meant his doctrine to be a barrier against the planting of foreign governmental or political influence in Central and South America. With what bewilderment he would see the same doctrine misused in these later days so as to exclude from Mexico all enterprises of Japanese farmers or fisherman!

If such an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is permissible and is recognized by the American

Government, the United States must logically be prepared to acquiesce in the application by Japan of a similar principle to American enterprises in the Far East. It is plainly wrong to expel all Japanese enterprises from Mexico, and, at the same time, insist upon the extension of American interests in those parts of the Orient where Japan has vital interests.

And yet America has no hesitation in proposing to control railways, exploit mines, finance governments in the countries with which Japan has a relationship similar to that of the United States to Mexico.

To come back to the Mexican land project, of which we have already spoken. That the American agitation for the annexation of Lower California is deeply resented by the Mexican statesmen is obvious from the statements issued by them. Governor Estaban Cantu, of Lower California, in an impassioned proclamation addressed to "The People and Government of the United States," characterizes that agitation as "a conspiracy framed by some citizens of the United States to assail the integrity and freedom of a friendly nation." General Amado Aguirre, under Secretary of Development and Agriculture, is positive that no land, contiguous to American territory or bordering upon the Pacific, can be, and has ever been, sold to foreigners. In a clear statement General Aguirre says:

"It is absurd to give credit to or take seriously the news published that there is imminent an inter-

national conflict because of the fact that Japanese subjects or companies are arranging to acquire lands in Lower California, said to belong to the California and Mexican Land Company of Los Angeles.

"In the first place, the lands, which were given by a concession in 1884 to the Mexican Land Company, were declared the property of the pre-Constitutional Government on April 7, 1917, which action rendered void the concession granted to the Mexican Land Company. Since then the Government has appointed a commission to divide these lands and sell them to Mexicans in small lots.

"Moreover, even though Japanese companies do propose to acquire, as is alleged, huge tracts of land in Lower California, they cannot be aided by our Government, since the Mexican constitution in Article XXXVII., expressly states that no foreigner can acquire land in a zone 100 kilometers (approximately thirty-three miles) wide from a foreign frontier nor in a belt fifty kilometers (seventeen miles) wide along the shores of the Pacific Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico."

Of numerous canards concerning Japanese schemes in Mexico, that of the historic "Magdalena Bay incident" has made perhaps the strongest impression upon the American public. And yet, when the geographical and climatic conditions of Magdalena Bay are fully understood, even the most scared will concede that no nation will ever think of establishing a stretegal base at such a place.

For Magdalena Bay is a spot condemned by nature to be a desert beyond reclamation. The bay itself is a noble stretch of water, landlocked, placid and deep. But the entire region extending for more than 400 miles along the ocean is absolutely rainless. If one were to live there one would have to have fresh water carried by ships from Todos Santos at the extreme southern tip of the peninsula. The nearest point available as a source of water supply, Todos Santos, is, nevertheless, 300 miles from Magdalena. The geological aspect of the region is forbidding. Mr. James H. Wilkins, for many years an explorer of the Pacific Coast of Mexico, writing in the San Francisco *Bulletin*, says of the country:

"I am more or less familiar with all the great desert regions of North America—with Death Valley, the region around Salton Sea, and the most desolate regions of Utah. None of these display the true desert conditions so impressively as the territory of the Hale concession (Magdalena Bay region). It is a weary expanse of rock and sand, glittering under a perpetual sun—lifeless, treeless, without a blade of grass or a plant except the tenacious orchilla or an occasional petaya cactus. There is not a drop of living water on the tract; only here and there are some small, uncertain water holes. The sole inhabitants are a few heartbroken looking lizards that gain a sustenance God alone knows how."

This rainless, barren region, fully 400 miles long and 50 miles deep, has, since the seventies, been

known as the Hale concession, as a San Francisco *entrepreneur* named Joseph P. Hale once had the exclusive concession to gather orchilla, the only plant that took a fancy to thrive there, and which was valuable in dyeing silks in the days when aniline dyes were unknown. But when the coal tar derivatives replaced the orchilla the concession became valueless, and Hale, or his heirs, in 1901 or thereabout offered the concession for sale for \$150,000, or less than three-fourths of a cent an acre.

This, then, is Magdalena Bay. Certainly not a pleasing or promising picture. In the face of a hostile fleet a garrison at Magdalena would soon perish of thirst and hunger. Could any man normally intelligent be so quixotic as to make any serious effort to set up a naval base or a colony in such a place?

But I know how the tempest in the teapot started. It started from various sources.

In December, 1910, a Japanese named Yokoyama, manager of the Toyo Hogeï Kaisha (Oriental Whaling Company) of Tokyo, secured from the Mexican Government a fishing concession along the Pacific Coast. The concession was far from exclusive, for Americans, Germans, Englishmen and others had enjoyed the same privilege. For lack of the necessary capital, the Oriental Whaling Company has failed to utilize the privilege.

The concession had nothing to do with Magdalena Bay, for it covered only the section between Salina Cruz and Manzanilo. But it was readily exploited

by sensation-hunters and by those with their own axes to grind. About the same time, that is, in the spring of 1912, another Japanese, engaged in fishing at Monterey, California, took a trip to Magdalena Bay at the invitation of J. S. Blackburn, representative of the John Henry Company of New York, organized under the laws of Maine for the purpose of exploiting the Magdalena Bay region. This company, eager to open up Magdalena Bay, offered alluring terms to a Japanese, Otojiro Noda by name, and asked him to start a fishing establishment and also to bring Japanese settlers there. Noda, escorted by Blackburn's agent, went to Lower California, and inspected the bay and the surrounding country. He reached the conclusion that not until human beings, as well as cows and horses, learn to subsist on sand and sea water would Magdalena Bay ever be colonized. Neither could he see how the fishing industry could profitably be established at such a place. So nothing resulted from Noda's trip. Noda, one of those ne'er-do-wells, trying his hand at everything and succeeding in nothing, died almost penniless in Sacramento in the spring of 1916. And this was the man whom the newspapers presented to the public as an emissary of the Mikado's Government.

While trying to interest Noda in the Magdalena Bay scheme, the John Henry Company also approached a Japanese steamship company with a view to importing Japanese settlers. The colonization plans had been communicated to Secretary of

the Navy, Mr. George von Meyer, who in turn sounded the State Department on the matter. Assistant Secretary Mr. Huntington Wilson had, it was reported, written to the John Henry Company, stating that the plans, as submitted to him, would not be objected to by the State Department. But approved or vetoed on the part of the State Department, the project had, from the beginning, no hope of realization, for the simple reason that the land on Magdalena Bay is utterly unsuited to settlement.

But all this furnished fire enough to heat the teapot. With due fanning by the yellow journals and their dubious allies, the fire soon became hot enough to cause a tempest in the pot. The result was the solemn and formidable resolution offered on August 2, 1912, by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, declaring that the United States could not see without grave concern the acquisition of any harbor on the American continent by a foreign corporation "which has such relation to another government, not American, as to give that country practical control for military or naval purposes." The more recent canard about the Japanese attempt to establish a naval base on Turtle Bay and at Panama is fashioned from the fantastic material furnished by the fairy tale of Magdalena Bay five years ago.

It is well to emphasize that Japanese emigrants have never come to Mexico in any considerable numbers. According to the investigation of the Japanese legation at Mexico City, there are at this



writing in the Mexican Republic some 2,000 Japanese, of whom about 300 are women and children. Of 1,700 male adults the majority, say about 800, are mining laborers; 400 are farmers and farm laborers; 200 are domestic servants, and the remaining 300 include storekeepers, physicians, carpenters, tailors, fishermen and miscellaneous laborers.

These are the Japanese whom we see often described as 200,000 trained soldiers! We have noted that out of the total of 2,000 Japanese, 300 are women and children. Of the remaining 1,700 not more than 10 per cent have had military training. To make 200,000 trained soldiers out of 1,700 odd Japanese would tax the brains of the greatest mathematical genius of the world. To some people, however, it is nothing difficult; they have performed the feat so often that the public is beginning to think that maybe after all 1,700 Japanese are numerically equal to 200,000!

Much of the apprehension seemingly prevailing among the Americans with regard to the Japanese in Mexico is, perhaps, due to the insidious German propaganda whose object has been to embroil Japan and the United States in trouble. Of this propaganda the letter addressed by Dr. Zimmermann, then Foreign Minister of Germany, to Von Eckhardt, the German Minister to Mexico, in the spring of 1917, was the last straw. In that letter Dr. Zimmermann instructed Von Eckhardt to endeavor to bring about an alliance between Japan and Mexico, an alliance

which would be directed against the United States. Of course the German Foreign Minister knew full well that Japan would never lend ear to such a proposal, and, as a matter of fact, he never approached Tokyo on that proposal. His sole object, in making an overture to the Mexican Government, was to alienate Japan and America, and thus cause anxiety and misgiving among the Americans with regard to Japan's possible attitude towards Mexico.

While the chancellory at Berlin was indulging in such diplomatic intrigues, the German press, publicists and writers did their part in creating the Japanese bogie in Mexico. From the great mass of German propaganda literature of this nature, let me quote the following passage penned by Professor Ruegalabouger of Heidelberg University:

"The Japanese glances are wistfully cast across the Pacific to America. Whether ethnologically and anthropologically tenable or not, for decades the most popular theory preached in Japan, particularly in the University of Tokyo, is that the Japanese are descendants of the old Mexicans, who were subjugated by the Spaniards. In the recent Mexican troubles Japan made untiring efforts to manifest her sympathies to the Mexicans, particularly so when United States troops occupied Mexican territory (Vera Cruz). Japan will make her influence felt in Central and South America at the expense of the United States."

Japan has no desire to create serious issues with

America over the Mexican situation. She has had more chances than one to "test" the Monroe Doctrine, if she wished, for her subjects have often been preyed upon and even murdered by bandit-like Mexican troops of one faction or another. Had she been bent upon making mischief she could easily have found excuse to lodge protests with the Mexican Government, such as it was, for the sole purpose of embarrassing the Government at Washington. To the contrary, Japan has been so fastidiously considerate of the susceptibilities of the American Government and people that the Mikado politely refused to extend official reception to Felix Diaz, whom the Huerta Government dispatched to Tokyo as special envoy in February, 1913. Japan felt constrained to take this embarrassing and delicate step for fear that official recognition of the Diaz mission, at the moment when she was anxiously watching the acts of the California legislature which had proposed an anti-Japanese land law, and when the embers of the Magdalena Bay incident were still smoldering, might be far from pleasing to the American nation. Japan's highly diplomatic note of regret reached Huerta after Diaz had already proceeded as far as Vancouver, British Columbia, on his way to the Mikado's capital. Virtually stranded there, the envoy saved his face by going to Paris.

It is to be hoped that Japan's solicitude for avoiding Mexican complications will not fail to receive due recognition on the part of the American public. It

must also be frankly admitted that the Monroe Doctrine, to be logical and convincing, presupposes the acceptance, on the part of the American people, of certain restrictions upon American enterprises and activities in that part of the Orient where Japan has vital interest. America enjoys enviable reputation for sportsmanship, and we are certain that she will not long deviate from the path of fair play in dealing with the Japanese in Mexico and in the Far East.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CHAOS IN CHINA

Danger to foreigners in China—The *North China Daily News* on the Chinese situation—A British view of China's internal warfare—The First and Second Revolutions—The Third Revolution—The Fourth Revolution—Dr. Sun Yatsen and General Li Yung-ting—The situation in Yun-nan—President Wilson's letter to China's new President—Military despotism of the worst type—Military governors worse than feudal chiefs—Arbitrary seizure of railways by generals—Instances of political blackmail—Japan's move to end internal warfare in China.

To understand the real meaning of Japan's recent activities in China, certain knowledge of China's existing internal condition is of great importance. Obviously Japan has been acting upon the conviction that, unless she fortifies her position in those parts of China vital to her own security, the western onslaught upon that country after the war will again assume a menacing aspect. Whether or not that conviction is based upon the right estimation of the real situation, we must at least concede that Japan's apprehension is genuine.

During the war we in America heard very little about China. Our attention was focussed upon the titanic struggle in Europe, and we were unwilling to divert it to the internal affairs of an Oriental nation. Only once in a good while did we notice in the press

laconic dispatches from Peking reporting a cabinet change or the bombardment of foreign vessels by Chinese forts, but even such news were sooner forgotten than read.

Yet while the world paid little attention to China, momentous events were taking place in that country. They were momentous not in the sense of progress or development but in the sense of degeneration and disorganization. Though China took no active part in the great war, she enjoyed not a day of peace during the past eight years. The country was torn by internecine warfare, and the innocent people were constantly preyed upon by contending factions. A republic only in name, China has degenerated into the worse form of military despotism. Official corruption, proverbial under the dynastic regime, has, since the advent of the "new regime," become even worse. Cabinet members seem to vie with one another in enriching themselves, while the parliament is far from immune from the taint of corrupt practices. In the light of what is going on in China even the following stricture of the Peking correspondent of the *London Times* seems not too severe:

"The funniest thing in China to-day is the Parliament, one of the main results of the agony through which the country has passed. To be more explicit, the Parliament has been made to look supremely ridiculous by a gigantic swindle engineered by some of its members."

As a symptom of this state of general disintegra-

tion, recent incidents, involving foreign lives and property, are highly significant.

On January 18, 1918, the American gunboat *Monocacy* was fired upon by Chinese troops near Yo-chow, a city in Hu-nan province which had shortly before been taken by the Southern "rebels." This wanton attack resulted in the killing of one American and the wounding of two. The grievous incident was followed in rapid succession by three others, though not quite as serious. In the province of Honan an American engineer, engaged in the surveying of a road for a prospective American railway, was captured by bandits and held for ransom for several months. At Chi-nan, the capital of Shantung province, two Americans, employed by the American-British Tobacco Company, were abducted by outlaws on April 24. In Kiang-suh province two American women-missionaries have been carried away by brigands.

Such incidents are in themselves deplorable enough but their real significance lies not so much in the direct material injury they involve as in the indication they afford of the state of anarchy now prevailing in China. If this unhappy condition is permitted to continue much longer, the outside Powers interested in China will sooner or later combine their influence to establish international supervision over that country.

To bring home to the reader the serious situation in China we may quote a few utterances from foreign

newspapers published in the Far East. On the occasion of the Monocacy incident, the *North China Daily News* of Shanghai, admittedly the most influential British newspaper in China, had this to say:

"The American Minister has duly registered his protest and asked for compensation for the lives lost and damaged. The Waichiaopu (Foreign Office) has been filled with regret and has tearfully promised all the reparation within its power. And there the matter must stand unless the foreign Powers are prepared to take action. The question is what action it is possible to take. Apparently it is impossible to find anybody with authority over the troops stationed on the Yangtze. Some of them who do the firing are independent Hu-nan forces, amenable neither to North or South. Some are troops revolting in Hupeh. Some are believed to be rapscaillions under Hsing Ko-Wu. Some are brigands pure and simple. . .

"The fact of the matter is that when there is no Government in a country, and anarchy prevails as it does in China, foreigners who go into the interior do so at their own risk. The foreign legations concerned may hold the present and future Governments of the country responsible for damage done, but that will not stop the attacks. If Peking and Hankow and Canton were razed to the ground by foreign troops or war vessels, it would not necessarily stop the firing on ships on the Yangtze. The problem is an elegant one. If it is to solve difficulties of this



sort that first-class Powers maintain expensive diplomatic missions at Peking, let the foreign ministers put their heads together and find the way out."

Mr. Edward S. Little, one of the leading English business men in Shanghai, writing in the *Peking Daily News* and the *Peking Daily Times*, deplors the growing state of disorder, and urges the cessation of the internal warfare which has for the past seven years harassed the people. As Mr. Little sees it such internecine warfare is all the more criminal because no one can tell what it is all about. Says the writer:

"Repeated inquiries amongst Chinese fail to bring to light any well defined issue in the present disorders. All with whom I have spoken state that at present it is simply and solely a question of individual struggle for power with the personal enjoyment of the plunder that naturally follows. It would, therefore, seem that the present chaotic condition in China is one that cannot be defended on any ground whatsoever. A few individuals for their own private gain are pushing the country to the verge of ruin."

And the editor of the *Peking Times* comes out openly for an international concert for the control of China, and declares that "winking at Chinese political hypocrisy is no help—it is like smuggling opium into an opium refuge."

Nor are such discouraging views expressed only by Englishmen. The Peking correspondent of the *Japan Advertiser*, an American daily newspaper in

Tokyo, writing under date of March 12, tells us that the situation in China is changing for the worse and that "the real quarrel in China is not between north and south, nor between democracy and tyranny, but between the principal generals and between conflicting elements panting for pelf and power." In a tone of hopelessness the writer adds: "Foreign observers are utterly disheartened, depressed and disgusted."

The absorbing question which overshadows all other troubles in China, is the rebellion in the south. Ever since the First Revolution of 1911, which brought about the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, most provinces south of the Yangtse river have been in a chronic state of revolt.

In July, 1913, General Li Lieh-chun, Governor of Kiangsi-province, raised the flag of revolt against the Yuan Shi-kai administration. In the history of the Chinese Republic this is known as the "Second Revolution." The movement, however, collapsed in September of that year, leaving President Yuan a virtual dictator.

But the country was allowed to enjoy only a short respite, for in December, 1915, another uprising, known as the "Third Revolution," was started in Yun-nan, soon to be joined by the neighboring provinces.

The object of the Second and Third Revolutions was to check Yuan Shi-kai's imperial designs. As such it seemed deserving of sympathy on the part

of all well-wishers of the Chinese Republic. With the death of Yuan in January, 1916, the danger of China reverting to an imperial regime practically ceased. And yet the South was not ready to discard the sword and turn to the plough. In the preceding five years of intermittent warfare the governors and military leaders of the southern provinces seem to have acquired such an unalterable habit of fighting that they could not stop fighting even when the *raison d'être* of revolution had disappeared. When there is nobody in Peking to fight against, the "leaders" of the South fight among themselves. That is what happened soon after Yuan's death in January, 1916. When in the summer of 1917, Premier Tuan Chi-jui's figure began to loom upon the political horizon of Peking, the southern politicians and generals again buried the hatchet and resumed military operations against this "common enemy," declaring that Tuan had been one of Yuan Shi-kai's lieutenants, and that he had no sincere sympathy for republican principles. And thus the "Fourth Revolution" burst in July, 1917, upon a people which had continuously been plundered in the name of republicanism.

The "Fourth Revolution," though at first considered insignificant in the political circles of Peking and even by the diplomatic corps, has steadily grown in magnitude, until today six out of eighteen provinces of China proper are occupied or controlled by the revolutionists. The six provinces are Kwangtung (Canton), Kwang-si, Kwei-chow, Hu-nan, Yun-

nan, and Sze-chuan. Engrossed in petty politics the politicians at Peking did not consider the southern situation with the seriousness which it called for, until Yo-chow, a strategical point on the Yangtse River, fell into the hands of the revolutionists in January, 1918. With the fall of Yo-chow, the fate of the triplet cities of Hankow, Hang-yang, and Wuchang, the most important commercial and strategical points on the great river, became somewhat precarious. Awakened by this serious turn of events, Peking at last dispatched expeditionary forces to the Yangtse region.

That some of the southern leaders are really fighting for republican principles we are willing to admit. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, for instance, may be sincere in his advocacy of republicanism, though there is much controversial opinion about it. Yet Dr. Sun is no longer the leader of the south. Since last summer the revolutionary faction in Canton and Kwang-si has been led by General Lu Yung-ting. Uneducated, ignorant, a freebooter in his younger days, this general knows nothing of republicanism and cares less for it. All he is concerned with is his personal profit and influence. Inspector General of the Two Kwangs, Lu has been aspiring to extend his inspectorate to Hu-nan province, which his forces have invaded. The only plausible reason for his apparent co-operation with Dr. Sun Yat-sen is that he believes it to be a convenient means to further his selfish ends.

Let us take a glance at the other revolutionary center, Yun-nan. General Tang Chi-yao, the recognized leader here, is credited by some with sincerity and patriotic motives. But there are many who question his solicitude for republican principles and declare that he is exploiting them for the selfish purpose of extending his influence into the province of Sze-chuen. Yun-nan, mountainous, unproductive, and isolated, is a very poor province. Whoever may be its governor is always desirous of including in his sphere of influence the province of Sze-chuen, which is rich in resources. In the past few years Yunnanese forces have invaded Sze-chuen three or four times, preying upon innocent people as they pass.

It is neither pleasant nor profitable to question one's motives. We may admit that these southern leaders are fighting for principles. Yet the fact remains that in their efforts to further their principles they are employing means whose justifiability is open to question. When Yuan Shi-kai put an end to the republic and enthroned himself upon an imperial dais, the southern leaders had plausible reason for revolting. With Yuan's death the situation changed much. Yet the Southern leaders were reluctant to stop fighting. To employ armed force every time the central government is organized by men contrary to their liking is certainly not the right way to promote any principle. The outstanding fact is that the leaders of China, both North and

South, are incapable and unwilling to do teamwork much needed for the good of the country.

This deplorable state of affairs is illustrated by an incident which took place at the time of the inauguration of the new President of China last October. On that auspicious occasion President Wilson, under date of October 12, addressed to the Chinese president a letter of congratulations in which he said:

“On this memorable anniversary when the Chinese people unite to commemorate the birth of the Republic of China I desire to send to you on behalf of the American people my sincere congratulations upon your accession to the Presidency of the Republic and my most heartfelt wishes for the future peace and prosperity of your country and people. I do this with the greatest earnestness not only because of the long and strong friendship between our countries, but more especially because, in this supreme crisis in the history of civilization, China is torn by internal dissensions so grave that she must compose these before she can fulfil her desire to co-operate with her sister nations in their great struggle for the future existence of their highest ideals. This is an auspicious moment, as you enter upon the duties of your high office, for the leaders in China to lay aside their differences, and guided by a spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice to unite in a determination to bring about harmonious co-operation among all elements of your great nation so that each may contribute its best efforts for the good of the whole, and

enable your Republic to reconstitute its national unity and assume its rightful place in the councils of nations."

When this letter was received, the Chinese Government published only the first half of the message, withholding from the public the last part in which President Wilson urged the Chinese leaders to bury their differences and unite for the common purpose of establishing a stable government.

I have said that China has degenerated into a military despotism of the worst form. This military despotism is not centralized in the government at Peking, but is practiced by a score of military governors stationed in various provinces. These military governors are none but feudal chiefs, and are, in this enlightened age of the twentieth century, perpetuating the worst traditions of the mediaeval ages. They have no close allegiance to the central government beyond the duty of paying the annual account of salt, tobacco and liquor taxes, traffic revenue, internal customs duty, and a few other public revenues. Even this duty some of the military governors are unwilling to discharge. Since the inauguration of the "republican" regime, many governors, on one pretext or another, have refused to contribute apportioned funds to the central government. Confronted by such recalcitrant governors, the government at Peking has no power to enforce order.

The main function of military governors is to

amass fortune at the expense of the state and of the people, and to satisfy their vanity by maintaining large armies which are employed mainly for the purpose of looting and plundering. Their chief interest lies in fortifying themselves in the respective provinces where they are stationed. Not only are they reluctant to contribute the prescribed sums to the national coffers, but they demand of the central government such material rewards as they deem due, them for the military services they claim to have rendered. Even foreign loans raised by the Peking government are as often as not utilized to quiet the clamorous and petulant military functionaries. The anachronism of the whole system is beyond the imagination of westerners.

To illustrate the curse of military despotism in China, let us describe a few recent incidents. The case of General Chan-Hsun, that picturesque pig-tailed general who attempted the restoration of the Manchu dynasty, is well known. When, in the summer of 1917, he wanted to come to Peking with his queued troops, he seized and arbitrarily used the government railway between Nanking and Tientsin, financed by England and Germany. This unfortunate precedent was followed, in the spring of 1918, by General Chang Tso-lin, Military Governor at Mukden. This Manchurian general, who started his career as a bandit, took possession of the Mukden-Peking railway, financed and superintended by England, to transport his soldiers to Tient-sin. His



pretext in taking this extraordinary course was to urge the vacillating President Feng to take a more decided stand and speed up military operations against the southern revolutionaries, but his real motive was to intimidate and bully the Government into according him a higher position. The general demanded the creation of the post of Military Inspector General of the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) and his own appointment to that post.

"Inspector General" seems to be the title favored by many military generals who think themselves powerful enough to exact additional power and money from the Central Government. In 1917 General Lu Yung-ting, who has risen to prominence from the unsavory class of free booters, wrested from the Peking Government the high-sounding title and remunerative post of "Inspector-General of the Two Kwangs." Even more notorious a case of political blackmail is the exaction by General Lung Chi-kong of the profitable position of Inspector General of Mines of the Two Kwangs. A lieutenant of the late President Yuan Shi-kai, General Lung, was sent to Canton by the deceased President in 1915 with instructions to suppress revolutionary activities there. When the Third Revolution came to an end by the sudden death of Yuan Shi-kai, the new administration at Peking desired to remove General Lung from Canton. But Lung had a formidable army which he threatened to employ in a manner by no means agreeable to Peking, should the central

government deprive him of official honors. So Peking sought solution for the difficulty in the usual expedient, creating for the general the remunerative post of Inspector General of Mines in the Two Kwangs. Not satisfied with this, the general took his army to Hai-nan Island off Canton, where he has since been firmly entrenched, collecting taxes at his will and expending the money thus raised as he pleases.

Early in 1918 a most glaring case of political blackmail was reported from Peking. When Yo-chow was captured by the Southern rebels in January, the central Government sent General Feng Yu-hsiang to the South, entrusting him to combat the revolutionary forces on the Yangtse. The general started on his way, but when he arrived in Chi-chow on the Yangtse he refused, no one knows for what reasons, to proceed any further. On the other hand, he sent Peking telegram after telegram, all couched in dictatorial terms, urging the immediate suspension of hostilities between the North and the South. In a most arbitrary manner he detained six steamers of the China Merchant Navigation Company, exacted money from the revenue collecting offices in the neighborhood of Chi-chow, and commandeered \$70,000 from the Salt Transportation Office and the Central Tax Office. And this is a general who had been very much admired by foreigners because of his espousal of Christianity!

The significance of all these stories lies in the

utter helplessness of Peking in dealing with refractory generals and governors. If the central Government fails to accommodate them, they point to the powerful troops under their command, which usually has a telling effect. The result is the creation of unnecessary offices, depleting the national treasury already heavily taxed. Unless this condition is radically altered it is idle to speak of efficient administration in China, let alone republican government.

In the face of all this chaotic state in China the question is irresistible, "What will Japan do?"

It is unthinkable that Japan will sit quiet with folded arms and watch the drift of affairs on the other side of the Yellow Sea. It is but natural that Japan should exercise her influence to put an end to China's internal warfare and restore harmony between the North and the South. As soon as the Hara Cabinet was organized in October, 1918, it signified its intention to act as an intermediary between the two factions in China with a view to terminating the disastrous strife of the past seven years. In the report wired by Chang Chun-Hsiang, the Chinese Minister at Tokyo, to the Government at Peking, Japan's plan for mediation was outlined as follows:

1. In view of the general situation of the world, the Allies should jointly offer their friendly mediation to China so as to enable her to bring peace and unification within her territories.

2. Although a recognition of a state of belligerency

has not been accorded by the Powers to the Military Government at Canton, nevertheless, in order to facilitate mediation, the Allied Powers should approach the leaders of both North and South China simultaneously.

3. Details of mediation should be drawn up by the Allies and submitted to the Chinese leaders jointly and simultaneously without the slightest intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of China so as to avoid suspicion on the part of the Chinese people.

4. The Powers will refrain from lending any money for whatever purposes until peace and unity have been re-established in China.

Before Japan arrived at this conclusion, she had consulted both the Northern and Southern leaders. Dr. Tang Shao-yi, the recognized leader of the South, had been in Tokyo for several weeks, conferring with the leading statesmen in Japan. To all intents and purposes, China was ready to welcome Japanese mediation.

As the result of such efforts the "peace conference" of China began its session at Shanghai in March. Whether this conference will accomplish the purpose for which it was organized we have yet to see.

## CHAPTER VIII

### HOW CHINA ENTERED THE WAR

An interview with the leader of Southern Republicans—His views as to why China should not have helped the entente Powers—A misrepresentation by a Chinese peace envoy—Yuan Shi-kai's imperial designs and his war policy—Japan checks Yuan's ambition—Japan and America advise China to declare war—Why China delayed the declaration of war—Factions fight over the war question—Southern republicans oppose the Cabinet's war policy—The war question plunges China into a civil war—General Chang restores the Manchu dynasty—The fall of General Chang—Southern Republicans still oppose the war policy of the Cabinet—The Cabinet declares war upon Germany—Liang Chi-chao's exposition of China's internal politics—China's motives in entering the war.

I was in Canton in the summer of 1917, and there met a number of prominent Southern secessionists. The leader of these men was extremely outspoken. He said to me:

"It is not to the advantage of Asia, especially of China and Japan, that this war in Europe should end in the crushing defeat of Germany—that the entente Powers, which are practically dominated by England, should come out victorious from the conflict, because such an eventuality will have the effect of tightening the British hold upon Asia in general, and upon China in particular. It would be much better for us of Asia if the war ended in a draw.

"Of course, we have no more love for Germany than for England, but from the point of view of our national safety, we do not like to see Germany beaten so completely that she will cease to be a restraining influence upon the British advance in the Far East. That is one of the chief reasons why we Republicans of the South do not want China to declare war upon Germany—why we are fighting the Peking faction, headed by Premier Tuan Chi-jui, which has entered upon the war on the side of the entente Powers.

"From the standpoint of world politics, of broad international relations, the course which Japan should follow in China at the present juncture is clear. Japan should help the Southern Republicans with money and arms. Suppose your country lent us a few million dollars at once, and sent us a few shiploads of arms,—we should have no difficulty in defeating the Northern faction. And when we have gained a controlling influence on our national politics, we shall define our attitude towards the war with a view to safeguarding Asia's interest to the best advantage.

"We of the South are the only people in China to-day who really understand the complicated international relations. The antiquated politicians of the North—Tuan Chi-jui, Feng Kuo-chang, and the rest, know nothing of the world politics of the twentieth century, and are blindly following the lead of England and America. Japan, the recognized leader

of Asia, must not play the same game and pick the white man's chestnut out of the fire.

"Do you know that every school established in China by Europeans and Americans is being utilized to incite anti-Japanese feeling among Chinese youths? Japan must look out for those schools. Now is the time for Japan to come to a clear understanding with the right party in China—the party of progressives."

Of course, the Chinese leader did not express himself in just this language, but his idea was exactly as I have set forth. During that summer I was sending articles from China to newspapers in New York and Tokyo, and I was greatly tempted to write an account of this interview with the Southern leader, knowing that such a "story" would create a sensation both in Japan and America. But I held my honor higher than my profession, and made up my mind never to disclose to the public the thought which this Chinese publicist confided to me. True, he did not enjoin me not to publish it, but I understood the spirit in which his words were spoken.

The name of this outspoken Southern leader is familiar to Americans and Europeans. In the United States and England especially he has many sympathizers, admirers, and personal friends. Had I published his views as expressed to me, he would have lost all of his Western friends. Moreover, the reputation abroad of the Southern republicans would have received the severest blow. That was why I thought it best to keep them to myself.

But the activities of the Chinese delegates at the Peace Congress have taken an extraordinary course, in the light of which I feel absolved from my self-imposed obligation to shield the above-named Chinese leader. Charity demands that I still withhold his name from the public. I will only say that he is the leader of republican leaders, and has been most closely identified with the revolutionary movement in China from its very inception.

Dr. C. T. Wang, of the Chinese peace mission, who represents the Southern faction, of which the above-mentioned publicist is the recognized leader, recently declared before a large group of American newspaper men in Paris that Japan blocked China's way when the latter was eager to join hands with the entente Powers.

The truth is that the very faction, with which Dr. Wang is closely identified, never wanted China to enter into the war, as the Southern leader's statement, quoted at the outset of this chapter, eloquently testifies.

To gain a clear understanding of the history of China's entrance into the war, we must go back to the fall of 1915 when Yuan Shi-kai was favorably inclined to the idea of lining up China on the side of the entente Powers. Not that he was anxious to be of any service to the cause of those Powers. An admirer of military dictatorship, Yuan was instinctively inclined to be friendly towards Germany. What Yuan really had in mind in declaring himself



in favor of the entente Powers was the attainment of his ambition to become an emperor. For months he had been scheming and laying plans for the realization of that ambition. To his great disappointment Japan, together with England, France, and Russia, stood firmly against the restoration of an imperial regime in China, as she knew that the Southern republicans would never acquiesce in such a course. But the resourceful Yuan, unwilling to give up his imperial designs, secretly conferred with England, proposing that he would declare war upon Germany and drive German interests from China, if the Entente Powers would, in return, support his scheme to enthrone himself. England, eager to exterminate German influence in China, was favorably disposed towards this proposal. But Japan, under the Okuma Cabinet which was sympathetic towards the Southern republicans, was unalterably opposed to the crowning of Yuan Shi-kai. Had Yuan entertained no such ulterior motive as the restoration of an imperial regime, Japan, in the fall of 1915, would have joined England in advising him to declare war upon the Kaiser. It was not because Japan wanted China to stay away from the war that she refused to endorse Yuan's proposal, but because she did not want to see Yuan Shi-kai destroy the infant Republic and become the imperial dictator of China.

With the death of Yuan Shi-kai in June, 1916, the danger of China's reverting to an imperial regime was no longer a question. This signal change in the

situation naturally brought about a corresponding change in the attitude of Japan towards the question of Chinese participation in the war. Furthermore, America's entrance into the conflict in the spring of 1917 made it advisable for China to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and fall in line with the democratic nations of the West.

Prior to the American declaration of war, that is, in October, 1917, the Okuma cabinet, which opposed Yuan's entrance into the war, came to an end, and was succeeded by the Terauchi Cabinet. The new Cabinet entertained no objection to bringing China into line with the entente Powers. When America, having severed diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, advised China to follow suit, the cabinet at Peking, headed by Tuan Chi-jui, consulted Japan as to the course it should follow. The Japanese Government expressed itself in favor of China's acceptance of the American invitation. Thus, on March 14, 1917, the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet announced the termination of diplomatic relations between China and Germany. The next question was whether China should go a step farther and declare war upon Germany, as did America on April 7. Viscount Motono, the Japanese Foreign Minister, speaking in the House of Representatives on June 27, announced that he had counselled the Chinese Cabinet to follow the course taken by America. He declared that China's active participation in the war would terminate the insidious machinations which

the Germans in that country had been conducting to the detriment of allied interests.

And yet China did not declare war until August 14, 1917. This delay was caused by two reasons. First, China was dickering with the entente Powers for the reward which she expected to receive from them for entering into the war. The price she had been asking was the postponement of the payment of the Boxer indemnity for five years, and an increase in the customs tariff. Japan, England, and the United States were willing to accept this term, but other Powers in the entente group were not ready to endorse it.

The second and more important cause for China's undue delay in declaring war upon the Central Powers was disagreement among the various factions on the war question. As soon as, in fact, even before, Premier Tuan Chi-jui decided to follow America's suit in early March, a hopeless wrangle began over the war question. The Parliament was in turmoil, the military governors were divided into opposing camps, and even the Cabinet faced the danger of disruption. It is no exaggeration to say that the war question plunged the country into a civil war, for it was soon converted into a tool by which each faction conspired to push its own interest.

In the camp opposing the declaration of the war the Southern republicans and their sympathers formed the most powerful factor. Urged by these so-called progressives President Li Yuan-Hung did

not endorse Premier Tuan Chi-jui's plan to push the country into the war. I need not inquire into the ulterior motives which prompted the Southern republicans to take this stand. I only emphasize the obvious fact that they formed the citadel of the anti-war factions.

To declare war upon Germany, Premier Tuan must first of all secure the consent of President Li Yuan-Hung, the Cabinet, and Parliament, and to that end the adroit soldier-statesman employed all means. Presumably upon his suggestion General Ni Shih-Chung, military governor of Anhui province, with three other generals, came to Peking in the early part of May, 1917, and urged upon the President, the Cabinet, and the members of the House the advisability of putting China in line with the entente Powers. Meanwhile, Premier Tuan was busy entertaining members of Parliament, and especially those opposing the war measure. On May 2, he received at a tea party at least 400 guests, and availed himself of the occasion to propagate his ideas as to the war question.

The Premier's toil was crowned with success to the extent of obtaining, on May 7, the consent of the Cabinet to the declaration of war. But Parliament, controlled by republicans, remained uncompromising.

On May 10 a mob of 2,000 Chinese, hired or instigated, as Tuan's opponents presume, by the Premier himself, gathered before the House of Representa-

tives, and by boisterous and even violent demonstrations demanded the immediate passage of the war bill. The legislators were so greatly intimidated that they were unable to leave the chamber for nine hours.

Whether the Premier was really responsible for such an unwise agitation is open to question, but his opponents were not slow in exploiting the incident to the prejudice of his reputation. Indeed he became so unpopular among the members of the House, that between May 12 and 20 all the members of his Cabinet tendered their resignations one after the other.

When the House sat again, on May 19, it adopted a motion postponing the discussion of the war bill until a new Cabinet was formed. In discussing the motion, members emphasized the point that the Premier, in assuming responsibility for the passage of the war measure, acted in contravention of the Constitution which requires the President, not the Premier, to shoulder that responsibility. It was also pointed out that even if the House voted for the declaration of war against Germany, there was no Cabinet to take up the grave task which must be entailed by such a vote. The motion was, at the bottom, a vote of want of confidence in Premier Tuan.

The Premier, still undaunted, pressed President Li Yuan-Hung to sign the war measure in defiance of the House. This the President declined to do. The chagrined Premier, on May 29, tendered his resignation and retired to Tientsin. Then the mili-

tary governors of the provinces of Anhui, Fengtien, Fukien, Chekiang, Chihli, Shantung, and Hupeh, all in sympathy with Premier Tuan, declared their independence and thus registered their opposition to the anti-war President and House.

Tuan, deprived of the premiership, had no intention of letting the controversy end there. On the contrary, he took immediate steps towards the establishment of a separate government at Tientsin, and by June 4 he announced the formation of a new Cabinet which would accept his war program.

Alarmed by this ominous development, President Li Yuan-Hung almost made up his mind to retire from the presidency. It was at this juncture that the American government, through its minister at Peking, Dr. Paul Reinsch, addressed to President Li a note urging him to remain in power and devote his labor to the restoration of order. That was on June 7, 1917.

But the situation had already become so serious that the timid President was at his wit's end. Driven by desperation, he asked General Chang Hsun, military governor at Hsuehow-fu, to come to Peking and employ his good offices for the alleviation of the situation. To the outsider it is a puzzle that President Li should invite such an arch reactionary as Chang Hsun to act as mediator between Tuan Chi-jui and himself. An ignorant soldier, Chang had been notorious for his opposition to Parliament and his adherence to the Manchu dynasty.

Mr. Liang Chi-chao, a brilliant writer and former Minister of Finance, says, in his recent essay, that President Li, in inviting General Chang to Peking, acted in accordance with the advice of the Southern Republicans who had been opposing the declaration of war. I shall later quote from Mr. Liang's article at length. Here it may be observed that General Chang had been notoriously pro-German, and came up to Peking with the intention to frustrate Premier Tuan's move to commit China to the cause of the entente Powers.

Accepting President Li's invitation, General Chang, with 3,000 of his celebrated pigtailed soldiers, entered Peking on June 14 and took immediate steps to dissolve the House. It is more than probable that the General came to the capital with the secret design to depose President Li.

On July 1 the world was startled by the unexpected report that General Chang had seized the government by force and set up a puppet monarch in the person of Emperor Hsun-Tung of the defunct Manchu dynasty. The general made himself dictator and organized a Cabinet of those politicians who were nothing but his tools. He notified provincial governors, military and civil, that he had changed the form of government with the endorsement of President Li.

This notification was immediately followed by the announcement of President Li that he had never renounced republican principles. But the pressure

brought by General Chang to bear upon the President became so great that the latter had, on July 6, to flee from the presidential palace and seek protection under the roof of the Japanese legation.

Meanwhile opposition to the reactionary general came to a head. He had counted on the immediate support of those military governors who had met at Hsuchow-fu a year before and pledged themselves to the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. He had failed to foresee that none of his "friends" would have him in the position of a dictator. All were selfish and were competing with one another for the sheer purpose of self-aggrandizement. The moment Chang Hsun's scheme seemed to succeed, all of his former friends deserted him and united in an effort to pull him down.

Ex-Premier Tuan Chi-jui, who had entrenched himself at Tientsin, naturally became the leader of the factions opposing Chang Hsun. Tuan himself is a man of dictatorial inclinations and has no particular sympathy for republican principles. To curry favor with the South, however, he professed to work for the restoration of the Republic as opposed to the imperialism of Chang Hsun.

By July 12 Tuan's troops, 2,500 strong, had already reached Peking and were bombarding Chang's forces encamped on the grounds of the Temple of Heaven as well as Chang's residence. Contrary to his bombastic proclamations, Chang, at the first sound of battle, deserted his troops and fled to the



Dutch legation. Thus the Manchu regime, restored on July 1, came to an end on July 12.

On July 13 Tuan Chi-jui, victor over Chang, left Tientsin and made a triumphal entry into Peking. A new Cabinet, with Tuan as Premier, was immediately organized, and began to take steps toward the declaration of war.

Even at this stage the Southern, and a few of the Northern, republicans remained firm against the war policy of the Cabinet. On July 16 the leaders of these republicans announced their intention of inaugurating a separate government at Canton. Simultaneously 140 members of the dissolved House of Representatives, led by Dr. C. T. Wang (the very gentleman who is now in Paris accusing Japan of having delayed China's entrance into the war), met in Shanghai and pledged themselves to oppose the Tuan Cabinet and its war policy. On July 22 Admiral Cheng Pi-Kung of the Chinese navy left Shanghai with his fleet for Canton, where he joined the Southern Government set up by Dr. Sun Yatsen.

In spite of this opposition on the part of the South, the Tuan Cabinet at Peking irrevocably cast its lot with the entente Powers on August 14, when it declared war upon Germany and Austria.

Mr. Liang Chi-Chao, Minister of Finance in the Tuan Cabinet, whom I have referred to in a preceding paragraph, has recently published a series of brilliant articles in the native press in Tientsin and Shanghai, recounting what may be called an inside

story of the circumstances under which China entered the war. Mr. Liang is not only a brilliant man of letters but also a prominent man of affairs. Professor Jeremiah W. Jenks in one of his recent articles regards him as the most enlightened and patriotic publicist in China to-day. Mr. Liang's exposition of China's internal politics in connection with the war question is, therefore, worthy of careful consideration. He says:

"After the termination of the internal dispute in China in 1916 and the subsequent death of President Yuan Shih-kai, I was staying at my own house in Tientsin, desiring to hear no more of Chinese political affairs. On the second day after the United States severed her diplomatic relations with Germany, I received many telegrams from both the Presidential Office and the Cabinet at Peking asking me to repair to the Capital at once. Immediately on my arrival in Peking, I called on Premier Tuan Chi-jui at his private residence, and discussed the whole matter with him in detail. I urged Premier Tuan to lose no time in following the example set by America, and I am glad to say now that the Prime Minister accepted all my views, and treated me as an intimate friend. On account of this, the so-called 'heroes' of the people's party, meaning Southern Republicans, treated me as their enemy, and all sorts of rumors were circulated against me, because at that time the dispute between the Presidential Office and the Cabinet was very intense, and both sides wanted to

get my views to support their own opinions in this important national affair.

"When I was in Peking, I received representatives of the various foreign Legations and prominent members of the two Houses of Parliament, and I did my best to assist Premier Tuan to put through his decision. Fortunately the bill, favoring the severance of diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, passed through Parliament by a majority; but unfortunately, on account of the continued disputes between the Presidential Office and the Cabinet, Tang Shao-yi and Kang Yu-wei strongly opposed the bill declaring war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. This caused great amusement to foreigners at that time, because the severance of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war are practically one thing, and can not be treated as separate questions in any country.

"The followers of these so-called 'heroes' of China used very offensive language against me, while Mr. Kang Yu-wei called me a madman who would be executed in Peking after the entry of the German Army in the capital of China through Siberia!

"General Hsu Shu-chen, who was the most trusted supporter of Premier Tuan at that moment, also expressed his disbelief in the wisdom of China's declaration of war on Germany; but as Premier Tuan is a man of principle and decision, who never wavers once he has formed his own policy in state matters, he did not lend his ear to Hsu's words. The chief

reason of the subsequent great upheaval in Chinese politics was due chiefly to the fact that on account of his honesty and simple-mindedness, President Li Yuan-hung was utilized by the members of the Kuomintang Party (Southern Republicans) in the two Houses of Parliament as their tool in opposing the policy of the Cabinet. The best weapons used by the Kuomintang politicians against the declaration of war were that the United States would never dare to go to war with Germany, that Russia must sign a separate peace with Germany, that the German Army would occupy Paris within one month, and that England would be starved by German submarines into capitulation.

"Just at this time, the Russian Revolution broke out, so that those who first favored war with Germany became so alarmed and frightened that they changed their own belief and opposed the war bill. Especially was this the attitude of those Kuomintang Cabinet Ministers, who quoted many precedents in which countries severed diplomatic relations without declaring war.

"In the mean time many pamphlets were issued by pro-German officials and others decrying war against Germany. These pro-Germans, with the strong support of many influential military men who used President Li Yuan-hung as their tool, most strongly opposed the war bill of the Cabinet. Hence at one time it seemed as though China's declaration of war on Germany would never be carried out, and

China would remain as a pro-German nation, as the actions of the so-called 'representatives' of the Chinese people in the Parliament clearly indicated."

The real motives of China, or more accurately, the Cabinet at Peking, in joining in the war, was the alleviation of financial difficulties. By the declaration of war, she has repudiated the Boxer indemnity of \$70,000,000 due Germany and Austria, and has secured the privilege to postpone the payment of five yearly installments, amounting to some \$44,000,000, due Russia, England, Japan, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and France, whose respective annual claims are as follows:

Russia . . . . .	\$3,547,000
England . . . . .	1,377,000
Japan . . . . .	946,000
Portugal . . . . .	25,000
Belgium . . . . .	230,000
Italy . . . . .	724,000
France . . . . .	1,928,000
	<hr/>
	\$8,877,000

In addition China is to secure a substantial raise in the customs tariff. China's annual receipts from import duties at present amount to some \$22,500,000. When the revision of the tariff is completed by agreement among the Powers that sum will increase to \$50,000,000 or more.

Another material benefit which the war has con-

ferred upon China is the exportation of 150,000 coolies to France, and to a lesser extent to England. These coolies were recruited by French and British agents in Shantung, Fukien, and Canton. Each of these coolies receive \$30 Mexican (or about \$15 American gold) per month. Of that monthly payment \$20 is handed to the families at home, the coolies themselves receiving \$10. This has been a great blessing to the poverty-stricken provinces where the great mass of the inhabitants have never had food or shelter or clothes adequate to ensure their physical well-being.

## CHAPTER IX

### CHINA'S CONTROVERSY WITH JAPAN

The attitude of the new Japanese cabinet towards China—Actions of the Chinese peace delegation—No secret treaties between Japan and China—Kirin forest and mine loan agreement—Premier Tuan's explanation of the same agreement—Manchurian railway agreement—The Japanese Government's statement on the same—Shantung railway agreement—The Chino-Japanese military agreement—The Chinese Government's statement on the same—These agreements not proper subjects of discussion at the Peace Congress—China's extraordinary performances at the Peace Congress—The Japanese Premier explains Japan's attitude towards China—Japan has no objection to publishing agreements with China—Why not also discuss at the Peace Congress China's agreements with other nations?—China's real motives in opposing Japan—Discreditable tactics of the Chinese peace envoys.

It is highly regrettable that Japan and China, the two foremost powers of the Orient, cannot act more harmoniously at the Peace Conference. Either nation will gain nothing by provoking and picking quarrels with the other.

About the time the armistice was declared in France, Japan was making earnest efforts to promote better relations with China. The democratic Hara Cabinet which succeeded the Terauchi ministry in October, 1918, committed itself to a Chinese policy signally different from that followed by its predecessor. As noted in the preceding chapter, the pres-

ent cabinet at Tokyo embarked, as soon as it was organized, upon a movement to bring a reconciliation between the Northern and Southern factions, whose continuous fighting for seven years brought nothing but misery and degradation upon the innocent masses of China. Fearing that loans advanced by Japanese interests with good intention might be used by the Peking authorities for the continuation of military operations against the South, Premier Hara and Foreign Minister Uchida declared, on December 19, that no further sums should be advanced to China until conditions in that country materially improved. Not only did the Cabinet reaffirm the intention of restoring Kiau-chow to China, but it was considering the relinquishment of Japan's share in the Boxer indemnity. Furthermore, it promised to render assistance to China's endeavor to secure a raise in import duties, as a means to increase her national revenue. In deference to the desire of the progressive elements in China for the suppression of opium, the Hara Cabinet decided, in January last, to deal rigorously with those suspected of smuggling the pernicious drug into China. What is more important, it decided to abolish the opium measure practiced in the leased territory of Kwan-tung and in Tsingtao as well as in Formosa—a measure by which natives addicted to opium-smoking were allowed to continue the habit by license under certain restrictions.

The cabinet at Tokyo was prompted to make such efforts by a sincere desire to establish Japan's rela-



tions with China upon a sound base. To it, therefore, the taunting attitude of the Chinese peace delegation at Paris was a great surprise.

As soon as the Chinese peace envoys arrived in America, *en route* to Paris, they reiterated statements which were calculated to create an impression that Japan intended permanently to hold Kiau-chow, and that she had wrested from China certain treaties and agreements which she did not wish to make public. In these days when "open diplomacy" has become the talk of the world, the Chinese intimation that Tokyo had obliged Peking to enter into "secret agreements" was highly unpleasant. One is inclined to think that the use of the word "secret" was not incidental but intentional. Can it be that certain Western advisers to the Chinese delegation were bent upon the malicious scheme of casting dark shadows upon Japanese diplomacy? In the name of "open diplomacy," the Chinese are practising Machiavelism.

Fortunately the myth of China's "*secret treaties*" with Japan has been exploded by China herself. In the instructions cabled on February 19 by the Chinese Foreign Office to the Chinese peace delegation at Paris, it is clearly stated that these treaties are nothing but the following:

1. Kirin forest and mine loan agreement.
2. Draft of agreement for Manchurian-Mongolian railway loans.
3. Draft of agreement for the extension of Shantung railways.

4. Notes exchanged on the co-operative working of the Kiau-chow railway.

5. An agreement for military co-operation.

6. Treaties and notes made in connection with the so-called "twenty-one demands" of 1915.

The official instructions further state, that besides the above agreements and notes, there are no secret treaties or agreements of any kind. What agreements Japan did make she has never considered secret, for they contain nothing that Japan is ashamed to disclose to the world. There is not a single Power interested in China which has not entered into compacts akin to those Japanese agreements. Except in the case of the twenty-one demands, Japan never so much as attempted to coerce China. Even in that case China signed treaties and notes only after Japan made considerable concessions. All those treaties and notes are contained in the "white book" of the Japanese Foreign Office and are accessible to anybody.

Reserving for later discussion the "twenty-one demands," let us first examine the other agreements named in the instructions of the Chinese Government to its representatives at the peace conference.

First, as to the Kirin forest and mine loan agreement. This agreement was concluded in July, 1918, between the Chinese Government under President Feng Kuo-chang and a Japanese *entrepreneure* named Nishihara. It was understood at that time that China received an advance of \$15,000,000 for which

the Japanese were given a concession to exploit mines and forests in Kirin. When the agreement was signed, Premier Tuan Chi-jui of the Chinese Government issued this statement:

"As I am also one of the citizens of the Republic of China, and as it is my duty to safeguard the interests of the country in my capacity as Prime Minister, I can confidently assure you that there is nothing harmful in the loan agreement signed with the Japanese about the development of forests in North Manchuria, otherwise I would never have given sanction. On the contrary, I believe that the natives of Kirin and Heilungkiang will derive immense profits out of the development of the natural resources of North Manchuria, in view of the fact that China has not sufficient capital to develop them herself. Furthermore, there is nothing in the agreement which may be construed as prejudicial to China's sovereignty or independence. I would, therefore, advise the representatives of Kirin and Heilungkiang to return to their respective provinces and explain the real condition of affairs to their fellows, and thus prevent them from becoming tools of certain ambitious politicians whose aim is to stir up disputes and disturbances to attain their selfish ends."

In the second place, agreements concerning the extension of railways in Manchuria and Shantung were never considered secret by the Japanese Government. To this nothing bears testimony more eloquently than the fact that the Terauchi Cabinet

issued, on October 1, 1918, a public statement describing the nature of those agreements. As translated in the *Japan Advertiser*, an English daily edited and published by an American, in Tokyo, this important statement reads as follows:

"First. Four railway loans in Manchuria and Mongolia: An agreement was made several years ago between the Japanese and the Chinese Government to the effect that the latter would borrow the necessary capital from Japan, in case the so-called five railways in Manchuria and Mongolia were to be constructed.

"The work on one of these five railways between Szeping-kai and Cheng-kiatun has been started by the Chinese Government with capital furnished by Japan, while the loans for the remaining four railways have been recently agreed upon. These railways are:

- (a) From Taonan-fu to Jehol.
- (b) From Changchun to Taonan-fu.
- (c) From Kirin to Haiyuen via Hai-lung.
- (d) From a point on the Taonanfu-Jehol railways to a seaport.

"These lines total more than one thousand miles, and will cost about \$75,000,000. The Chinese Government is expected to float a gold loan to be subscribed entirely by the Japanese Bankers' Syndicate. The syndicate will furnish \$10,000,000 to China as an advance loan, forming part of the gold loan proper.

"Second. The Tsinan-fu and the Kaomi Railways

Loans: As a result of the existing desire on the part of the Japanese Government to reach an understanding with the Chinese Government on the question of railways in Shantung Province, the following railway loans have been lately agreed upon:

- (a) From Tsinan-fu in Shantung province, to Shun-teh in Chihli province.
- (b) From Kaomi in Shantung province, to Hsuehchow in Kiangsu province.

“The amount of \$10,000,000 will be furnished to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Syndicate as an advance loan. In case investigations show that these proposed railways will be unprofitable from a business point of view, different lines will be substituted by agreement of both parties. The proposed lines extend over about 460 miles altogether and will cost about \$35,000,000, to be raised in the same manner as the loans for the four railways in Manchuria and Mongolia.”

Finally, the military agreement named in the instructions to the Chinese peace envoys, was signed between Tokyo and Peking in May, 1918. It was entered into with a view to forestalling the German penetration of the Far East, which, due to the collapse of Russia, seemed then imminent. For strategical reasons this agreement was kept secret, but its substance was reported to be as follows:

1. Japan and China form a defensive alliance against the menace of the peace of the Far East for a period covering the duration of the war.

2. Japan will furnish arms and the sinews of war to the Chinese.

3. Japan will furnish officers for the Chinese forces so far as China requests her to do so.

4. Japan will furnish railroad operators to operate portions of the Chinese-Eastern Railway.

5. Japanese troops will coöperate with the Chinese in specified parts of Chinese territory to guard against the Germans.

At that time there were rumors that, simultaneously with this military agreement, Japan entered into another understanding with China, conferring certain advantages or privileges upon the former. The Chinese Government denied the existence of such an agreement, and issued, through the official Chinese News Agency at Peking, the following statement:

“In view of the circulation of false reports, it is necessary to inform the Chinese people of the facts of the negotiations. Since the conclusion of peace between the Russian Maximalists and Germany, the fear has existed in Japan and China of an eastward intrusion of German influence. On account of the propinquity of their territory the governments of Japan and China recognized the necessity of a definite arrangement for joint defense. This joint defense concerns military movements in Siberia and Manchuria, and has no reference to other matters. The scheme will become null and void with the termination of the war.

"On the other hand, the convention will not be enforced unless the influence of the enemy actually penetrates Siberia. It is not a treaty, but an entente, which will become a scrap of paper if there is no enemy menace. The sole reason for the non-publication of its contents is the preservation of the secret from the enemy. The convention does not involve the loss of sovereign territorial rights and Japan gains no privileges."

I have described the nature and scope of the so-called "secret treaties," much advertised by the Chinese peace envoys or their Western tutors. Japan, of course, had no objection to making them public. In her judgment, however, the agreements concerning railways in Manchuria and Shantung, and mining and forest concessions in Kirin have no connection with the war, and, therefore, are not proper subjects of discussion before the Peace Congress. Moreover, they concern only China and Japan, affecting the interests of no other nation. It must also be remembered that these agreements were arrived at through a friendly exchange of views between the two Governments. Neither side applied pressure upon the other. As a matter of fact the Chinese Government was anxious to make such agreements, mainly because it had to raise money in some way. Naturally the above-named agreements were signed by China cheerfully and in good faith. True, since the signing of these agreements the Cabinet at Peking has changed, and the new ministry

consists of men unfriendly to the preceding Premier. But China cannot propose to abrogate foreign compacts upon the simple grounds of cabinet change, unless she prefers to follow the dangerous course of Bolshevism. No two nations can enter into any agreement, if the cabinet of either nation is permitted, at some unexpected future moment, to propose the repudiation of such agreements, simply because they were signed by a previous cabinet whose policy was different from its own.

Conceding, however, that these agreements constituted proper subjects for discussion before the Peace Congress, the fact remains that the Chinese delegation acted in a discreditable manner. The agreements had been entered into between the two Governments in good faith and in a friendly spirit, and it behooves either side to consult the other in an equally friendly spirit, before announcing its intention to publish those documents. Instead of observing this obvious duty and established diplomatic usage, the Chinese peace envoys abruptly announced that they would disclose all the "secret" treaties with Japan, and would, moreover, demand the return of Kiau-chow to China. When Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister at Peking, called the attention of the Foreign Office of China to this extraordinary course followed by the Chinese peace delegation, it was reported from Washington that his complaint was couched in threatening words. It is not for me to judge whether Mr. Obata made the indiscreet re-



marks he is reported to have made on his recent call at the Chinese Foreign Office, but I cannot but believe that the report emanated from certain sources extremely hostile to Japan. I have before me a recent issue of the *Japan Advertiser*, containing a statement made by Minister Obata just before he left Tokyo for Peking. In that statement he said:

“Heretofore our countrymen, both diplomats and laymen, have manifested singular disregard of Chinese susceptibilities. We have said and done things which must be highly offensive to the Chinese. It is imperative that we should reverse this objectionable practice and deal with China with due deference to her self-respect.”

It is not easy to believe that the man who made this statement would speak so arrogantly to the Foreign Minister of China as he is reported to have spoken. One is inclined to think that there is somewhere an organized conspiracy whose purpose is to misrepresent and discredit Japan and her diplomacy.

When the American press published reports from Peking and Washington to the effect that the Japanese Minister to China made threatening remarks in an attempt to prevent the publication of the agreements in question, the liberal elements in the Parliament at Tokyo demanded of the Cabinet an explanation of the situation. Replying to this interpellation, Premier Hara, on February 17, made the following statement before the finance committee of the House of Representatives:

"It is rumored in Peking that the Japanese Government has applied pressure upon the Chinese Government with a view to hindering the activities of the Chinese peace delegation. That this rumor is absolutely groundless is clearly shown by the statement just issued by the Foreign Office at Peking. The Japanese Government believes that, if the Chinese peace envoys want to publish diplomatic documents affecting both nations, it is China's duty to conform to the established diplomatic usage which requires China to confer with Japan prior to the publication of such documents. Consequently, our Government, through our Minister to Peking, called China's attention to this established custom. We have never attempted to oblige the Chinese peace delegates to desist from publishing any treaties or agreements. We have never tried to prevent them from submitting any demands or claims to the Peace Congress. To say that Japan threatened or coerced China is a sinister perversion of facts. Our policy in China has been clearly defined, and we are definitely pledged to uphold that policy. The essence of that policy is to bring about a better understanding between China and Japan. With that end in view, our Government is formulating measures of co-operation upon equitable basis. We are willing and ready to support and help carry out any claims which China is justly and reasonably entitled to advance. It is highly regrettable that in certain quarters reprehensible efforts are being made for the es-

trangement of China and Japan, circulating rumors which do not contain even the faintest shadow of truth. Time will come when the whole truth will be known—when the blame will be placed where it properly belongs.”

If it is China's intention to confess before the world that she is incapable of putting her own house in order, and that she must have the assistance and co-operation of the Powers in formulating her railway and financial policy, why should she confine herself to the discussion of the innocent agreements with Japan, ignoring that she has contracted more important railway and loan agreements with other Powers? The question is, how far China intends to go on this proposition. If she singles out Japan, and makes her the sole object of attack, her purpose is obviously sinister. Examining the record of China's dealings with foreign governments or concessionaires in the past several years, we find the following among the more important agreements already made:

1. Russian-Belgian concession to build railway from Ran-chow to Hai-mon—August, 1912.
2. Russo-Mongolian Treaty—November, 1912.
3. Belgium secures silver mining concession in Hupeh Province—January, 1913.
4. Russo-Mongolian Loan Agreement—June, 1913.
5. Draft of Chino-British convention concerning Mongolia—October, 1913.
6. France acquires concession to build railways

from Yan-nan to Cheng-tu in Sze-chuen Province—February, 1914.

7. The Standard Oil Company acquires concession to exploit oil fields in Shen-si Province—February, 1914.

8. American interests reported to have acquired a naval port on the Fukien Coast—February, 1914.

9. England acquires concession to build railway from Nan-king to Shang-sha—March, 1914.

10. England acquires concession to build railway from Hsu-chow, Honan Province to Jeng-Yang, Hupeh Province—May, 1914.

11. France acquires exclusive privilege to build railways and exploit mines in Kwang-si Province—September, 1914.

12. The Russo-Chinese treaty concerning Mongolia—June, 1915.

13. American International Corporation acquires the privilege to build 1,100 miles of railways in China—October, 1916.

14. American International Corporation acquires the right to repair the Grand Canal of China—October, 1916.

15. France forcibly seizes a strip of land at Tient-sin—October, 1916.

16. Chicago Continental Commerical Bank contracts a loan of \$30,000,000 to the Chinese Government—November, 1916.

17. American bankers enter agreement with China for a loan of unspecified amount—July, 1918.

Some of these concessions are far more vital than those given to the Japanese. It is well known that England claims the vast Yangtse Valley, measuring some 362,000 square miles, as her sphere of influence where she does not allow any other nation to build railways. It is also a matter of common knowledge that France regards Yun-nan, Kwan-si, and part of Szu-chuan, as her sphere of influence, claiming the exclusive right to build railways and exploit mines. What is China going to do about such claims? If she proposes to discuss Japanese railway concessions at the Peace Congress, why not also discuss more extensive concessions granted to other Powers? While China's hands were tied by the constant revolutionary uprisings in recent years, Russia and England steadily encroached upon Mongolia (1,300,000 square miles), and Tibet (500,000 square miles), and yet China does not propose to bring this grave matter before the Peace Congress. It takes no extraordinary insight to discern that China is actuated by sinister motives.

What the Chinese peace envoys have been trying to do at the Peace Congress is plain enough. They want to counteract Japan's growing influence in China by courting and inviting assistance from Western Powers. This is nothing but an application of China's traditional diplomatic axiom, known as *Yuan Chiao Chien Kung*, meaning "check your neighbor by befriending those who are further from you." Not only have the Chinese applied this

axiom to their diplomacy in modern times, but they had for many centuries practiced it among themselves, when their country was divided into small states fighting with one another. Since her entrance into the comity of nations, China has assiduously cultivated the subtle art of setting one power against another, thus hoping to save herself from disintegration by creating discord among the powers interested in her country. Acting upon that principle China thinks it best to check Japan's influence by discrediting her before the world, and by alienating British and American sympathy from her.

Besides contriving to create an impression that Japan had exacted secret treaties, the Chinese peace delegation has made it a point to intimate that Japan is determined to retain Kiau-chow. The mission has, all the way from Peking to Paris, strewn their path, as it were, with proclamations and announcements to the effect that they would insist upon the restoration of Kiau-chow to China. There was, of course, no need of such pronunciamentos, for the Chinese knew full well that Japan intended, with all sincerity, to return the territory to China. But China had other purposes to serve. She thought it shrewd diplomacy to accentuate the impression, already existing abroad, that Japan is aggressive and is eager to attain the political domination of China.

For the sake of China's good name, it is highly regrettable that her peace envoys, in their zeal to discredit Japan, have resorted to tactics which will

recoil upon their own reputations. The Chinese diplomats, upon their arrival in Paris, insinuated that the secret treaties, which they intended to publish, had been stolen by Japanese agents, while they were passing through Japan. What good would it do Japan to steal from the Chinese envoys documents whose duplicates are securely stored in the vaults of the Foreign Office of China? No Japanese thinks that the Chinese diplomats are so foolish as to carry away with them any diplomatic documents without leaving their originals or copies with their Government. The treasured documents have, of course, been found safe in the bag in which they had been placed, but to this later report the press has given but scant notice. It is equally regrettable that some of China's friends in America should go so far as to intimate that the recent murder at Washington of three Chinese educational commissioners was the work of Japanese agents. Instead of offering such gratuitous explanation, they should have advised the Chinese in America to get rid of their proverbial gunmen and put an end to the century-long *tong* war, whose nature and purpose no one knows but they.

## CHAPTER X

### THE JAPANESE ADVANCE IN CHINA

The Ishii-Lansing understanding—Self-preservation underlying motive of Japanese policy in China—Japan anxious to get iron and coal from China—Japan's precarious industrial structure—Japan's interest in the Han Yey Ping Company—To solve her population problem Japan must become an industrial nation—The blunder of the "twenty-one demands"—The "group five" of those demands—The supply of arms to China—Foreign advisers to China—The Chino-Japanese treaties of May, 1915—Transformation of Manchuria under Japanese management—Dr. Martin on extraterritorial rights in China—The fall of the Okuma Cabinet due to its failures in China—The Terauchi Cabinet and China—The Hara Cabinet's policy in China.

In entering into various economic agreements with China, which we have discussed in the preceding chapter, Japan was undoubtedly encouraged by the Ishii-Lansing understanding of November, 1917. In the memorable notes exchanged between Viscount Ishii and Mr. Lansing, we find the following recognition of principle:

"The government of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part in which her possessions are contiguous."



The understanding was couched in flexible terms permitting of various interpretations. But if we may gauge the official sentiment at Washington through the press dispatches from the capital at the time the understanding was consummated, the American Government was prepared to go a long way towards the establishment of the principle that Japan was entitled to secure a paramount influence in certain sections in China, as long as she does not encroach upon the "open door" principle. Japan has special interests of a semi-political nature in Shantung, it was said in such dispatches, which she wrested from Germany, by reason of its vicinity to Port Arthur, to Korea, and to the Japanese islands. It was further recognized that the prosperity of the island of Formosa and its successful administration by Japan is largely dependent upon conditions in the Chinese province of Fukien, separated only by a narrow strait. Japanese railway concessions in Manchuria were likewise regarded as proper objects of special Japanese interests, not to detail large private-owned Japanese business enterprises in China proper.

It must be frankly admitted that ever since China opened her doors to western nations, her territory has been regarded as a "happy hunting ground" by concession-seekers of all, but especially of European, countries. Her inefficiency, her impotency, and the general disorganization and corruption of her administrative system have been such as to invite a veritable universal scramble for concessions. This regret-

table state of things had been prevailing for several decades before little Japan awakened and entered the Chinese field at the eleventh hour—before she became a political and economic factor to be reckoned with in the adjustment of Far Eastern affairs. To the Japanese, it is certain that, unless they take the necessary measures of precaution, the whole province of China will sooner or later be held in the grip of Western interests. Of course she could not, even if she would, undertake to safeguard all the vast dominion of China, but she must by all means forestall the establishment of preponderating western influence in such sections of that dominion as are contiguous or adjacent to her own territories.

It is, therefore, mainly dictates of self-preservation which impelled Japan to enter into the Ishii-Lansing agreement, and which urges her to secure her position in Manchuria, Shan-tung, and Fukien. Had China had a well organized government, capable of developing her own resources, and fully prepared to protect her own interests against Western onslaught, Japan's policy in those sections would have taken a totally different course.

There is another factor which must be recognized in discussing Japanese activities in China. The teeming millions of Nippon, confined within their own narrow precincts, and forbidden, by the mandate of western nations, to emigrate to any of the territories occupied or controlled by the white races, must perforce find a field of activity within their

own sphere. With this in view Japan is eager to convert herself into a great industrial and commercial nation. If she fails in this attempt, she must eventually perish from congestion, stagnation and inanition. And in order to become a foremost industrial nation, she must have the essential materials of modern industry such as iron and coal.

To her great disadvantage, Japan has little of such materials in her own country. The volume of iron ores produced at home is but a fraction of what Japan actually consumes. Of coal she has a considerable output, but none that is available for coking purposes. Without coke the steel industry is impossible. China is the country to which Japan must logically and naturally look for the supply of iron ores and coking coal. That is why Japan is anxious to secure mining concessions in China, before China's mines and collieries, unutilized by herself, will be all but mortgaged to Western nations—nations which have already secured vast colonies in different parts of the world, and which have plenty of raw materials and mineral supplies in their own territories.

Japan's output of ores, including that of Korea, amounts only to some 324,000 tons, equivalent to 160,000 tons in pig iron. As against this small output, Japan consumed in 1917, 1,300,000 tons of steel and pig iron.

Before the war this deficiency was partly supplied by steel imported from England and Belgium. When

the war cut off this source of supply Japan turned to the United States for relief. For three years—from the fall of 1914 and to the summer of 1917—Japan's shipyards and iron works were enabled to work almost entirely with material furnished by steel mills in America. But in July, 1917, the United States, too, declared an embargo upon steel, and the activities of Japanese shipyards and iron works came suddenly to a halt. At that moment Japan had 300,000 tons of ships in course of construction at various yards. The American embargo virtually stopped work on all such ships. Never before did Japan realize so keenly as on that occasion the precarious nature of her industrial structure, depending upon foreign countries for the supply of steel.

The American embargo intensified Japan's national desire, long uppermost in the minds of her industrial leaders, for the independence of her steel industry from foreign mills. That desire soon became a national slogan. And yet how is Japan to translate that slogan into a reality? She has but scant supply of ores at home. What she is at present getting from China and Manchuria is far from commensurate with her demand. Unless Japan succeeds in entering into a satisfactory agreement with China for the further development of China's iron resources, her industrial structure will never be placed upon a secure foundation.

What iron Japan has been getting from China comes almost exclusively from the Tayeh mines on

the Yang-tsu river. These mines are owned and operated by a Chinese corporation called the Han Yeh Ping Company, which also operates the Han Yang Iron Works and the Ping Shang coal mines. Ever since its establishment, in 1898, its finances have been in such an unhappy condition that it has contracted with the Yokohama Specie Bank of Japan various loans totalling \$40,000,000. In spite of the huge loan it has advanced, the Japanese bank has no voice in the management of the business of the Han Yeh Ping Company. All it is permitted to do is to oversee the expenditures of the company.

The loan contract now in force stipulates that the Chinese company shall supply the Japanese Government Iron Works at Wakamatsu with 8,000,000 tons of pig iron and 15,000,000 tons of ore in forty yearly installments beginning with 1914. The volume to be supplied in one year is not fixed, as it will have to vary according to the output at the Tayeh mines and at the Han Yang Iron Works. In 1915 the company delivered to Japan 110,000 tons of pig iron and 250,000 tons of ore. This supply, considerable as it may seem, falls far short of Japan's actual demand, which will soon reach 2,000,000 tons per annum.

In these conditions can we not find a factor impelling Japan to seek greater sources of iron and coal supply in China, untrammelled by the obstacles of China's domestic and foreign politics? Whether Japan succeeds in this attempt is not a question of aggrandizement, but a question of life or death.

With her growing population forbidden to seek opportunities in countries where profitable employment awaits their toil, with her food product inadequate to supply her own need, Japan must perforce become an industrial country. Surely the Western nations, which have agreed among themselves to exclude the Japanese from their own territories, will not conspire to block Japan's way in that part of Eastern Asia where she seeks nothing more than the means of self-preservation.

We have seen in the preceding chapter that economic advantages secured by the Japanese in China, especially in Manchuria and Shang-tung, are nothing extraordinary—nothing different from, or more than, those obtained by other nations in other sections of China. As such there is nothing menacing or dangerous about them. Why is it, then, that the Chinese envoys should make so much ado about them? Why is it that the outside world should also view them with alarm?

In the previous chapter I have given some of the chief reasons for this peculiar attitude on the part of China and the outside world. Here I must note that Japan's diplomatic blunders in pressing the celebrated "twenty-one demands" upon China in the spring of 1915 have been a factor, which has, to no small extent, been responsible for provoking anti-Japanese feeling in China and in the West. Had Japan acted more diplomatically and with greater discretion and saner judgment, in the spring of 1915, her later move

with regard to Manchuria and Shantung would have been permitted to pass unchallenged. The present hostility towards Japan is mainly the aftermath of the bitter controversy created by the twenty-one demands, for which the Okuma Cabinet at Tokyo was responsible. The Chinese opposition, which Japan is facing to-day in the matter of economic agreements she has recently secured in Manchuria and Shantung, is largely the harvest from the seeds she had sown in the twenty-one demands.

Nothing shows more clearly than the attitude assumed by Japan in presenting those demands to China that the Sunrise Empire has adopted Western vices as much as it has emulated Western virtues. Tokyo's diplomacy in the case of the twenty-one demands was exactly the diplomacy that has for more than half a century been practiced in China by London, by Paris, by Vienna, by Berlin, by St. Petersburg.

Not that those demands were in principle wrong and unjustifiable, but because they were pressed upon China in utter disregard of the susceptibilities of the nation whose friendship she had been professing to value. The details of the negotiations that followed are too well known to require reiteration here, but there are a few points which might still be emphasized.

In the first place, Japan ought to have published the contents of the demands simultaneously with their presentation to China, and transmitted them

at least to the British Foreign Office. There was no reason why the Japanese diplomat should avoid publicity, if he had, as he undoubtedly did, sincere confidence in the reasonableness of the demands. Instead of taking this sensible course, he urged upon President Yuan Shi-kai the observance of strict secrecy. Could any one with common sense imagine that Yuan would keep silence, when he knew he could, through publicity, arouse the sympathy of the world in his favor and thus succeed in warding off at least some of the demands?

Even more reprehensible was the overbearing manner in which the demands were submitted to the Chinese President. With no previous warning, with no previous exchange of views with the Chinese Foreign Department, Japan abruptly brought forward an apparently formidable set of demands, and placed them directly in President Yuan's hands, thus ignoring the usual channel and the established etiquette of diplomatic presentation.

When we look at the twenty-one demands in cold blood, compare them with concessions and special privileges wrested from China by other Powers, and consider them in the light of China's decaying condition, creating an international "battle for concessions and loans"—when we look at the question in this light, we can realize that the twenty-one demands had cogent reasons behind them, and that they were of no nature to justify the great excitement created at the time.



The ways of the diplomacy of the old school, no matter of what power, are always devious. The world would be better off if there were no such thing as diplomacy. Had there been no Wilhelmstrasse, no Quai d'Orsay, no Downing Street, there would have been no Kasumi-ga-seki at Tokyo. In submitting the twenty-one demands to China in January, 1915, Japan resorted to the usual methods of dickering. The so-called group five was included in the demands unquestionably for the purpose of driving the best bargain. The evidence of this is found in the following instruction which Foreign Minister Baron Kato handed to Mr. Eki Hioki, the Japanese Minister at Peking, on December 3, 1914, i. e., forty-six days before the submission of the demands to the Chinese Government:

"As regards the proposals contained in the fifth group, they are presented as the wishes of the Imperial Government. The matters which are dealt with under this category are entirely different in character from those which are included in the first four groups. An adjustment, at this time, of these matters, some of which have been pending between the two countries, being nevertheless highly desirable for the advancement of the friendly relations between Japan and China as well as for safeguarding their common interests, you are also requested to exercise your best efforts to have our wishes carried out."

Even if group five were not "wishes" but real

"demands" I see no cause for excitement, provided they were presented in an unoffensive manner. Take for instance, the proposition concerning the supply of arms. China's urgent need to-day is not only an efficient civil administration but a well organized system of defense. In the organization of an effective military power the unification of arms is as essential as the training of officers and men. Can we not understand why Japan expressed her wish for the establishment of Chino-Japanese arsenals or the purchase of Japanese arms? Japan believes that China's military organization, if not guided and rehabilitated by her, will eventually be controlled by some European nation by no means congenial to her. Signs of this unhappy tendency were clearly discernible before the outbreak of the European war.

Again, the employment of foreign advisers is unmistakably one of China's sovereign rights, which under normal conditions does not permit of foreign interference. But when a nation proves so wayward in the management of its own affairs as to jeopardize the welfare and safety of its neighbors, it becomes the right and duty of the neighbors to urge upon that nation such measures as will remove the cause of such embarrassment. Did not the United States play an important part in the secession of Panama from Columbia? Has she not assumed the control of the finances and police power of Haiti when Haiti has become troublesome to her? And are not Americans urging their Government to deal rigorously with

Mexico? With the Monroe Doctrine firmly established, and endowed with enormous potential power to back that doctrine, the United States may remain calm with regard to Mexico, while Japan, enjoying no such advantage, is extremely restive with regard to China.

To many Japanese it appears obvious that China, left to her own resources, will eventually become the Turkey of the Far East, if it has not already become such. Students of Near Eastern affairs all know what a hotbed of plots and intrigues the Turkish capital has been in the past half century. Russia, Germany, England, France, Austria and Italy all played more or less important parts in the great tragi-comedy staged for the alien control of the Ottoman Empire. In their zeal to push their selfish interests, they disregarded all decency in their diplomacy. They employed women of dubious character, bribed eunuchs, corrupted officials, and spread over the whole country a network of espionage. In this rivalry for the control of the Sublime Porte Germany, just before the war, proved a winner. What is the result? Not only did the Turkish Government become a tool in the hands of Germany, but the Turkish army and navy were dominated by the Kaiser's officers. The fate of Constantinople is a vivid lesson to China and Japan.

To Americans, unable to understand Japan's singular position in the Far East, it perhaps makes but little difference whether China is dominated by

England, Germany, France, Russia or Japan. From the Japanese point of view it is different. With the history of European diplomacy in the Near and Far East before them, the Japanese cannot but shudder at thought of the day when China shall be held fast in the grip of Western Powers.

The substance of the Chino-Japanese agreements, which were entered into as the result of the twenty-one demands, is briefly told. Japan agreed to return Kiau-chow to China, provided the Powers would, after the war, permit Japan to dispose of it in this manner. It was with this end in view that in February, 1917, Foreign Minister Motono secured from England, France and Italy a promise to allow Japan to acquire German possessions in Shantung. She considered this step necessary in order to secure the right to restore Kiau-chow to China in conformity with the agreement she made with Peking in the spring of 1915.

In eastern Inner Mongolia, Japan, in order to offset the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia, proposed to establish a foothold. In South Manchuria, Japan secured the extension of the lease of Port Arthur and of the concession of the South Manchuria railway. She also obtained for Japanese subjects the privilege to travel, reside and engage in agricultural and commercial pursuits in any part of South Manchuria. This will greatly facilitate the industrial development of Manchuria. With all the limitations they had to contend with in the past, the

Japanese have already created in Manchuria a vast new industry, the bean industry, benefiting not only the natives of Manchuria but tens of thousands of coolies of Shantung province. Where ten years ago Manchurian farmers barely eked out a living, they are to-day exporting \$40,000,000 worth of beans and bean-cake. This is entirely due to Japanese enterprise. Observing this transformation of Manchuria, even Mr. Frederick Moore, at times openly unfriendly to Japan, had to make the following admission:

“The Chinese are a backward race, wasting their opportunities because of ignorance and the intense selfishness which centuries of most wretched individual struggling for sustenance has engendered. That China would be materially better off under their (Japanese) organization cannot be disputed. Before the Japanese came to Manchuria the people used to raise enough soy beans to support life. If they raised more there was no means of shipping them, and if they made money brigands or officials robbed them of the surplus. To-day tens of thousands of coolies cross the Gulf of Chihli annually from Shantung Province to help harvest the great bean crops which go by Japanese railroad and steamship lines to Europe and compete there with the products of American cotton seed. It would be so, I have no doubt, with all China, were the Japanese to assume control. The Japanese would profit most, but the Chinese would also greatly benefit. The majority of

the people (we have Manchuria as an example) would be glad of the opportunity to make a living where they are on the constant verge of starvation to-day. A coolie is lucky in China to draw a regular wage of three dollars a month; he will even raise a family on that income."

But to return to the Chino-Japanese agreements under consideration. With regard to Fukien Province, close to the Japanese island of Formosa, China engages not to grant any foreign Power the right to build any shipyard, military or naval station. China also promises to safeguard the Japanese investment, amounting to more than \$40,000,000, in the Han-yeh-ping Company, and not to contract for it any foreign loan other than Japanese. Japan's interests in this company have been more fully described in an earlier passage in this chapter.

Finally, one may find an objectionable feature in the provision that the Chinese police regulations and Chinese taxation measures in Manchuria, to be applied to the Japanese, must be approved by the Japanese consul. This is, however, an inevitable consequence of permitting the Japanese to travel and reside in the interior districts of South Manchuria, where there is no administrative system to which people from civilized countries can entrust the security of life and property. I shall let the late Dr. W. A. P. Martin, one of the most sympathetic critics of China, speak on this question. Says this friend of China:

"Such exemption is customary in Turkey and other Moslem countries, not to say among the Negroes of Africa. It was recognized by treaty in Japan; and the Japanese, in proportion as they advanced in the path of reform, felt galled by an exception which fixed on them the stigma of barbarism. When they had proved their right to a place in the comity of nations, with good laws administered, foreign powers cheerfully consented to allow them the exercise of all the prerogatives of sovereignty.

"How does her period of probation compare with that of her neighbor? Japan resolved on national renovation on Western lines in 1868. China came to no such resolution until the collapse of her attempt to exterminate the foreigner in 1900. With her the age of reform dates from the return of the Court in 1902—as compared with Japan four years to thirty! Then what a contrast in the animus of the two countries! The one characterized by law and order, the other by mob violence, unrestrained, if not instigated, by the authorities!

"When the north wind tried to compel a traveller to take off his cloak, the cloak was wrapped the closer and held the tighter. When the sun came out with his warm beams, the traveller stripped it off of his own accord.

"The sunrise empire has exemplified the latter method; China prefers the former. Is it not to be feared that the apparent success of the boycott will

encourage her to persist in the policy of the traveler in the north wind. She ought to be notified that she is on probation, and that the only way to recover the exercise of her sovereign rights is to show herself worthy of confidence. The Boxer outbreak postponed by many years the withdrawal of the cloak of ex-territoriality, and every fresh exhibition of mob violence defers that event to a more distant date."

We have noted the substance of the Chino-Japanese agreements concluded in May, 1915, as the consequence of the twenty-one demands. Had the Japanese diplomats at the helm been more sagacious and far-sighted, they could in time have accomplished more than was attained by those demands, without, at the same time, provoking such a great furore as was witnessed in the spring of 1915. The fall of the Okuma Cabinet in October, 1916, was mainly due to the failure of its Chinese policy. The Terauchi Cabinet, which succeeded the Okuma Cabinet, came into power with a promise to create a better understanding with China. Terauchi's Chinese policy was indicated in the following statement made before the House of Representatives by Foreign Minister Viscount Motono, in January, 1917:

"Why is it that China at times cherishes towards us misgivings and a certain animosity? The chief cause seems to be the tendency in certain circles of our country to interfere in the internal quarrels of China. Since the overthrow of the Tsing Dynasty and the establishment of the republic, various



political parties have been formed in China, and we have in Japan people who are in sympathy with one or another of these parties. These people have a marked propensity to assist the particular party which is in sympathy with their own political or personal views. I believe that all these persons are prompted by perfect good-will, but the consequences are deplorable. We have gained nothing but the animosity of our neighbors as well as misunderstanding of our real intentions by other nations.

“The present Cabinet absolutely repudiates these courses. We desire to maintain very cordial relations with China. We desire only the gradual accomplishment of all the reforms which China proposes to make for her future development. We shall spare no pains to come to her assistance, if she desires it. We shall try to let her understand our sincere sentiments, and it is for her to decide whether to trust us or not. We have no intention of favoring one or another of the political parties in China. We desire to keep up relations of cordial amity with China herself, but not with this or that political party. It is essential for us that China should be able to develop in a normal manner in the path of progress. What we fear most is her disintegration as the result of continued internal troubles and disorder. We shall make every effort to the end that China may never find herself in such a position, for it is essential to us that she should maintain her independence and territorial integrity.”

During its tenure of a year and a half, the Terauchi ministry made honest efforts to befriend China. And indeed it reasonably succeeded in making friends with the Cabinet at Peking which was headed by Tuan Chi-jui. But the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet, recognized by all foreign Governments as it was, represented only one faction against which many other factions were pitted. While the Terauchi Cabinet was dealing with the Cabinet at Peking on friendly terms, the southern faction or factions, which set up a semblance of government at Canton, sent many emissaries to Tokyo and appealed to Terauchi for help. However sympathetic as Terauchi might have been, he could not deal with the South, knowing that the Cabinet at Peking was the only *de facto* government of China. Whatever may be Terauchi's shortcomings, he is a sincere man and has never resorted to double-dealing.

In order to maintain friendly relations with the *de facto* Government at Peking, the Terauchi Cabinet entered, or induced private interests to enter, into agreements advancing loans to Peking which was hard pressed for money, and which appealed to Terauchi for relief. This was not agreeable to the factions opposed to the Chinese Cabinet then in power. As long as the same Cabinet held its own, with Tuan Chi-jui as its head, Japan's official relations with China was apparently amicable. But the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet had to fall in October, 1918, and the succeeding Cabinet has been organized by

men not friendly to Tuan Chi-jui. In this Cabinet, or more properly factional, change lies one of the main reasons for the refractory attitude assumed by the Chinese peace envoys towards Japan.

Almost simultaneously with the fall of the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet at Peking, the Terauchi Cabinet at Tokyo was succeeded by a more democratic cabinet headed by Takashi Hara, whom the Western press calls the "Great Commoner" of Japan. The Hara Cabinet, recognizing the failures of its predecessor, put an injunction upon the advancement of further loans to China, and launched, at the same time, a movement to effect a reconciliation between the northern and southern factions in China. That was the main feature of Japanese policy in China, when the curtain rose upon the historic scene of the Peace Congress, as we have noted at the outset of Chapter V.

## CHAPTER XI

### JAPAN AND THE FINANCES OF CHINA

China's singular proposals at the Peace Congress—Her admission of inabilities—China's annual deficit—Financial difficulty main reason for her entrance into the war—Official corruption worse under the new regime—Examples of corruption—China's foreign indebtedness—Japan's share in the same—Japan's economic loans to China—Japan compelled by China to make financial advances—Japan's present financial policy in China defined by the Foreign Office—Wanted: An international supervision of China's finances—President Wilson advises American bankers to withdraw from China—Mr. Wilson reverses that advice—America's new financial policy in China.

China occupies a singular position in the Peace Congress. Her aims and purpose in joining the great concourse of the nations are unique. Not only does she seek at the Paris conference to solve such of her problems as have arisen directly from the war, but she has come there to invoke the assistance of the Powers in adjusting some of her internal affairs which have no bearing upon the war. The disposal of Kiau-chow, the former German territory in China, which the Japanese captured after military operation of some seventy days, is unquestionably a proper subject for discussion at the peace table. So are the former German railways and mining concessions in Shantung Province. But agreements and under-

standings, which have been made between the Chinese and Japanese Governments quite independently of the war and the Japanese campaign against the German territory, are obviously foreign to the scope of an international conference whose business is to dispose of the problems immediately arising out of the great war. Some of these agreements China would discuss at the peace conference. In addition, the Chinese delegation has signified the intention to ask the Powers at the peace table to decide upon a plan for China's financial rehabilitation. It would also ask them to formulate a policy for providing China with railways, concessions for which have hitherto been granted to various Powers by the Government at Peking for the sheer purpose of getting money for administrative purposes. In plain language, China, finding herself in a hopeless muddle, lays bare before the world her ills and troubles, and implores the Powers to lift her from the throes of despondency.

It is perhaps well that China should so frankly confess her inabilities, admitting that her affairs, both internal and external, require a speedy and general liquidation, politically as well as financially. She knows that the necessary liquidation cannot be accomplished without foreign assistance, and she thinks it the part of wisdom to avail herself of the golden opportunity of the Peace Congress to present her story of woes. The Peace Congress, as such, may not undertake to seek a remedy for China's internal

troubles, but when the League of Nations becomes an accomplished fact, the Powers will, and must, co-operate with one another in an effort to put China upon her own feet.

Of China's numerous troubles that which requires immediate remedy lies in her chaotic finances. The annual expenditure of the central Government totals \$236,000,000 in round figures, and its revenue amounts to only \$226,000,000. Here is a clear deficit of \$10,000,000. How is this deficit made good? Only by reckless borrowing. For many years past China has been borrowing foreign money right and left, offering various taxes or concessions as collateral in utter disregard of the ultimate welfare of the country. The worst of it is that the funds thus raised have never been entirely put in the treasury, for the officials who have any part in their control are eager to line their own pockets at the expense of the state. Even when they are actually put in the national coffers, their expenditure is directed by no honest desire to rehabilitate the finances of the nation.

The main reason for China's entrance into the war in the summer of 1917 was to seek relief from this financial plight. By declaring war upon Germany, China could repudiate the remainder of the Boxer indemnity due the Central Powers, amounting to some \$70,000,000. Moreover, she was given the privilege of postponing for five years the payment of the annual installments of \$30,000,000 of the same indemnity due the Powers other than Germany and

Austria. In addition she was promised by the entente Powers a substantial raise in import duties, which under the existing treaty not only cannot exceed five per cent. *ad valorem*, but are based upon the average prices of 1897-1899. Japan, America and England are understood to have already agreed to the desired raise of import duties.

With all such advantages as she has gained or will gain by entering the war, China's financial outlook is as dark as ever, because her trouble lies not merely in the lack of cold cash but in the proverbial corruption of officialdom.

In China's present state of official speculation and irregularity, one may be justified in wondering whether any amount of money will be of any avail for the much-needed rehabilitation of her finances. When I was in Peking last summer an English newspaper correspondent, long resident in China, told me that since the inauguration of the so-called republic the corrupt practices among officials have become much worse than under the Manchu regime. Under the old regime, he said, the tenure of officials was comparatively secure, and they did not have to think that they must "get rich quick."

From time immemorial China has had the saying: "Even the most honest governor can amass a hundred thousand dollars in three years" (*San nien ching chih-fu shih wan hsueh hua yin*). Under the Manchu regime, if an official kept his squeezing practices within "reasonable" bounds he did not have to

worry himself about his position. With the advent of the republican government all this has changed. To-day no cabinet knows how long it is going to last. And if a cabinet changes, most functionaries, both central and provincial, must also change. Consequently everybody is eager to make hay while the sun shines. Is it any wonder that in the past few years the most flagrant cases of official corruption have come to light?

To illustrate this universal corruption, let us note a few notorious examples.

From distant Yun-nan, the birthplace of the anti-monarchist movement, which destroyed Yuan Shikai, there set forth in the fall of 1916 a band of patriots bound for the capital. The party included the newly appointed Minister of Justice, seven members of the Parliament, a large-headed General who had led a brigade in the fight for freedom, and secretaries and servants of the above-mentioned notabilities. At a certain stage of their journey by sea to Shanghai a telegram was sent giving warning of their approach and requesting the Customs facilities usually accorded to high officials.

Here it must be observed that the Chinese Customs are not controlled by the Central Government at Peking, but are in the hands of a body of foreign officials who collect the revenue derived from this source, pay it into certain designated foreign banks, and this money is allotted to pay interest on the foreign loans secured on the Customs revenues.



Under these circumstances the English and French officials of the Customs Service are not, as a rule, overawed by the dignity of the Chinese members of Parliament, who generally received as even-handed treatment as mere plain citizens or foreign merchants, but, on occasions, even Homer nods.

Well, on arrival at Shanghai the baggage of the party was bowed past the inspecting officers without examination, and joyfully removed to a native hotel in the International Settlement. There then followed a quick distribution of the baggage to the far corners of the city. The municipal police, however, arrived just in time to catch the last four trunks, and to arrest the M. P.'s in charge. These gentlemen bitterly opposed the examination of their belongings, and swore that the trunks contained nothing but official papers. But the foreign policemen, being without bowels, forcibly opened the boxes, and found them filled to the brim with opium. They obtained other evidence, which enabled them to trace twenty more trunks to the official residence of the Chinese city magistrate. These, being found in an adjacent house, were given up, and on examination were also found to contain "official papers!" The opium seized was valued at \$750,000, and there were thirty-six trunks missing, believed to contain opium worth \$1,125,000.

In 1917, Hsu Shih-ying and Wan Fo-wei, Minister and Vice-Minister of Communication respectively, were indicted on charges of irregular practices in

connection with the purchase of freight cars for the Tientsin-Pukow railway. The comical part of this case was that the prosecuting officer of the Tientsin Court, having been bribed with a substantial sum (\$100,000, it was said), permitted Wan Fo-wei, one of the defendants, to flee from China.

About the time of the above case, Chin Chientao, Doctor of Philosophy of Yale University, and then Minister of Finance, was arrested on the charge of receiving bribes from a certain Chinese organization to which he had granted the exclusive privilege of handling copper coins.

In 1914, Hsiung Hsi-ling had to resign his post as Prime Minister, as the Parliament impeached him for misappropriating antique treasures belonging to the Imperial palace at Jehol.

In 1911 a politician named Yang-tu secured a loan of \$150,000 from a foreign firm ostensibly for the purpose of reconstructing the city of Hankow which had been destroyed in the revolutionary upheaval. The strange thing is that the city never got a cent of that sum, and no one knows how Mr. Yang disposed of it.

It is extremely unpleasant to note such cases of corruption, but the time has come when the world must know the truth about China's financial affairs. In the face of these painful truths the question is irresistible; should the Powers decline to advance any more money to China, or if they continue to make loans, under what conditions?

Of late, wild rumors have been afloat as to the financial hold which Japan is alleged to have established upon China. If all such rumors were true, Japan would soon gain a controlling influence in China. The truth is that Japan has merely entered a wedge into a field long monopolized by European Powers. At the end of 1916 China's long-term foreign indebtedness, including the Boxer indemnity, totaled approximately \$633,000,000. In addition to this, she had short-term debts aggregating \$36,000,000. Besides these, her railway loans amounted to \$189,000,000.

All told, China's outstanding external loans in 1916 amounted to some \$867,000,000. Of this total Japan's share was only about \$30,000,000, including about \$10,000,000 of the Boxer indemnity.

During 1917 and 1918 Japan, under the Terauchi Cabinet, advanced considerable sums. These Japanese loans were not political, but economic loans, contracted for the purpose of building railways, establishing iron works or developing natural resources in Manchuria and Shantung Province. Such enterprises involve an expenditure of some \$150,000,000, but the advances actually made to the Chinese Government do not exceed \$25,000,000. The loan contracts explicitly provide that no part of the loans shall be used for any other purpose than those specified therein. But in China's present chaotic state of finances, with no able honest foreigner to supervise them, there is no knowing how

funds realized by foreign loans will be used once they are handed over to Chinese officials. At the time Japan advanced these loans, internecine warfare was going on between the Northern faction, represented by the Tuan Chi-jui cabinet, the *de facto* government at Peking, and the Southern faction headed nominally by Dr. Sun Yatsen, but in reality by a number of ambitious "leaders" in Canton, Yunnan, and Sze-chuan provinces. It is conceivable that the *de facto* Government at Peking, having received loans from Japan for economic purposes fixed in the contract, misused some of the funds in carrying on war against the South. Professor James F. Abbott, discussing this peculiar aspect of the Chinese question, makes the following observation:

"It would seem that the constant warfare going on in a neighboring state with its attendant disruption of normal trade would be a most serious detriment to Japan, yet it appears to be a fact that without the loans which Japan has been making to China, military activities in that unhappy land would be sadly curtailed. For without funds the various military governors would be unable long to maintain their armies. And in spite of the ostensible purposes for which the loans have been raised, the money in practically every instance has been squandered in the army."

What Professor Abbott says is true enough, but we must sympathize with Japan for her peculiarly

difficult position in dealing with China. China sorely needs money, and she does not care where she gets it. Various factions in China—those in power at Peking as well as those opposing them—would say to Japan: "We want you to lend us money. You cannot afford to refuse. If you do not accomodate us, we will borrow from some other nation, and that would be detrimental to your prestige and influence in our country."

Of course, the Chinese diplomats, past masters in etiquette as they understand it, would not talk so brusquely, but however gracefully the idea may be expressed, the implied threat cannot be overlooked. Like the Russian Bolshevik, Chinese diplomats would say "Our weakness is our strength." Japan feels that she cannot sit quiet under the impending danger of having her influence in China undermined by the advent of third Powers whom China threatens to invite, if Japan fails to comply with her requests for money. But that is not the worst Japan has to face. If Chinese cabinet changes after Japan handed over money, there is no knowing what the new cabinet may do. It may seek to abrogate the contracts into which its predecessor entered in good faith.

It is not, of course, Japan's money alone that has been subject to misuse. In 1916 a Chicago bank entered into a contract, agreeing to advance \$30,000,000 to the Yuan Shih-kai Government for the specific purpose of reforming the Bank of China. Of this total \$5,000,000 was handed to Yuan Shi-

kai as the first installment. When this transaction was consummated, Eugene Chen, the erratic editor of the *Peking Gazette*, vehemently attacked the deal, deploring that "American gold would soon kill Chinese freedom." To this Chinese editor it was obvious that the American loan would be used by Yuan Shih-kai not for banking reform but for the suppression of the republican movement in the South. When in the spring of 1917, the Chicago banker went to Peking to investigate how the \$5,000,000 he had advanced in the preceding year had been used, he could obtain no satisfactory accounting from the Chinese authorities.

Under the Terauchi cabinet, Japan recognized the Government at Peking, as did all other Powers, and refused to deal with the Southern factions. It enjoined all private interests in Japan not to advance any funds to the South. What loans it advanced to the authorities at Peking were advanced in good faith, making it plain to the Chinese that no part of the funds should be used for political purposes. But the fact cannot be ignored that the funds were misused at the hands of the northern factions. Consequently, the Hara Cabinet, which succeeded the Terauchi ministry in September, 1918, recognized the necessity of reversing the policy of its predecessor, and in the middle of December issued, through the Foreign Office, the following statement:

"Mischievous reports of Japanese activities in China, more particularly with regard to the grant-

ing of loans, have for some time past been in circulation and have imputed to the Japanese government intentions which are entirely foreign to it. For obvious reasons, the Japanese government cannot undertake to discourage financial and economic enterprises of their nationals in China, so long as those enterprises are the natural and legitimate outgrowth of special relations between the two neighboring and friendly nations.

"Nor is the Japanese government at all receding from its readiness to render needed financial assistance to China, consistently with the terms of all the declarations and engagements to which it is a party, should the general security and welfare of China call for such assistance.

"At the same time, it fully realizes that loans supplied to China, under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country, are liable to create misunderstandings on the part of either of the contending factions and to interfere with the re-establishment of peace and unity in China, so essential to her own interests as well as to the interests of the foreign powers.

"Accordingly, the Japanese government decided to withhold such financial assistance to China, as is likely, in its opinion, to add to the complications of her internal situation, believing that this policy will be cordially participated in by all the powers interested in China."

There is no doubt that China must have foreign

assistance in the rehabilitation of her financial conditions. By foreign aid I mean not only the advance of money, but also an international supervision of the finances of China. However distasteful to China it may be, the time has come—it indeed came long ago—when she must face the situation squarely, and frankly admit that her financial affairs cannot be reorganized upon a sound basis without some sort of international supervision. No amount of funds, if entirely left in the hands of native officials, can do China any good. In the great task of China's financial rehabilitation, therefore, all civilized nations must co-operate. Obviously it is too gigantic an undertaking for any single nation. Even if an opulent, resourceful nation like the United States be in a position single-handed to undertake the task, China's foreign relations have become so sadly complicated that other Powers will not acquiesce in such an arrangement. The best thing that America can do in the interest of China would be to become a leading member in an international body which must sooner or later be organized for the surveillance of China's financial affairs.

Viewed in this light the withdrawal of America from the so-called six-power group, organized for the purpose of financing the Chinese Government, was highly regrettable. Signifying his opposition to any scheme which might interfere with China's financial autonomy, President Wilson, on March 18, 1913, issued the following statement:



"We are informed that at the request of the last administration a certain group of American bankers undertook to participate in the loan now desired by the government of China (approximately \$125,000,000).

"Our government wished American bankers to participate along with bankers of other nations because it desired that the good will of the United States toward China should be exhibited in this practical way, that American capital should have access to that great country, and that the United States should be in a position to share with the other powers any political responsibilities that might be associated with the development of the foreign relations of China in connection with her industrial and commercial enterprises. The present administration has been asked by this group of bankers whether it would also request them to participate in the loan.

"The representatives of the bankers through whom the administration was approached declared that they would continue to seek their share of the loan under the proposed agreements, only if expressly requested to do so by the government. The administration has declined to make such a request, because it did not approve the conditions of the loan or the implications of responsibility on its own part which it was plainly told would be involved in the request.

"The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it

ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency or forcible interference in the financial, and even the political affairs of that great oriental state, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people.

“The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes—some of them antiquated and burdensome—to secure the loan, but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the government of our people rests.”

With all our sincere admiration for the dignified attitude assumed by Mr. Wilson, we cannot but believe that the principle laid down in the above statement will prove impracticable. That it has already proved impracticable seems evident from the gradual change of attitude on the part of the American Government. In plain language, Mr. Wilson has come to understand China a little better. In the summer of 1918 it was reported that the State Department had decided to inaugurate a policy which would virtually reverse the principle enunciated in Mr. Wilson's statement of March, 1913.

In accordance with this new policy, the American Government will no longer stand aloof from American bankers interested in Chinese loans, but "will be willing to aid in every possible way, and to make prompt and vigorous representations, and to take every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by American citizens in foreign lands." This policy was outlined by the State Department as follows:

"First, the formation of a group of American bankers to make a loan or loans and to consist of representatives from different parts of the country.

"Second, an assurance on the part of the bankers that they will co-operate with the Government and follow the policies outlined by the Department of State.

"Third, submission of the names of the banks who will compose the group for the approval by the Department of State.

"Fourth, submission of the terms and conditions of any loan or loans for approval by the Department of State.

"Fifth, assurances that if the terms and conditions of the loan are accepted by this Government and by the government to which the loan is made, in order to encourage and facilitate the free intercourse between American citizens and foreign states which is mutually advantageous, the Government will be willing to aid in every way possible, and to make prompt and vigorous representations, and to take

every possible step to insure the execution of equitable contracts made in good faith by citizens in foreign lands.

“It is hoped that the American group will be associated with bankers of Great Britain, Japan and France. Negotiations are now in progress between the Government of the United States and those governments which, it is hoped, will result in their co-operation and in the participation by the bankers of those countries in equal parts in any loan which may be made.”

Simultaneously with the publication of the above statement, the American Government approved the loan of \$50,000,000 to China, proposed by a group of New York and Chicago bankers. When peace is restored, the American Government will not hesitate to co-operate with other Powers in the much needed financial rehabilitation of China. Without international supervision, China's finances can never be straightened out.



















